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THE APPLIED ETHICS AID POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD POVERTY AND FAMIIfE 
A T h e s i s f o r t h e Degree o f M.A, i n P h i l o s o p h y 
W r i t t e n by-
Simon A,J. H a r t 
C o l l e g e o f St H i l d & St Bede 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Durham 
ABSTRACT 
I n essence, t h i s t h e s i s i s concerned w i t h whether m a n i f e s t gross 
I n e q u a l i t i e s i n w e a l t h and ev i d e n c e o f 15,000 deaths each day a t t r i b u t a b l e 
t o p o v e r t y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e concept o f a m o r a l l y j u s t w o r l d , and, 
i f n o t , whether t h e a f f l u e n t and those i n a p o s i t i o n o f power a re m o r a l l y 
o b l i g e d t o c h a l l e n g e t h e s t a t u s quo and p r o v i d e f o o d and s e c u r i t y f o r a l l . 
At t h e c e n t r e o f t h e debate l i e s an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f j u s t i c e . A 
su r v e y o f u t i l i t a r i a n and K a n t i a n t h e o r y l e a d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t 
n e i t h e r p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s upon which t o base one's moral 
p r i n c i p l e s and t h u s p r o p e r l y address t h e problem o f p o v e r t y and famine. 
D e s p i t e a f a i l u r e t o d i s c u s s t h e s p e c i f i c problem o f w o r l d p o v e r t y i n any 
d e t a i l , John Rawls' d o c t r i n e o f " j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s " i s found t o p r o v i d e a 
more adequate d e s c r i p t i o n o f j u s t i c e , r e c o n c i l i n g l i b e r a l and e g a l i t a r i a n 
t r a d i t i o n s , and f o r m i n g t h e t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f r o m which i s d e r i v e d an 
o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n t o b r i n g about g l o b a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o end p o v e r t y 
and g u a r a n t e e b a s i c s t a n d a r d s o f l i b e r t y and m a t e r i a l w e a l t h f o r t h e whole 
o f humanity. 
The debate about w o r l d p o v e r t y and famine n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y c e n t r e s around 
r e d l s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e and t h i s r a i s e s many q u e s t i o n s w i t h i n t h e sphere o f 
p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , g i v e n t h e i m p o r t a n t i n f l u e n c e which t h e 
b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i e t y p l a y s i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e outcome o f our l i v e s , 
R a w l s i a n j u s t i c e i s shown t o have c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e r e f o r m 
o f c o ntemporary s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s . While a 
b l u e p r i n t f o r t h e e r a d i c a t i o n o f p o v e r t y i s beyond t h e scope o f t h i s work, 
i t i s c l e a r t h a t a s o l u t i o n i s a t hand g i v e n t h e necessary p o l i t i c a l and 
moral w i l l . I n c o n c l u s i o n g l o b a l government. I t s e l f under an o b l i g a t i o n t o 
s t r i v e f o r j u s t i c e , f a r f r o m b e i n g a h u m a n i s t i c pipedream, i s seen t o be an 
end t h a t humanity i s under an o b l i g a t i o n t o achieve. 
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IHTRODUCTIOH 
" V i t h i n a decade, no c h i l d w i l l go t o bed hungry, ...no f a m i l y w i l l f e a r f a r 
i t s n e x t day's b r e a d and ...no human be i n g w i l l be s t u n t e d by 
m a l n u t r i t i o n . " ' 
Such l o f t y d e c l a r a t i o n s adapted by t h e World Food Conference i n Rome i n 1974 
have n o t been matched by deeds. I f a n y t h i n g t h e i n c i d e n c e o f a b s o l u t e 
p o v e r t y has I n c r e a s e d o v e r t h e p a s t t w e n t y years, and i s now w i d e l y 
acknowledged as, " p r o b a b l y t h e p r i n c i p a l cause o f human m i s e r y t o d a y " . ^ 
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e Food and A g r i c u l t u r a l O r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
(FAO) up t o 15,000 d e a t h s per day can be a t t r i b u t e d t o m a l n u t r i t i o n and 
a s s o c i a t e d d i s e a s e , and p r o j e c t i o n s made by t h e World Food C o u n c i l i n t h e 
mid-1980s suggested t h a t about one b i l l i o n people were c h r o n i c a l l y hungry. 
Yet i n t h e f a c e o f t h i s t h e amount o f a i d g i v e n t o d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s by 
B r i t a i n , as a p r o p o r t i o n o f GFP, has a c t u a l l y f a l l e n s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 
Famine i s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y widespread i n t h e w o r l d today. The f i r s t s e c t i o n o f 
t h i s t h e s i s w i l l be d e v o t e d t o examining t h e e x t e n t o f t h e problems 
I n v o l v e d i n p o v e r t y . The l a s t decade o r so has seen a v a s t i n c r e a s e i n 
p u b l i c awareness. The media coverage o f t h e E t h i o p i a n famine i n t h e mid-
1980s i n B r i t a i n , f o r i n s t a n c e , made a i d an i s s u e o f g r e a t p o p u l a r concern, 
a l b e i t f o r a r a t h e r b r i e f p e r i o d of time. However hunger I s more t h a n a 
t e m p o r a r y phenomenon expressed i n l o c a l i s e d a r e a s as a r e s u l t o f e c o l o g i c a l 
d i s a s t e r s . Rather i t i s a r e s u l t o f a permanent c y c l e o f p o v e r t y , s i c k n e s s 
and death. For many i n t h e T h i r d World, l i f e does not go beyond t h e e a r l y 
s t a g e s o f c h i l d h o o d , f o r t h e r e s t , l i f e i s s h o r t , u n c e r t a i n , and harsh: 
"Famine e p i s o d e s a r e o n l y t h e t i p o f an i c e b e r g whose i n v i s i b l e and l a r g e r 
p a r t i s endemic hunger and d e p r i v a t i o n : n o t a l l t h e South i s E t h i o p i a . ' " ^ 
Indeed w h i l e t o t h e c a s u a l o b s e r v e r , r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p l i g h t o f t h e poor 
w i l l p r o b a b l y evoke images o f t h e l a t e s t famine t o have been brought i n t o 
t h e home by t h e w o r l d ' s media, whether i t be Somalia, Mozambique, E t h i o p i a 
o r Bangladesh, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t a l l c o u n t r i e s i n t h e T h i r d World 
a r e p e r m a n e n t l y poor. F a c t u a l m a t t e r s such as t h i s , and whether a n y t h i n g can 
be done about i t are as i m p o r t a n t as t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s taken. 
D i a m e t r l a c a l l y opposed c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn by those s h a r i n g t h e same 
e t h i c a l p remises a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f a c t u a l c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t t h e y draw. *^  
n e v e r t h e l e s s most agree w i t h Susan George who observes t h a t : 
"Hunger may have been t h e human r a c e ' s c o n s t a n t companion, and t h e poor may 
always be w i t h us , b u t i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , one cannot tak e t h i s 
f a t a l i s t i c v i e w o f t h e f a t e o f m i l l i o n ' s o f f e l l o w c r e a t u r e s . T h e i r 
c o n d i t i o n i s n o t i n e v i t a b l e b u t i s caused by i d e n t i f i a b l e f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e 
p r o v i n c e o f r a t i o n a l , human c o n t r o l , ' " ^ 
W i t h t h i s i n mind, t h e r e s t o f t h e t h e s i s i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h what 
moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h e a f f l u e n t n a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d , or those 
I n d i v i d u a l s i n them, have to w a r d s t h e d e p r i v e d . I n a sense t h i s i s a 
r e l a t i v e l y new moral problem. Of course m i l l i o n s have d i e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e 
c o u rse o f human h i s t o r y as a r e s u l t o f sheer s t a r v a t i o n o r p o v e r t y . The Book 
o f Genesis r e c o u n t s t h e s t o r y o f seven yeaz-s o f famine " i n a l l t h e lands"''', 
and f u r t h e r examples o f p o v e r t y and famine can be f o u n d t o have o c c u r r e d i n 
e v e r y p a r t o f t h e w o r l d s i n c e t h e dawn o f c i v i l i s a t i o n . Yet d i s t a n c e appears 
t o have made a g r e a t d e a l o f d i f f e r e n c e : no one u n t i l v e r y r e c e n t l y was i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o do a n y t h i n g about f a r away deaths and so the q u e s t i o n o f a i d was 
never s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d . Consequently moral t h e o r i s t s t h r o u g h o u t most o f 
t h e l a s t two m i l l e n i a have had l i t t l e t o say on t h e i s s u e . Today however the 
means a r e a v a i l a b l e t o come t o t h e a i d o f t h e s u f f e r i n g . T h i s f a c t i n 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e d awareness f a c i l i t a t e d by g l o b a l communication 
means t h a t t h e moral q u e s t i o n cannot be i g n o r e d . 
B e f o r e t h e n a t u r e o f t h e moral o b l i g a t i o n i n v o l v e d i s examined, an 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l be made i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n between e t h i c s and p o l i t i c s , 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r i n t o whether t h e moral o b l i g a t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s are 
b i n d i n g a l s o on governments and o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h e p u b l i c domain, or 
v i c e - v e r s a . A p r i v a t e c i t i z e n may f e e l o b l i g e d t o g i v e a t e n t h o f h e r / h i s 
income away t o h e l p t h e poor i n f a r o f f c o u n t r i e s , b u t o n l y i f t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n s o f a n a t i o n s t a t e qua n a t i o n s t a t e a re t h e same w i l l t h e 
r e s u l t i n g a c t i o n have much e f f e c t . But t h e n t h e consequences would a l s o have 
a much g r e a t e r impact a t home, d o u b t l e s s l e a d i n g t o a drop i n domestic 
s t a n d a r d s o f l i v i n g a c r o s s t h e n a t i o n . 
There i s a s t r o n g t r a d i t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g which sees i t as a sphere 
where n e c e s i t y r a t h e r t h a n m o r a l i t y t a k e s precedence. Those i n t h e 
M a c h i a v e l l i a n t r a d i t i o n , such as S t u a r t Hampshire, argue t h a t p u b l i c and 
p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y must be d i s t i n c t , 
"A f a s t i d i o u s n e s s about t h e means employed, a p p r o p r i a t e i n per s o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s , i s a moral d e r e l i c t i o n i n a p o l i t i c i a n . " ' ^ 
I n t h i s s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t , a i d i s r e g a r d e d as a merely p r u d e n t i a l q u e s t i o n 
t o be c o n s i d e r e d o n l y i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s t o be gained i n 
g i v i n g o r n o t g i v i n g economic and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e needy. Yet i f 
t h i s i s t h e case t h e n e t h i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n w i l l be l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t , 
u nable t o address t h e problems o f famine and endemic p o v e r t y t h r o u g h o u t the 
T h i r d World today. However p o v e r t y seems t o be as much an e t h i c a l problem as 
any o t h e r and i t may appear i n t u i t i v e t h a t one n a t i o n has r e d i s t r i b u t i v e 
o b l i g a t i o n s t o a n o t h e r i n t h e same way as one i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e next. 
However such a q u e s t i o n cannot be s e t t l e d u n t i l a s a t i s f a c t o r y moral b a s i s 
i s f o u n d upon which one can j u s t i f i a b l y ground an o b l i g a t i o n t o h e l p the 
di s a d v a n t a g e d . The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d U a t i o n s i n t h e post-war era 
means t h a t t h e r e i s now an i n s t i t u t i o n w hich begins t o approach t h e "concept 
o f g l o b a l government"^, w i t h a concern f o r t h e w e l f a r e o f every g l o b a l 
c i t i z e n . A r t i c l e 3 o f t h e U.N. U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f Human Rights<1948) 
s t a t e s t h a t "everyone has a r i g h t t o l i f e , l i b e r t y and s e c u r i t y o f person', 
and s i m i l a r language i s f o u n d i n t h e European Convention on Human R i g h t s 
(1953) and i t s American c o u n t e r p a r t (1973). Acceptance o f such p r i n c i p l e s 
c a r r i e s w i t h i t an o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t human l i f e f r o m n a t u r a l as w e l l as 
man-made t h r e a t s . The U.N. ' D e c l a r a t i o n on S o c i a l Progress and development' 
<1969) s a n c t i o n s t h e r i g h t o f a l l persons i n a l l c o u n t r i e s t o "proper 
n u t r i t i o n " and " e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y " . " ^ I t i s t h e r e f o r e d i f f i c u l t t o 
d i s a g r e e w i t h Yoram D i n s t e i n who s t a t e s t h a t " t h e human r i g h t t o l i f e i s 
e n t r e n c h e d i n customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l law".'' 
I n t h e l a t e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ' r i g h t s ' j a r g o n i s v e r y much a t c e n t r e - s t a g e , 
and as f e a r f r o m p e r s e c u t i o n perhaps l e s s e n s i t i s n a t u r a l t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
e l i t e s , as w e l l as t h e p u b l i c a t l a r g e , f o c u s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f hunger and 
human r i g h t s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y a U.M. World Conference on Human R i g h t s , t h e 
b i g g e s t such g a t h e r i n g f o r t w e n t y - f i v e years, was h e l d i n Vienna i n June 
1993. But t h e f a c t t h a t r e a l i t y i s so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e t h e o r y ; t h a t 
d e s p i t e t h e a c q u i s t i o n o f new f o u n d r i g h t s t h e p l i g h t o f t h e poor shows no 
s i g n o f improvement, s h o u l d a l e r t one t o t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g 
t o o much on t h e ' i s ' r a t h e r t h e n t h e 'ought'. By p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y d i v o r c i n g 
p o s i t i v e law f r o m any e t h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s , " t h e system l a c k s any motive f o r 
a c t i o n o r g o a l s f o r f u t u r e development".'^ 
T h e r e f o r e w h i l e t h e p o s i t i o n o f human r i g h t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w i l l be 
b r i e f l y examined i t i s more i m p o r t a n t t o d i s c o v e r what, i f a n y t h i n g , makes 
c e r t a i n r i g h t s u n i v e r s a l , moral and i m p o r t a n t . Does e x i s t e n c e o f these 
r i g h t s a u t o m a t i c a l l y o b l i g e us t o g i v e a i d ? Or a r e t h e y merely a u s e f u l 
t o o l i n h e l p i n g t o g a i n t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n ? 
I f such r i g h t s a r e f u n d a m e n t a l i t i s necessary t o show t h a t t h e y have a more 
secure f o u n d a t i o n t h a n t h a t o f t h e b a s i s o f many i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n p o s i t i v e law. I t i s f i r s t necessary t o work out a coherent 
s e t o f p r i n c i p l e s which m i g h t address t h e 'ought' q u e s t i o n , and t o d i s c o v e r 
whether a p e r s u a s i v e s ystem o f r i g h t s , o r any o t h e r m o r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
r e a sons t o a i d t h e poor, e x i s t . 
The s u c c e e d i n g c h a p t e r s o f t h i s t h e s i s w i l l be devoted t h e r e f o r e towards 
e x a m i n i n g arguments f r o m t h e l e a d i n g s c h o o l s o f moral t h o u g h t . While a t one 
l e v e l t h e g e n e r a l adequacy o f each t h e o r y as a guide t o moral t h i n k i n g w i l l 
be assessed, a t a n o t h e r t h e i r s p e c i f i c r e l e v a n c e t o t h e debate c o n c e r n i n g 
w o r l d p o v e r t y w i l l be examined. Hence p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n w i l l be p a i d t o 
t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r human r i g h t s , t h e v a l u e o f human l i f e , n a t u r e o f 
J u s t i c e and b e n e f i c e n c e , and moral o b l i g a t i o n w i l l be e x p l o r e d . 
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m and K a n t i a n i s m w i l l be e x p l o r e d i n t u r n , and s p e c i f i c 
a t t e n t i o n w i l l be p a i d t o r e c e n t works i n each t r a d i t i o n c o n c e r n i n g w o r l d 
p o v e r t y and famine, e s p e c i a l l y t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s made by P e t e r S i n g e r and 
Onora O'Neil. C o n v i n c i n g reasons why each cannot be accepted w i l l , i t i s 
hoped, be p r o v i d e d . To d i s c o v e r an a l l embracing, o b j e c t i v e and coherent 
e t h i c a l t h e o r y w i t h o u t any f l a w s or p i t f a l l s i s p r o b a b l y beyond one's grasp. 
But one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t c r i t e r i a o f any p r i n c i p l e upon which one bases 
a d u t y t o a i d t h e famine s t r i c k e n and poor, i s t h a t i t must s a t i s f y t o a 
r e a s o n a b l y e x a c t degree b o t h t h e l e v e l o f s a c r i f i c e t h a t t h e donor c o u n t r i e s 
o r i n d i v i d u a l s a r e o b l i g e d t o make, and t o what p o i n t t h e ' v i c t i m s ' are t o 
be a i d e d . 
I n an a t t e m p t t o r e a c h t h i s g o a l p a r t i c u a l a t t e n t i o n w i l l be p a i d t o John 
Rawls' 'A Theory o f J u s t i c e ' ( 1 9 7 2 ) . The Rawlsian p r i n c i p l e o f " J u s t i c e as 
f a i r n e s s " was d e s i g n e d by Rawls t o l a y down p r i n c i p l e s o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e 
w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l c i v i l s o c i e t i e s , i g n o r i n g f o r t h e most p a r t q u e s t i o n s o f 
g l o b a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and g l o b a l j u s t i c e . However i t can be c o n v i n c i n g l y 
argued t h a t an a l t e r e d v e r s i o n o f Rawl's account can be f o r m u l a t e d a l l o w i n g 
p r i n c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e t o be produced, w i t h o u t d e s t r o y n g t h e 
coherence and a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f Rawls' o r i g i n a l argument. 
Much o f t h e debate about w o r l d hunger and p o v e r t y c e n t r e s around 
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . The m a j o r i t y o f people i n t h e T h i r d World have l e s s 
t h a n t h e y need t o l i v e i n an a c c e p t a b l e manner, but a m i n o r i t y o f t h e 
w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n , m o s t l y t h o s e i n t h e developed w o r l d , have many more 
goods t h a n t h e y a c t u a l l y need. While f o c u s s i n g on t h e dispossessed and needy 
i n t h e T h i r d World, c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l a l s o be made as t o whether t h e r e i s 
any r e a l m o r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between i n e q u a l i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e 
w o r l d and i n e q u a l i t y a t home. P o v e r t y i s n o t r e s t i c t e d t o t h e T h i r d World. 
Many pe o p l e a r e poor, and even d e f i n e d as l i v i n g i n p o v e r t y , i n t h i s c o u n t r y 
and t h e r e s t o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d w o r l d , 
" D e t e r m i n e d l y and i r r e v o c a b l y ...has come t h e modern r e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
' u n d e r c l a s s ' " , ' ^ ' 
The c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e o r no d i f f e r e n c e between p o v e r t y a t home 
or abroad i n e v i t a b l y q u e s t i o n s t h e moral s i g n i f i c a n c e o f n a t i o n a l 
b o u n d a r i e s , whether one n a t i o n might have a d u t y t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e a f f a i r s 
o f a n o t h e r , o r whether t h e autonomy o f t h e n a t i o n s t a t e i s s a c r o s a n c t . 
A c h a p t e r i n t h i s t h e s i s w i l l a l s o be devoted t o t h e i n t e r e s t i n g and 
i m p o r t a n t i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l debate. Not o n l y i s i t p e r t i n e n t t o ask whether 
r e p a r a t i o n s , over and above one's normal o b l i g a t i o n s , a r e owed by e x c o l o n i a l 
powers l i k e B r i t a i n f o r p a s t e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e T h i r d World, b u t i t i s a l s o 
e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t t o d e c i d e whether a c t i o n s t a k e n i n t h e p r e s e n t s h o u l d 
t a k e i n t o account t h e i r e f f e c t on f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s . I f i t i s de c i d e d t h a t 
t h e y do t h e n i t w i l l have f a r - r e a c h i n g e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o 
b o t h t h e f o r m and amount o f a i d g i v e n t o poor c o u n t r i e s . 
I t has been sug g e s t e d t h a t t h e t o p i c o f famine and p o v e r t y i s a r e l a t i v e l y 
new moral problem. I t i s however unusual f o r one ever t o come acr o s s an 
e n t i r e l y n o v e l e t h i c a l i s s u e . I n s t e a d i t may w e l l t u r n o u t t h a t t h e moral 
c h o i c e s a r e f a m i l i a r ones, j u s t a p p l i e d on a wi d e r s c a l e . Should i t emerge 
t h a t t h e r i c h a r e u n d e n i a b l y under a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o reduce a b s o l u t e 
p o v e r t y , however, i t might s t i l l be r e a s o n a b l e t o ask whether we can do what 
s h o u l d be done w i t h o u t c r e a t i n g a w o r l d s t a t e . Once i t i s agreed t h a t an 
o b l i g a t i o n e x i s t s t h e r e i s s t i l l much t o be di s c u s s e d , e s p e c i a l l y t h e a c t i o n 
one s h o u l d t a k e i n d i s c h a r g i n g t h i s o b l i g a t i o n . 
The acceptance o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a moral o b l i g a t i o n w i l l n o t be enough 
i t s e l f t o s e r i o u s l y c h a l l e n g e t h e p l i g h t o f t h e poor. Such i s t h e n a t u r e o f 
man t h a t " s a n c t i o n s o f law and s o c i a l p r e s s u r e " " * w i l l p r o b a b l y be always 
necessary t o ensure t h a t common s t a n d a r d s a re n o t v i o l a t e d . The c o n v i n c i n g 
arguments o f t h e moral and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r may go some way t o c r e a t i n g 
t h e l a t t e r , as de m o n s t r a t e d by t h e changing a t t i t u d e s t owards s l a v e r y and 
sexism. But g l o b a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l never occur t o any s i g n i f i c a n t degree 
u n t i l t h e r e i s a body c a p a b l e o f e n f o r c i n g i t w i t h t h e necessary l e g a l and 
p h y s i c a l s a n c t i o n s . 
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CHAPTER OITE; FACTS AMD THEORIES 
" I n t h e e a r l y 1980s, t h e mass media d r a m a t i c a l l y b r o u g h t us t h e p i c t u r e o f 
hunger f r o m A f r i c a - s t a r v i n g c h i l d r e n , s k i n and bone, w i t h t h e i r b l o a t e d 
b e l l i e s , t o o weak t o even s t a n d up. People i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d western 
c o u n t r i e s responded w i t h an o u t p o u r i n g o f fu n d s f o r famine r e l i e f . But t h e 
p e r s i s t e n t m a l n u t r i t i o n e x p e r i e n c e d by people l i v i n g I n p o v e r t y i n o t h e r 
a r e a s o f t h e w o r l d was l a r g e l y i g n o r e d . " ' 
P r e c i s e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e e x t e n t and s e v e r i t y o f p o v e r t y and famine i n t h e 
w o r l d d i f f e r v a s t l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e methods used and t h e a l l e g i a n c e s o f 
tho s e making t h e p o i n t . However t h e f a c t t h a t hunger i s widespread, and t h a t 
m i l l i o n s have d i e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s as a r e s u l t o f an inadequate d i e t i s 
i n d i s p u t a b l e . However, i n s p i t e o f t h i s , i t n o t viewed as one o f t h e most 
u r g e n t i s s u e s f a c i n g t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l community a t t h i s t ime. Though, t e n 
ye a r s a f t e r t h e World Food Conference, hundreds o f m i l l i o n s o f people were 
a f f l i c t e d by m a l n u t r i o n , P h i l i p A l s t o n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , " f o r t h e most p a r t , 
i t i s a p r o b l e m w h i c h has t o d a t e been p e r c e i v e d by most ( w e l l f e d ) p o l i c y 
makers, academics, human r i g h t s a c t i v i s t s and o t h e r s as a p a i n f u l but 
i n e v i t a b l e f a c t o f ' l i f e ' . . . " ^ L i t t l e has changed s i n c e 1984, except t h a t 
p o v e r t y p e r s i s t s and worsens, and a i d f r o m t h e a f f l u e n t c o u n t r i e s has i f 
a n y t h i n g f a l l e n . 
At one end o f t h e s p e c t r u m t h e s t a t i s t i c s e s t i m a t i n g deaths each year i n t h e 
T h i r d World a r e bad enough. The U n i t e d K a t i o n s C h i l d r e n s Fund (UNICEF) 
e s t i m a t e d t h a t i n 1984 15 m i l l i o n young c h i l d r e n d i e each year f r o m 
m a l n u t r i t i o n and r e l a t e d i n f e c t i o n . ^ I n o t h e r words t h i s amounts t o some 
40,000 c h i l d r e n each day. The UN Food and A g r i c u l t u r e O r g a n i s a t i o n (FAO) 
made a more c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t i m a t e i n t h e i r "Assessment o f t h e World Food 
S i t u a t i o n " p r e p a r e d f o r t h e 1974 World Food Conference. Some 400- 450 
m i l l i o n p eople, t h i r t y p e r c e n t o f t h e T h i r d World p o p u l a t i o n , were s a i d t o 
be m a l n o u r i s h e d . But a t t h e same t i m e a World Bank r e p o r t c a l c u l a t e d t h a t 
t h i s f i g u r e was a c t u a l l y w e l l over 900 m i l l i o n . T h i s s h o u l d be balenced by 
B r i a n Walker, iorrmr D i r e c t o r General o f OXFAM, who i n 1982 argued t h a t 
90,000 d i e each day f r o m s t a r v a t i o n and m a l n u t r i t i o n . T h i s amounts t o w e l l 
over 32,000,000 l i v e s each year. Furthermore a c c o r d i n g t o t h e U n i t e d Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) some 1.5 b i l l i o n , o u t o f a w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n o f 
5.3 b i l l i o n l i v e i n p o v e r t y . 
There i s l i t t l e p r o s p e c t t h a t an u n d i s p u t e d f i g u r e w i l l ever be agreed upon 
by a l l t h o s e concerned. What i s c l e a r however, i r r e s p e c t i v e of those 
f i g u r e s one chooses t o b e l i e v e , i s t h a t t h e s u f f e r i n g i n v o l v e d i s immense 
and t h a t i t i s no s m a l l ' p r o b l e m which w i l l go away o f i t s own accord i n 
t i m e . On t h e c o n t a r y , as a r e s u l t inter alia o f t h e p r o l o n g e d w o r l d 
r e c e s s i o n . T h i r d World Debt C r i s i s , wars i n E t h i o p i a , Sudan, Mozambique and 
El S a l v a d o r , and a f a i l u r e t o come t o terms w i t h t h e s e problems, t h e 
s i t u a t i o n i s g r a d u a l l y worsening. D u r i n g t h e 1980s hunger a c c o r d i n g t o the 
World Food C o u n c i l , I n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t h e pooorer c o u n t r i e s o f t h e 
World, f o o d consumption f a l l i n g per c a p i t a between 3 and 4 per cent i n 1987 
a l o n e . * The UNDP, argued by many t o be amongst t h e most r e l i a b l e p r o v i d e r s 
of s t a t i s t i c s , e s t i m a t e s t h a t t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n i n 114 T h i r d World 
G e n t r i e s l i v i n g a l i f e below p o v e r t y was i n 1988, 940 m i l l i o n : a r i s e o f 40 
per c e n t s i n c e 1965-70. F u r t h e r t o t h i s t h e UNDP b e l i e v e t h a t of 41 
c o u n t r i e s f o r which more d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e , 25 experienced 
an i n c r e a s e i n p o v e r t y i n t h e same years. For example i n Bangladesh t h e 
numbers r o s e f r o m 45 m i l l i o n i n 1965 t o 82 m i l l i o n i n 1988, i n Kenya f r o m 
3.5 m i l l i o n t o 9.9 m i l l i o n , and i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f r o m 12 m i l l i o n t o 23 
m i l l i o n . Morover each o f t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a p r o p o r t i o n a t e as w e l l as a b s o l u t e 
r i s e i n p o v e r t y . 
At t h e same t i m e one might, i n t h e f a c e o f t h s i n e x o r a b l e r i s e i n p o v e r t y , 
expect a i d f r o m t h e r i c h e r n a t i o n s t o be growing. I n f a c t q u i t e t h e r e v e r s e 
appears t o be o c c u r r i n g . I n 1960 t h e amount of a i d g i v e n t o T h i r d World 
C o u n t r i e s by B r i t a i n , as a p r o p o r t i o n o f GNP (Gross N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t ) , s t o o d 
a t 0.56 p e r c e n t . By 1990 i t had f a l l e n s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t o a mere 0.27 per 
c e n t . D e s p i t e t h e pledge g i v e n by a l l donor c o u n t r i e s a t t h e 1992 Rio E a r t h 
Summit Conference t o r e a c h t h e UN t a r g e t of 0.7 per c e n t "as soon as 
p o s s i b l e " t h e r e i s l i t t l e e v i d e n c e t o suggest t h a t t h e l e v e l s o f development 
a i d a r e due t o i n c r e a s e i n t h e f u t u r e . There i s even evidence t o suggest 
t h a t B r i t a i n now r e c e i v e s more t h a n i t a c t u a l l y donates f r o m t h e T h i r d 
World: 
"A landmark f o r B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e T h i r d World i n 1990 was the 
r e c o r d i n f l o w o f £6,847 m i l l i o n f r o m repayments on p r e v i o u s d e b t s by 
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . I t meant a n e t i n l o w o f f u n d s f r o m t h e poor w o r l d 
a f t e r o v e r s e a s a i d and i n v e s t m e n t s had been deducted o f £2,600 m i l l i o n . T h i s 
was t h e f i r s t t i m e f o r t h e UK t h a t repayments on p a s t l o a n s exceeded 
o f f i c i a l a i d and new l o a n s . "'^  
Indeed i n t h e p e r i o d 1983-90 payments t o t a l l i n g some £98 b i l l i o n n e t o f a l l 
a i d and new l o a n s t o t h e r i c h c o u n t r i e s i n t h e w o r l d were made by 114 T h i r d 
World C o u n t r i e s . I n r e c e n t t i m e s t h e r e f o r e t h e poor have been s u b s i d i s i n g 
t h e r i c h r a t h e r t h a n v i c e - v e r s a as i s commonly presupposed. 
B e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g any f u r t h e r i t i s w o r t h p a u s i n g i n o r d e r t o d e f i n e some o f 
t h e t e r m s which have a l r e a d y been f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d t o , and which w i l l 
c o n t i n u e t o f e a t u r e r e g u l a r l y t h r o u g h o u t t h i s e n t i r e t h e s i s . I t i s worth 
n o t i n g t h a t many terms d e a l i n g w i t h , and many d e s c r i p t i o n s o f w o r l d p o v e r t y 
and hunger a c t u a l l y embody e t h i c a l p o s i t i o n s . Since t h i s work i s p r i m a r i l y 
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e e t h i c a l i s s u e s i n v o l v e d , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o t r y 
n o t t o b e g i n w i t h t o o many assumptions and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . 
Perhaps t h e most n o t o r i o u s example i s use o f t h e word ' c h a r i t y * . " I s i t 
r i g h t o r wrong t o g i v e c h a r i t y t o those l e s s f o r t u n a t e t h a n o u r s e l v e s ?" 
T h i s i s a v e r y common way t o b e g i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s t o p i c i n layman's 
terms. Yet t h e word ' c h a r i t y ' i m p l i e s t h a t what i s done i s an a c t o f 
b e n e f i c e n c e , over and above any demands o f d u t y and j u s t i c e . An a c t o f 
' c h a r i t y ' i s viewed by a l m o s t a l l as m o r a l l y p r a i s e w o r t h y , but a t t h e same 
t i m e as s u p e r e r o g a t o r y , i n o t h e r words more t h a n can o r s h o u l d be expected. 
I t i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f many i n t h i s f i e l d , a view t o which I w i l l 
e v e n t u a l l y s u b s c r i b e , t h a t t h e t r a n s f e r o f r e s o u r c e s f r o m t h e a f f l u e n t t o 
th e poor i s i n s t e a d an a c t which i s demanded by a concept o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e . 
C onsequently r e f e r e n c e t o ' c h a r i t y ' w i l l be k e p t t o a minimum, used i n 
c o n t e x t s o n l y where i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e . I n s t e a d t h e t r a n s f e r o f r e sources 
w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as ' a i d ' i n g e n e r a l , whether i t be t h r o u g h t h e work o f 
v o l u n t a r y a i d a g e n c i e s (commonly r e f e r r e d t o as ' c h a r i t i e s ' e.g. OXFAM or 
Save t h e Childi-en>, n a t i o n a l governments, o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s such 
as t h e UN. At t i m e s i t w i l l be necessary t o be more s p e c i f i c , and t h e f o r m 
o f a i d w i l l be s p e c i f i e d e.g. f o o d a i d , g r a n t s , loans, t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
a s s i s s t a n c e and so f o r t h , b u t when t h e p r i n c i p l e i s b e i n g d i s c u s s e d t h e t e r m 
' a i d ' w i l l be employed, i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t i t does not c a r r y w i t h i t t o o 
many p r e c o n c e p t i o n s and subconcious i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
S i m i l a r y t h e use o f group nouns t o d e s c r i b e numbers o f c o u n t r i e s l i n k e d 
t o g e t h e r by a f f l u e n c e o r p o v e r t y , b u t o t h e r w i s e heterogeneous, has been 
w i d e l y c r i t i c i s e d . P e t e r Berger argues t h a t t h e l a r g e l y r i c h West has been 
engaged i n "a s o r t o f n e g a t i v e baptism""-' towards t h e p o o r e r c o u n t r i e s . Terms 
such as " t h e l e s s c i v i l i s e d " , "underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s " , " d e v e l o p i n g 
c o u n t r i e s " t e n d t o suggest, argues O ' N e i l l among o t h e r s , t h a t t h e problems 
of t h e poor a r e a consequence o f a l a c k o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , o r 'normal' 
economic achievement. Morover such terms a l s o suggest t h a t t h e problems o f 
th e p o o r e r n a t i o n s a r e a l l o f one n a t u r e . W h i l s t t h i s i s t r u e i n s o f a r as 
p o v e r t y and hunger a f f e c t s them a l l , t h e deeper problems which cause such 
symtoms cannot be so e a s i l y l a b e l l e d under one heading. 
I t has a l r e a d y been p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n many cases t h e problems o f t h e poor 
c o u n t r i e s o f t h i s w o r l d a re g r o w i n g worse. T h e r e f o r e , as Susan George p o i n t s 
out-', t o d e s c r i b e them as " d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s " (D.C.s) i s i n a c c u r a t e , as 
w e l l as e u p h e m i s t i c . Since t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e Brandt Report i n 1980 t h e 
use o f phrases such as "Morth-South problems", has g a i n e d c u r r e n c y . Such 
phrases a r e des i g n e d t o s t r e s s t h e a c t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
"developed" c o u n t r i e s ( m o s t l y Western; N o r t h America and Europe, b o t h East 
and West, t o g e t h e r w i t h Japan and a few o t h e r s such as A u s t r a l i a and New 
Zealand) w i t h t h e problems o f t h e poor. On t h e whole, however, t h e terms 
most f r e q u e n t l y employed w i l l be " r i c h " and "poor" n a t i o n s , and where more 
c o n v e n i e n t " T h i r d World" and t h e "West". 
The d e f i n i t i o n o f an i n a d e q u a t e d i e t must a l s o be c l a r i f e d . The FAO 
i n i t i a l l y employed t h e t e r m " u n d e r n u t r i o n " t o d e s c r i b e an inadequate i n t a k e 
o f c a l o r i e s , o r energy. On t h e o t h e r hand " m a l n u t r i t i o n " was used t o 
d e s c r i b e a d e f i c i e n t d i e t , l a c k i n g v i t a l amounts o f p r o t e i n , v i t a m i n s or 
m i n e r a l s . However f o r t h e sake o f s i m p l i c i t y , t h e t e r m " m a l n u t r i o n " w i l l be 
employed i n t h i s t h e s i s t o d e s c r i b e a d e f i c i e n t d i e t , whether i t i s a r e s u l t 
o f a l a c k o f c a l o r i e s , p r o t e i n o r a n y t h i n g e l s e . I t i s I m p o r t a n t t o bear i n 
mind t h a t v e r y o f t e n i l l n e s s and even d e a t h can be caused as much by l a c k o f 
a v a r i e d d i e t , as by t h e l a c k o f enough c a l o r i e s i n g e n e r a l . 
A s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s i s t h e problem o f d e f i n i n g " p o v e r t y " . Robert McNamara, 
f o r m e r P r e s i d e n t o f t h e World Bank, d e s c r i b e d p o v e r t y as: 
"A c o n d i t i o n o f l i f e so l i m i t e d by m a l n u t r i t i o n , i l l i t e r a c y , d isease, h i g h 
I n f a n t m o r t a l i t y , and low l i f e expectancy as t o be below any r a t i o n a l 
d e f i n i t i o n o f human decency.""^' 
On t h e o t h e r hand a more w i d e l y a c c e p t e d d e f i n i t i o n i s t h a t advanced by Adam 
Smith i n 1776, who d e s c r i b e d p o v e r t y t o be: 
"Whatever t h e custom o f t h e c o u n t r y r e n d e r s i t t o be i n d e c e n t f o r c r e d i t a b l e 
p eople, o f t h e l o w e s t o r d e r , t o be w i t h o u t . " ' ' 
B e f o r e e x a m i n i n g t h e s e two c o n c e p t i o n s o f p o v e r t y i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l , i t i s 
f i r s t w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t p o v e r t y must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m famine. Araartya 
Sen d e s c r i b e s famine as a "sudden c o l l a p s e o f t h e l e v e l o f f o o d 
consumption"'*' and c i t e s v a r i o u s examples such as t h e I r i s h p o t a t o famine o f 
1845-51 which k i l l e d one f i f t h o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f I r e l a n d , and t h e 
famine i n Bangladesh i n 1973/4. I t i s o n l y perhaps w o r t h a d d i n g t h a t such 
f a l l s i n f o o d consumption e x c l u d e those which a re s e l f - i m p o s e d . Sen f u r t h e r 
n o t e s t h a t . 
"Famines i m p l y s t a r v a t i o n , b u t n o t v i c e versa. And s t a r v a t i o n i m p l i e s 
p o v e r t y , b u t n o t v i c e versa. I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r p o v e r t y t o e x i s t , and be 
r e g a r d e d as a c u t e , even when no s e r i o u s s t a r v a t i o n occurs. " '=^  
Indeed w h i l s t many thousands d i e i n famines, hundreds o f thousands d y i n g o f 
s t a r v a t i o n i n t h e m i d - e i g h t i e s i n A f r i c a whex-e famine i s s a i d t o have been 
s e r i o u s I n a t l e a s t t w e n t y - f o u r c o u n t r i e s , d e s p i t e t h e f o c u s o f a t t e n t i o n 
upon E t h i o p i a a l o n e ; many more s u f f e r i l l n e s s , m a l n u t r i t i o n , and an e a r l y 
d e a t h t h r o u g h t h e e f f e c t s o f p o v e r t y e v e r y day t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d . 
D e f i n i t i o n s o f p o v e r t y can be grouped under two headings. Those such as 
McNamara a t t e m p t t o d e s c r i b e p o v e r t y as an " a b s o l u t e " concept, wheras o t h e r s 
i n t h e S m i t h i a n t r a d i t i o n v i e w p o v e r t y more as a " r e l a t i v e " concept. Seebohn 
Rowntree i n a s t u d y o f p o v e r t y i n York a t t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y d e f i n e d 
those i n p o v e r t y as t h o s e whose " t o t a l e a r n i n g s a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o o b t a i n 
t h e minimum n e c e s s i t i e s f o r t h e maintenance o f merely p h y s i c a l 
e f f i c i e n c y . " " ' ' I n common w i t h McNamara, Rowntree approaches p o v e r t y f r o m a 
b i o l o g i c a l aspect. Such an approach, however, does have i t s drawbacks. For a 
s t a r t d i e t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y w i t h p h y s i c a l f a c t o r s , c l i m a t i c 
c o n d i t i o n s and work h a b i t s . Morover t h e c o s t o f one's minimum f o o d 
r e q u i r e m e n t s can be e x t r e m e l y low, y e t such a d i e t would be e x t r e m e l y b o r i n g 
and f o o d h a b i t s a r e n o t d e t e r m i n e d i n t h i s way. Furthermore i t i s f a r l e s s 
easy t o d e f i n e non-food r e q u i r e m e n t s i n such a way. 
However w h i l e such a concept o f p o v e r t y , i s loose and p r o b a b l y n o t i d e a l , 
t h e r e i s , "no reason t o suppose t h a t t h e concept o f p o v e r t y must i t s e l f be 
c l e a r c u t and sharp" Sen p o i n t s o u t t h a t i n i t s f a v o u r i s t h e one s i m p l e 
c r i t e r i o n when a s s e s s i n g p o v e r t y i s t o check whether a person i s meeting h i s 
o r her n u t r i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , something which can be done w i t h o u t g o i n g 
t h r o u g h t h e medium o f income l e v e l . F urthermore w h i l e m a l n u t r i t i o n 
r e p r e s e n t s o n l y one s i d e o f p o v e r t y , i t i s e x t r e n e l y i m p o r t a n t : 
" m a l n u t r i t i o n must have a c e n t r a l p l a c e i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f p o v e r t y . "^ '^  
The concept o f " r e l a t i v e p o v e r t y " i s w i d e l y employed. P e t e r Townsend 
d e s c r i b e s t h e poor as t h o s e who "are unable t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a c t i v i t i e s 
and have t h e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s and a m e n i t i e s which are customary i n t h a t 
s o c i e t y . " ' ^ Most would agree t h a t p o v e r t y i s c u l t u r a l l y s p e c i f i c t o each 
c o u n t r y and t h a t t o c r e a t e a u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t a b l e p o v e r t y l i n e i s not 
p o s s i b l e . Indeed t o d i s a s s o c i a t e " f e e l i n g s o f p o v e r t y " f r o m " c o n d i t i o n s o f 
p o v e r t y " i s an a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e t a s k . One's sense o f p o v e r t y w i l l 
d o u b t l e s s l y be p a r t l y formed by v i e w i n g o t h e r s i n one's community w i t h which 
one compares o n e s e l f . Morover i t w i l l a l s o be r e l a t e d t o one's e x p e c t a t i o n s 
of what i s b o t h r i g h t and f a i r . The l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s o f t h e poor i n 
c o u n t r i e s l i k e B r i t a i n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s o n l y i n v e r y i s o l a t e d cases 
comparable t o t h a t o f many i n A f r i c a , y e t i t cannot be d e n i e d t h a t p o v e r t y 
i s w i d e s p r e a d i n both c o u n t r i e s . Townsend p o i n t s o u t t h a t , " m o r t a l i t y r a t e s 
f o r males i n Harlem a r e c u r r e n t l y worse t h a n i n Bangladesh."'^ E s t i m a t e s 
f o r t h o s e l i v i n g i n p o v e r t y i n Canada i n 1982 ranged f r o m 17 per cent 
( S t a t i t i c Canada) t o 25 p e r c e n t (Canadian C o u n c i l on S o c i a l Development)^"^ 
Much o f t h i s i s caused by an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h and gross 
i n e q u a l i t i e s i n income, a f a c t o f l i f e i n most o f t h e West. Between 1979 and 
1989 t h e r e a l d i s p o s a b l e income o f t h e r i c h e s t 20 per c e n t rose by £5,304, 
a t 1989 p r i c e s , wheras t h a t o f t h e p o o r e s t 10 per c e n t f e l l by £208. 
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However w h i l s t t h e " r e l a t i v e " approach d e f i n i t l y supplements any more 
o b j e c t i v e approach i t cannot r e p l a c e i t . P o v e r t y and i n e q u a l i t y are c l o s e l y 
a l i g n e d b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s d i s t i n c t . There i s a p o w e r f u l case f o r r e t a i n i n g , 
t o some e x t e n t , a more b i o l o g i c a l approach: 
"Indeed, t h e r e i s a i r r e d u c i b l e c o r e of a b s o l u t e d e p r i v a t i o n i n our ide a o f 
p o v e r t y , which t r a n s l a t e s r e p o r t s o f s t a r v a t i o n , m a l n u t r i t i o n and v i s i b l e 
h a r d s h i p i n t o a d i a g n o s i s o f p o v e r t y w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o a s c e r t a i n f i r s t t h e 
r e l a t i v e p i c t u r e . " ^ ' 
The e x i s t e n c e o f endemic p o v e r t y i s beyond d i s p u t e . More c o n t r o v e r s i a l , 
however, i s whether i t can be a v o i d e d and, i f so, what measures might 
e l i m i n a t e , o r p a r t i a l l y e l i m i n a t e , t h e problem o f p o v e r t y f r o m t h e face of 
t h i s e a r t h . Some q u e s t i o n whether t h e e a r t h can c o n t i n u e t o su p p o r t a 
r a p i d l y r i s i n g p o p u l a t i o n , o r whether w e s t e r n s t a n d a r d s o f l i v i n g can be 
extended t o a l l a r e a s o f t h e w o r l d . Others b e l i e v e t h a t a l l a t t e m p t s t o 
e r a d i c a t e p o v e r t y w i l l be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e , l e a d i n g t o an i n c r e a s e i n 
p o p u l a t i o n and y e t more hungry mouths demanding t o be f e d . On t h e o t h e r hand 
o t h e r s a r e l e s s p e s s i m i s t i c about t h e s i t u a t i o n . Even i f t h e r e a re l i m i t s t o 
t h e amount o f f o o d t h a t can be produced, much i f n o t a l l o f t h e p o v e r t y 
t o d a y c o u l d be e r a d i c a t e d by j u d i c i o u s r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f res o u r c e s , a t t a i n e d 
t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l and economic change. A su r v e y o f these i s s u e s i s 
e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t , f o r i f th o s e who are most p e s s i m i s t i c are i n f a c t 
c o r r e c t , " e t h i c a l r e a s o n i n g , which i s t o t h e p o i n t o n l y where a c t i o n can 
make a d i f f e r e n c e , c o u l d have few i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r famine or hunger."^^ 
The 1970s saw famine and p e r s i s t e n t hunger become an i s s u e o f he i g h t e n e d 
p u b l i c awareness f o l l o w i n g t h e o i l p r i c e boom i n 1973, famine i n Bangladesh 
and t h e Sahel i n 1973/4 and t h e World Food Conference i n 1974. At t h e same 
t i m e Neo-Malthusian t h e o r i e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e i s s u e were advanced by many. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r Paul E l r i c h ' s "The P o p u l a t i o n Bomb"(1971), G a r r e t Hardin's 
" L i f e b o a t E t h i c s : The Case A g a i n s t H e l p i n g t h e Poor"(1974), and "The L i m i t s 
o f Growth"(1972) by Meadows e t a l . were e s p e c i l l y i n f l u e n t i a l . 
The Neo-Malthuslans d i f f e r i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , b u t as a group take 
t h e i r name f r o m t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y p o l i t i c a l economist Thomas Malthus, 
who i n 1798 p u b l i s h e d h i s "Essay on t h e P r i n c i p l e o f P o p u l a t i o n " . His 
p r i m a r y p o i n t was t h a t , " p o p u l a t i o n , when unchecked, i n c r e a s e s i n a 
g e o m e t r i c a l r a t i o . S u b s i s t e n c e i n c r e a s e s o n l y i n an a r i t h m e t i c a l r a t i o " . 
I n o t h e r words Ma l t h u s b e l i e v e d t h a t u n r e s t r i c t e d p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h would be 
f a s t e r t h a n g r o w t h i n f o o d s u p p l i e s , c o n s e q u e n t l y l e a d i n g t o hunger and 
famine. Many i n t h e n e x t hundred y e a r s or so t h o u g h t e v e n t s had proved him 
wrong. The s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g and a v a i l a b i l i t y o f f o o d has c e r t a i n l y 
improved v a s t l y s i n c e 1798 i n many c o u n t r i e s . However most Neo-Malthuslans 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s cannot be s u s t a i n e d , and t h a t t h e s t a r v a t i o n so p r e v e l a n t 
i n t h e w o r l d t o d a y prove him a l l t o o r i g h t . 
The r a p i d r i s e i n p o p u l a t i o n i n many T h i r d World c e n t u r i e s i s regarded by 
t h e Neo-Malthusian s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t as a bomb which cannot be defused. 
E l r i c h argued i n "The P o p u l a t i o n Bomb" t h a t hundreds o f m i l l i o n s would d i e 
i n t h e 1970s due t o o v e r p o p u l a t i o n and a consequent l a c k o f food. I t was h i s 
vie w t h a t t h e T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s would remain poor u n l e s s t h e i r 
p o p u l a t i o n s were c o n t r o l l e d . Food a i d , he argues, s h o u l d be g i v e n t o those 
c o u n t r i e s w i t h a comprehensive b i r t h c o n t r o l programme. The i n f l u e n t i a l 
M a l t h u s i a n Club o f Rome Report-^'^ p r e d i c t e d s e r i o u s l a n d s h o r t a g e s by t h e 
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year 2000, and t h a t t h e l i m i t t o g l o b a l g r o w t h would be reached w i t h i n a 
hundred y e a r s . 
Kost Neo-Malthusians b e l i e v e t h a t Malthus' p r e d i c t i o n was postponed by two 
f a c t o r s . F i r s t l y t h e d i s c o v e r y o f v i r g i n l a n d o u t s i d e Europe i n t h e New 
World i s s a i d t o have absorped s u r p l u s p o p u l a t i o n . Secondly t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n 
o f f o s i l f u e l s , m i n e r a l s and t h e d i s c o v e r y o f o f new t e c h n o l o g y i s s a i d t o 
have c r e a t e d a "myth o f l i m i t l e s s n e s s " ^ ^ However t h e Neo-Malthusians p o i n t 
o u t t h a t f i n i t e s u p p l i e s o f f o s i l f u e l s a r e b e g i n n i n g t o r u n o u t , and t h a t 
t h e r e i s no g uarantee t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l advance can be s u s t a i n e d . Morover 
t h e problems caused by p o l l u t i o n and d e c l i n i n g y i e l d s p r e s e n t f u r t h e r 
o b s t a c l e s w h i c h must be overcome i f s u s t a i n e d g r o w t h i s t o be achieved. 
The w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n s t o o d a t a p p r o x i m a t l y 4.72 b i l l i o n i n 1985. By t h e 
y e a r 2000 i t i s e x p e c t e d t o exceed 6 b i l l i o n , and f i n a l l y s t a b i l i s e a t about 
10.1 b i l l i o n by t h e y e a r 2045. Furthermore t h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n p o p u l a t i o n 
w i l l t a k e p l a c e m a i n l y i n t h e p o o r e s t p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d . The p o p u l a t i o n o f 
I n d i a i s e x p e c t e d t o r i s e f r o m 765 m i l l i o n i n 1985 t o 1,678 m i l l i o n i n 2045, 
t h e N i g e r i a n p o p u l a t i o n f r o m 100 m i l l i o n t o 529 m i l l i o n , and t h e Chinese 
p o p u l a t i o n f r o m 1,040 m i l l i o n t o 1,683 m l l l i o n ^^'' I n t h e 1970s one h e c t a r e 
o f l a n d was r e q u i r e d t o s u p p o r t an average o f 2.6 persons, by t h e year 2000 
t h e same amount o f l a n d w i l l have t o s u p p o r t 4 persons, and by 2045 many 
more. P o p u l a t i o n c o n t r o l i s t h e r e f o r e seen as t h e key t o a v o i d i n g famine by 
most Neo-Malthusians. Famine i t i s t h o u g h t can be m i n i m i s e d by b r i n g i n g t h e 
r a t e o f p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h down below t h e r a t e o f a c h i e v a b l e economic growth. 
B i r t h c o n t r o l measures, i n t h e f o r m o f s t e r i l i s a t i o n o r c o n t r a c e p t i o n i s 
c a l l e d f o r u r g e n t l y i n a l l p a r t s o f t h e T h i r d World. 
Other Neo-Malthusians, however, b e l i e v e t h a t famine and p o v e r t y cannot be 
a v o i d e d by such means. Not o n l y i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u s t a i n e d economic 
g r o w t h doubted, b u t a l s o i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t a t t e m p t s t o c u r b f e r t i l i t y w i l l 
be u n s u c c e s s f u l . C o n t r a c e p t i v e measures are p o o r l y understood, and l a c k 
r e l i a b i l i t y . Morover t h e y a r e b o t h d i f f i c u l t t o use and expensive f o r those 
l i v i n g i n p o v e r t y . P s y c h o l o g i c a l o b t a c l e s a l s o s t a n d i n t h e way o f such 
p r o g r e s s . I n t h e minds o f many Neo-Malthusians famine and p o v e r t y i s 
i n e v i t a b l e , and i n a sense t h e r e d u c t i o n o f p o p u l a t i o n by s t a r v a t i o n i s t h e 
o n l y f a c t o r which p r e v e n t s g l o b a l d i s a s t e r f r o m o c c u r r r i n g sooner. T h i s i s 
how t h e most p e s s i m i s t i c Neo-Malthusians, such as G a r r e t H a r d i n , see t h e 
s i t u a t i o n a t l e a s t . The e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s approach w i l l be 
examined i n Chapter 4. 
The N e o - M a l t h u s i a n appraoch i s n o t s h a r e d by a l l . C r i t i c s f r o m d i v e r s e 
backgrounds have been q u i c k t o p o i n t o u t t h e f l a w s i n t h e Neo-Malthusian 
argument. Orthodox economists, dominant i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as t h e World 
Bank and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund (IMF), M a r x i s t s , and r a d i c a l 
p o l i t i c a l e c onomists l i k e Susan George a l l t a k e d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s o f view 
c o n c e r n i n g p o v e r t y and famine and o f f e r t h e i r own s o l u t i o n s . To o f f e r a 
b l u e p r i n t f o r t h e e r a d i c a t i o n o f p o v e r t y i s beyond t h e scope o f t h i s t h e s i s 
and w a r r e n t s a major work o f i t s own. I t i s more i m p o r t a n t , a t t h i s stage, 
s i m p l y t o r e a c h t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t s o l u t i o n s are a t hand; and t h a t g i v e n 
t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l , p o v e r t y can by one means o r a n o t h e r be e r a d i c a t e d . 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t mentioned above are v i r t u a l l y 
u n i t e d i n t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t t h e Neo-Malthusians a r e mistaken t o t h i n k t h a t 
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an improvement i n t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g can be a c h i e v e d by l i m i t i n g 
p a p u l a t i o n growth. I t i s commonly n o t e d t h a t i n t h e West a demographic 
t r a n s i t i o n t o o k p l a c e , r e d u c i n g t h e average f a m i l y s i z e and o v e r a l l 
p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h , f o l l o w i n g an improvement i n t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . 
Economic g r o w t h w i l l l e a d t o a h a l t i n t h e r a p i d r i s e i n p o p u l a t i o n r a t h e r 
t h a n v i c e v e r s a . W h i l s t f a m i l i e s remain poor, t h e y have a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t i n 
l a r g e f a m i l i e s s i n c e t h e y p r o v i d e i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t t h e i r p a r e n t s ' o l d age 
o r s i c k n e s s , and b e g i n e a r n i n g money and a d d i n g t o t h e f a m i l y income f r o m an 
e a r l y age. 
C r i t i c s o f t h e Neo-Malthusians are more d i v i d e d about t h e c o r r e c t s t r a t e g y 
f o r g r o w t h which i s needed t o b r i n g about an en v i s a g e d demographic 
t r a n s i t i o n i n t h e T h i r d World, and e s p e c i a l l y about t h e p a r t which 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n needs t o p l a y i n t h i s . 
The o r t h o d o x p o s i t i o n o f t h e World Bank i s t y p i f i e d by t h e 1981 p o l i c y 
s t a t e m e n t on A f r i c a e n t i t l e d " A c c e l e r a t e d Development i n Sub-Saharan 
A f r i c a " The Bank recommended a r e d u c t i o n o f s t a t e spending on f o o d 
s u b s i d i e s and o t h e r b a s i c human needs, reduced emphasis on f o o d s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n c y , s t r e s s i n g i n s t e a d t h e " c o m p a r a t i v e advantage" o f e x p o r t i n g cash 
c r o p s , and o v e r a l l " f r e e i n g o f t h e market". I t i s h e l d i n o r t h o d o x c i r c l e s 
t h a t o n l y a minimum programme f o r hunger i s needed, i n c l u d i n g a c o n t i n u a t i o n 
of l o a n s and a i d t o f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . Food a i d would o n l y be r e q u i r e d where 
famines were t a k i n g p l a c e . A b a s i c f a i t h i s p l a c e d i n t h e s o - c a l l e d 
" f r e e m a r k e t " system, and as a r u l e d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m or 
any o t h e r t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e o u t s i d e t h e c a p i t a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i s r e j e c t e d . 
More r a d i c a l e c o n o m i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t problems a r e caused as much 
by t h e e x i s t i n g c a p i t a l i s t s y stem as a n y t h i n g e l s e : 
" T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s can go i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n u n t i l h e l l f r e e z e s 
and hunger w i l l remain, f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n w i l l go t o those who a l r e a d y have 
p l e n t y - t o t h e developed w o r l d o r t o t h e w e a l t h y i n t h e T h i r d World 
i t s e l f . . . e v e r y t i m e weaker n a t i o n s have a t t e m p t e d t o r e a l l o c a t e t h e i r 
r e s o u r c e s and u n d e r t a k e l a n d r e f o r m , p o w e r f u l i n t e r e s t s emanating f r o m t h e 
r i c h w o r l d and i t s m u l t i l a t e r a l b o d i e s have t h w a r t e d t h e i r e f f o r t s . 
At t h e h e a r t o f t h e m a t t e r i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e e x i s t g r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s 
of w e a l t h , income and i n f l u e n c e . Poor c o u n t r i e s a r e s a i d t o be e x p l o i t e d by 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s , who c o n t r o l much o f t h e l a n d , and Western 
governments. Poor c o u n t r i e s are a r e f o r c e d t o c u l t i v a t e cash c r o p s and s e l l 
much o f t h e f o o d t h a t t h e y produce t o e a r n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c y i n o r d e r t o 
repay f o r e i g n l o a n s . Warnock p a i n t s o u t t h a t a consequence o f t h i s i s t h a t , 
"The poor i n t h e T h i r d World, t h e r e f o r e , a r e unable t o f e e d themselves, 
because t h e y do n o t have access t o t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s " . There i s 
t h e r e f o r e an u r g e n t need f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h and resources. By 
common consent, t h e r e i s enough f o o d i n t h e w o r l d t o f e e d t h e p r e s e n t 
p o p u l a t i o n . The f o o d s u r p l u s e s o f t h e West are c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e 
d e p r i v a t i o n and s c a r c i t y i n t h e T h i r d World: 
"The w o r l d has ample f o o d , t h e g r o w t h o f g l o b a l f o o d p r o d u c t i o n has been 
f a s t e r t h a n t h e unprecedented p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h o f t h e p a s t 40 years."®^ 
"...Some d i s a s t e r s a s i d e . . . t h e b a s i c problem i s n o t one of food, but 
p o v e r t y . "^ '^  
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R e d i s t r i b u t i o n , on a l a r g e s c a l e t h a t i s needed, w i l l o n l y come about as a 
r e s u l t o f s o c i a l and economic change. There i s disagreement about t h e 
p r e c i s e measures demanded, b u t agreement t h a t a c t i o n w i t h i n contemporary 
economic s t r u c t u r e s w i l l n o t be s u f f i c i e n t . Indeed most o r t h o d o x economists 
a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l a l s o have t o be 
t a c k l e d . O ' N e i l l s t a t e s t h a t , "On e i t h e r v i e w t h e r e d u c t i o n and remedy o f 
hunger and p o v e r t y demand enormous economic and p o l i t i c a l changes."^® 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o s t r e s s t h a t p o v e r t y and famine a r e s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s . 
Most p e o p l e do n o t d i e f r o m s t a r v a t i o n caused by l a c k o f food. I n s t e a d 
p remature d e a t h s a r e caused by p e r s i s t e n t p o v e r t y , r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e l a c k 
o f a b a l e n c e d d i e t , e d u c a t i o n , access t o h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
and employment. There i s agreement t h a t adequate f o o d s u p p l i e s are b e i n g 
produced i n t h e w o r l d t o n o u r i s h everybody. The c e n t r a l i s s u e i s t h e r e f o r e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . Food a i d , by I t s e l f however, e x c e p t I n cases o f extreme need 
caused by famine o r c i v i l war, i s u s u a l l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . Tony Jackson 
argues p e r s u a s i v e l y t h a t , "Free hand-outs o f f o o d do not address t h e 
problem, t h e y a g g r a v a t e t t " . ^ ^ ' ' ' - U nless f o o d a i d i s c o n t r o l l e d c a r e f u l l y i t 
t e n d s t o c r e a t e a dependence upon i m p o r t e d commodoities, t o d e s t r o y l o c a l 
m a r k e t s and t h e l i v e l y h o o d s o f l o c a l f a r m e r s and t h u s work a g a i n s t 
development. R e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h , n o t j u s t f o o d , i s t h e r e f o r e c a l l e d 
f o r . I n a w o r l d where much o f t h e w e a l t h o f t h e West has been b u i l t upon t h e 
e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s and l a b o u r o f t h e T h i r d World, t h i s 
f o r many more r a d i c a l t h i n k e r s i s a demand o f j u s t i c e . 
CHAPTER TWO: ETHICS AND POLITICS 
"Ceux qui voudront t r a i t e r s6par6ment l a p o l i t i q u e et l a morale n'entendront 
Jamais r i e n k aucune de deux."' 
" I n d i v i d u a l i s t assumptions p e r s i s t i n e t h i c a l theory, although i t i s widely 
acknowledged t h a t i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n and e f f o r t s alone are u n l i k e l y t o bring 
an end t o hunger or t o poverty."^ 
I f estimates by the World Bank t h a t 40 per cent of the population i n the 
Thi r d World (something l i k e one b i l l i o n people) l i v e i n absolute poverty are 
at a l l accurate then i t should appear obvious t h a t the e f f o r t s , however 
strenuous, by p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s alone w i l l not be enough t o bri n g about 
any s i g n i f i c a n t change t o the s i t u a t i o n . I f one i s serious about t a c k l i n g 
problems faced, i t appears t h a t concerted a c t i o n on behalf of more powerful 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i s necessary. 
" . . . i n t h i s day and age, e s p e c i a l l y , i s o l a t e d acts of c h a r i t y on an 
i n d i v i d u a l basis, or even extensive and moderatly popular s o l i c i t a t i o n s such 
as those made by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Red Cross must be rather i n e f f e c t i v e by 
comparison w i t h the p o t e n t i a l of government a c t i o n . . . " ^ 
The work of the leading a i d agencies i s of course very important. 
Organisations such as OXFAM, Save the Children and CARE, funded l a r g e l y 
through i n d i v i d u a l v o l u n t a r y donations, work t i r e l e s s l y throughout the Third 
World b r i n g i n g short-term r e l i e f t o areas s t r i c k e n w i t h famine, and more 
im p o r t a n t l y , educating peasants t o fend f o r themselves, g i v i n g them the know 
how t o avoid calamity i n the f u t u r e . Yet such programmes only a f f e c t the t i p 
of the iceberg of world poverty as a whole. M i l l i o n s a t any poin t are 
probably a f f e c t e d by famine (where the emergency r e l i e f of the a i d agencies 
remains the most v i s i b l e ) . But many times t h i s number s u f f e r i n a st a t e of 
p e r s i s t e n t poverty a t the same time, as i s h i g h l i g h t e d i n the previous 
chapter. Despite t h e i r valuable work i n the f i e l d of long term development, 
t h i s i s a s t a t e of a f f a i r s which the voluntary a i d agencies are l a r g e l y 
unable t o change s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Moreover although the amount of money that 
they c o n t r o l has grown, i t i s s t i l l a f r a c t i o n of t h a t already given by 
governments. For example i n the year up t o 1991 OXFAMdJK/Ireland) received 
an income of $124 m i l l i o n i n comparison w i t h t o t a l UK government a i d of 
$2,587 m i l l i o n . * l o t only t h e r e f o r e i s the money given by p r i v a t e 
i n d i v i d u a l s not enough t o contain the most obvious symtoms of poverty i n the 
world, but i t i s also not l i k e l y t o lead t o a cure f o r the causes. The 
contemporary s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n s t i t u t i o n a l power i s recognised by Thomas 
Nagel: 
"The growth of p o l i t i c a l power has introduced a scale of massacre and 
d e s p o l i a t i o n t h a t make the e f f o r t s of p r i v a t e c r i m i n a l s , p i r a t e s and bandits 
seem t r u l y modest."*^ 
Indeed not only does the scale of poverty c a l l f o r concerted government 
a c t i o n , but also the nature of the problem suggests t h a t government a c t i o n 
alone i s equipped p r o p e r l y t o deal w i t h i t . As discussed i n Chapter One, 
r e a l s o l u t i o n s w i l l only be found through economic and p o l i t i c a l change. 
Western governments continue t o demand repayment of a l l previous loans, 
causing T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s t o gear production towards the export market 
and valuable f o r e i g n currency. Powerful groups want food prices t o remain at 
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s c a r c i t y - v a l u e l e v e l s , and m u l t i n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s wish t o grow crops 
cheaply and s e l l them a t i n f l a t e d l e v e l s t o the r i c h West. Susan George's 
comment i s t h a t the goal of the West, " i s not, and never was, t o feed 
today's undernourished or s t a r v i n g m i l l i o n s , but t o perpetuate poverty and 
dependence f o r a l t o g e t h e r ' v a l i d ' p o l i t i c a l and economic reasons."® 
However while moral o b l i g a t i o n s are taken s e r i o u s l y by most i n d i v i d u a l s , 
despite the lack of concensus about what p r e c i s e l y they e n t a i l , there i s f a r 
less agreement about whether the same s o r t of o b l i g a t i o n s are binding on 
governments and other i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the p u b l i c domain. Moral reasoning i s 
considered by many t o be an i n t r i n s i c a l l y personal matter: an A r i s t o t e l i a n 
s t r u g g l e w i t h one's desires i n p u r s u i t of v i r t u e perhaps. Moreover there i s 
a s t r o n g t r a d i t i o n which sees p o l i t i c s as a sphere where necessity r a t h e r 
than m o r a l i t y takes precedence. I t i s w e l l known, f o r instance, t h a t Niccolo 
M a c h i a v e l l i argued t h a t , "...no considerations of j u s t i c e or i n j u s t i c e , 
humanity and c r u e l t y , nor of g l o r y or of shame, should be allowed t o 
p r e v a i l . " ^ This appears t o be very much the order of the day i n practice. 
Many of the leading US statesmen at the time of the Vietnam War, responsible 
f o r the k i l l i n g of hundreds of thousands of innocent c i v i l i a n s , continued t o 
hold high o f f i c e a f t e r t h e i r p a r t i n such a t t r o c i t i e s had been exposed. 
Robert McNamara became president of the World Bank and the secretary of 
defense, E l l i o t Richardson, became attorney general.*^ Yet i f m o r a l i t y i s 
divorced from p o l i t i c s then e t h i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n i s unable t o address the 
problems of famine and endemic poverty throughout the developing world 
today. 
Much e t h i c a l reasoning i s guided towards an audience of i n d i v i d u a l agents, 
r a t h e r than c o l l e c t i v i t i e s such as governments or m u l t i n a t i o n a l 
corporations. I t i s o f t e n assumed t h a t moral p r i n c i p l e s apply, and are 
supposed t o guide, i n d i v i d u a l human beings alone. By the same token the 
a c t i v i t i e s of i n s t i t u t i o n s and c o l l e c t i v i t i e s are by d e f i n i t i o n only 
concerned w i t h f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r r o l e , such as f u r t h e r i n g the 
i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r c i t i z e n s or shareholders. But i f t h i s i s the case then 
there i s no place f o r the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth by governments through 
the i m p o s i t i o n of t a x a t i o n f o r the sake of moral ends. However most would 
t h i n k i t s e l f evident t h a t i t i s r i g h t and proper f o r goverments t o do j u s t 
t h i s . 
While moral agents are fundamentally I n d i v i d u a l beings, l a r g e r I n s t i t u t i o n s 
such as s t a t e s are also moral agents i n a sense since they are composed of 
I n d i v i d u a l s , and can act only through the actions of persons. Thus the 
a c t i o n s of a s t a t e might be expected t o be d i r e c t e d w i t h moral p r i n c i p l e s i n 
mind, i f not d i r e c t l y then c e r t a i n l y i n d i r e c t l y . I n the same way as they 
d e l i b e r a t e about p o l i c y or economic issues, they might be expected t o 
d e l i b e r a t e about e t h i c a l issues. However those i n p u b l i c l i f e , do i n the 
eyes of many, acquire w i t h t h e i r o f f i c e a c e r t a i n immunity from moral 
c r i t i c s m . I n some way i t i s considered t h a t a government m i n i s t e r i s not 
personally morally responsible f o r the actions t h a t he i n i t i a t e s : 
"Even i f one i s i n no doubt about the merits of the acts i n question, the 
agents seem t o have a s l i p p e r y moral surface, produced by t h e i r r o l e s or 
o f f i c e s . " ^ 
For instance one of the reasons why the careers of McNamara and others 
survived the Vietnam War i s t h a t even those who believe t h a t US p o l i c y was 
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undoubtedly c r i m i n a l may h e s i t a t e from l i n k i n g the crimes w i t h those 
i n d i v i d u a l s who perpetrated them. I r o n i c a l l y the m o r a l i t y of a p o l i t i c i a n ' s 
a c t i o n s i n h i s p r i v a t e l i f e i s considered more important. 
However even though the actions of an o f f i c e h o l d e r tend t o be 
depersonalised, s u r e l y one must accept t h a t o f f i c e alone cannot change the 
moral nature of an act. Thomas Nagel s t r o n g l y emphasises t h a t , "...there i s 
no reason t o t h i n k t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s i n p u b l i c r o l e s are released from 
t r a d i t i o n a l moral requirements on the treatment of others , or t h a t i n 
p u b l i c l i f e , the end j u s t i f i e s the means. "^ '^  The t r i a l of E r i c Honecker, 
former leader of the GDR, i s evidence t h a t t h i s contention i s p u b l i c l y 
accepted occaisonally at l e a s t , as were the Uuremberg ITazi war crime t r i a l s . 
Indeed the exercise of power, as p r a c t i s e d by p o l i t i c i a n s , i s descibed by 
Nagel as, "One of the most personal forms of i n d i v i d u a l self-expression, and 
a r i c h source of purely personal pleasure."'' 
I t i s also important t o note t h a t f o r most people the r u l e s of m o r a l i t y are 
not merely a standard w i t h which t o judge the actions of oneself. I f e t h i c s 
were so s u b j e c t i v e t h a t a l l one meant by saying t h a t something, such as 
slavery or a b o r t i o n , was wrong was t h a t one disapproved of i t , there would 
be l i t t l e basis f o r f u r t h e r debate w i t h someone who thought i t r i g h t , f o r 
both could be r i g h t . Indeed one uses moral judgements t o decide what one 
would d i r e c t other people t o do. " I n the end", w r i t e s Narveson, "they are 
the r u l e s or p r i n c i p l e s by reference t o which one w i l l c r i t i c i z e or appraise 
the behaviour of any body, not j u s t oneself. "^ '^ I n other words they are 
codes of conducts f o r groups, and thus u l t i m a t l y f o r a l l those i n the same 
community. Therefore i t seems n a t u r a l t h a t they should apply t o the 
p o l i t i c i a n s responsible f o r law making and law enforcement w i t h i n the 
community. 
Nevertheless there remains a strong t r a d i t i o n of t h i n k e r s who concur with 
M a c h i a v e l l i ' s I m p l i c a t i o n t h a t p u b l i c and p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y must be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d . Stuart Hampshire, f o r instance argues t h a t , "A fastidiousness 
about the means employed, appropriate i n personal r e l a t i o n s , i s a moral 
d e r e l i c t i o n i n a p o l i t i c i a n , and the relevant moral c r i t e r i o n f o r a great 
n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e i s l a s t i n g success....: continuing power, prosperity, 
high n a t i o n a l s p i r i t . . . " ' = ^ Obviously a p o l i t i c i a n must bear i n mind the wish 
t o stay i n o f f i c e , which may have as much t o do w i t h a desire t o continue 
b r i n g i n g about a s t a t e of j u s t i c e , as w i t h personal ambition. Bernard 
Williams notes t h a t " t r y i n g t o stay i n o f f i c e " , "must count as a p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y anywhere.""* 
However M a c h i a v e l l i assumes t h a t p o l i t i c s i s an end i n i t s e l f , the sole 
purpose of which i s t o preserve and increase p o l i t i c a l power. Religious, 
s o c i a l or moral considerations are divorced by Machiavelli from p o l i t i c a l 
measures, except where the manipulation of the former might be p o l i t i c a l 
expedient: 
"A Prince t h e r e f o r e . who desires t o maintain himself must learn t o be not 
alwatys good, but t o be so or not as necessity may require. .. For, a l l things 
considered, i t w i l l be found t h a t some thi n g s t h a t seem l i k e v i r t u e w i l l 
lead you t o r u i n i f you f o l l o w them; w h i l s t others t h a t apparently are 
vices, w i l l , i f followed, r e s u l t i n your s a f e t y and well-being" ^ 
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While t h i s i s p a r t of the f u n c t i o n of a p o l i t i c i a n i t i s c e r t a i n l y not the 
whole s t o r y . What i s achieved during the period i n o f f i c e i s c e r t a i n l y f o r 
most observers more important than merely the length of t h a t s p e l l . Margeret 
Thatcher was Prime M i n i s t e r i n the UK f o r longer than anyone else t h i s 
century, but t h i s does not necessarily make her the most successful. 
For the most part M a c h i a v e l l i i s non-moral rat h e r than simply immoral, by 
a b s r a c t i n g p o l i t i c s from the r e s t of l i f e he t r e a t s the 'legitimacy' or 
' j u s t i c e ' of any p a r t i c u l a r act w i t h a great deal of i n d i f f e r e n c e . His 
assessment of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s not based upon i t s message but r a t h e r i t s 
e f f e c t upon men. The C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s , he argues, makes man feeble and easy 
prey t o evil-minded men. Behind almost a l l Machiavelli says i s h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t man i s e s s e n t i a l l y s e l f i s h , and t h a t r e a l l y a l l t h a t keeps society 
together i s the Prince and the power behind the law. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
m o r a l i t y i s t h e r e f o r e l i m i t e d t o i t s use as a device f o r maintaining 
d i s c i p l i n e among the people, and i n t h i s respect Machiavelli considered the 
c i v i c v i r t u e s of the ancient Romans most e f f e c t i v e , and i n t h i s sense the 
Prince i s above the m o r a l i t y t o be enforced w i t h i n the group. 
But Hampshire's above statement seems t o concern not so much whether the 
m o r a l i t y expected from p o l i t i c i a n s qua p o l i t i c i a n s must d i f f e r from t h e i r 
m o r a l i t y as p r i v a t e people, but more t o do w i t h a b e l i e f t h a t the moral 
o b l i g a t i o n s of a government go no f u r t h e r than o b l i g a t i o n s towards i t s own 
c i t i z e n s . Indeed, i n h i s a r t i c l e 'Public and Private M o r a l i t y " , Hampshire 
stresses both " a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o one's f o l l o w e r s " and the adoption of 
" p o l i c i e s t h a t are t o be j u s t i f i e d p r i n c i p a l l y by t h e i r eventual 
consequences."^'= According t o some n a t i o n a l i s t t h i n k e r s the goverment of 
each n a t i o n s t a t e has an o b l i g a t i o n only t o make sure t h a t i t s own c i t i z e n s 
are fed, clothed and protected. The o b l i g a t i o n s of the B r i t i s h goverment 
would, t h e r e f o r e , go no f u r t h e r than the shores of the B r i t i s h I s l e s , and 
"we should feed other c o u n t r i e s i f and only i f i t i s t o our own enlightened 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t and does not e n t a i l too b i g a s a c r i f i c e on our p a r t . " ^ ^ Thus 
decisions regarding world hunger are s a i d t o be p r u d e n t i a l rather than 
moral, j u s t i f i e d s o l e l y on the grounds of p o l i t i c a l expediency. 
I t i s commonly acknowledged t h a t the goverment of a p a r t i c u l a r nation does 
have a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i t s people. However i t i s t o many, 
c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s as strong and exclusive 
as some n a t i o n a l i s t s might imagine: 
"Whoever takes on a p u b l i c or o f f i c i a l r o l e assumes the o b l i g a t i o n t o serve 
a s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n and o f t e n the i n t e r e s t s of a special group... [ b u t ] . . . 
O b l i g a t i o n s t o the s t a t e also have l i m i t s , which derive from t h e i r moral 
context."^^ 
I t i s probably f a i r t o say t h a t the idea t h a t moral o b l i g a t i o n s do not 
extend beyond the n a t i o n a l boundary s t r i k e s most people as repugnant. 
W i l l i a m Frankena i s unequivocal i n h i s dismissal of such an idea: 
"... they may contend t h a t , while we should act on non-egotistic p r i n c i p l e s 
i n our r e l a t i o n s t o f e l l o w c i t i z e n s , such p r i n c i p l e s are not binding across 
n a t i o n a l boudarles and we may and should be egoists i n dealing with peoples 
i n other other countries. Such a combination of a l t r u i s m and egoism s t r i k e s 
me as simply i n c e d i b l e ; i t i m p l i e s . . . t h a t while i t i s morally wrong f o r me 
t o cause a f e l l o w American t o starve . . . i t i s not morally wrong f o r me or 
the United States t o cause A f r i c a n s or B r i t o n s t o s t a r v e . . . " ' ^ 
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Nevertheless the b e l i e f t h a t moral judgemexits cannot be applied t o actions 
t h a t have e f f e c t s across n a t i o n a l borders has been defended on several 
grounds. 
F i r s t , i t i s argued t h a t no o b l i g a t i o n can e x i s t i n cases where the agent i s 
unable t o act. That 'ought' implies 'can' i s a tenet t o which most moral 
philosophers subscribe. For example an i n f e r t i l e couple could not be said t o 
be morally obliged t o have c h i l d r e n . Along these l i n e s some have argued that 
there i s nothing one can do t o improve the welfare of f o r e i g n peoples, and 
hence t h a t there i s no o b l i g a t i o n upon one t o t r y and do so. I t might not 
have been possible i n the past f o r one nat i o n t o have much e f f e c t upon 
another, and even t h i s i s ra t h e r doubtful e s p e c i a l l y when they were 
geographically close together, but c l e a r l y today i t i s no longer the case. 
Much can be done by i n d i v i d u a l s . and governments i n any one country, which 
has i n f l u e n c e abroad. This i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e of r i c h western countries such 
as the United States or B r i t a i n . The USA i s described as a 'superpower' 
simply because decisions made i n t h a t country have repercussions throughout 
the world. For instance today there e x i s t s a t r u l y global economy and the 
economic decisions taken i n one country w i l l a f f e c t others. The outcome of 
the c u r r e n t round of GATT t a l k s w i l l be f e l t throughout the world. Much i n 
t h i s sphere can be done t o ensure, at l e a s t , t h a t matters i n the Third 
World are not made worse. S a c r i f i c e s may be necessary, but t h i s i s not the 
point . 
Second, i t i s argued by others t h a t the le g a l autonomy of each nation state 
removes concern f o r the welfare of each nation's c i t i z e n s from other 
coun t r i e s . I f the prescence of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law i s put t o one side f o r the 
time being (though i n Chapter 3 i t w i l l be considered) i t i s c e r t a i n l y true 
t h a t each n a t i o n s t a t e i s l e g a l l y independent. However there i s no reason 
to b e lieve t h a t once a body of people declare themselves t o be a sovereign 
s t a t e , t h a t a l l other nations are automat i c a l l y released from any 
o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t they might have had towards them. Once the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community recognised the existence of Bosnia as a separate nation i t d i d not 
cease, i n p r a c t i c e or i n theory, t o f e e l morally responsible f o r the 
humanitarian p l i g h t of i t s peoples. There i s i t seems l i t t l e reason t o 
accept t h a t " l e g a l autonomy e n t a i l s moral n o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " . Within one 
country two i n d i v i d u a l s may be l e g a l l y independent, yet t h i s does not mean 
th a t they are not bound by moral o b l i g a t i o n s i n t h e i r dealings w i t h one 
another. 
There i s of course a danger t h a t a nat i o n may be tempted t o un i v e r s a l i s e the 
m o r a l i t y p e c u l i a r t o i t s e l f and, "oppose each other as the standard bearers 
of moral systems, each of n a t i o n a l o r i g i n , and each of them claiming t o 
provide u n i v e r s a l moral and p o l i t i c a l standards which a l l the other nations 
ought t o accept."'-' Some contemporary observers f e e l t h a t t h i s I s the goal 
of US f o r e i g n p o l i c y , as i t i s seen a c t i n g as a quasi-world policeman. 
However, while i g n o r i n g the motiv a t i o n of US p o l i c y , i t i s wrong t o believe 
t h a t m o r a l i t y i s so r e l a t i v e and t h a t there i s not i n f a c t concensus among 
most players on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage about the moral norms t h a t should be 
observed. Few would accept the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t e t h i c s i s always r e l a t i v e t o 
a p a r t i c u l a r society. The in f l u e n c e of warnings of such dangers tends merely 
t o j u s t i f y and r e i n f o r c e acquiescence i n the face of acts of inhumanity. 
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Third, the view t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i s an amoral a f f a i r i s r e f l e c t e d 
by some s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r i s t s . Machiavelli c e r t a i n l y hinted t h a t moral 
o b l i g a t i o n s must u l t i r a a t l y be derived from law and goverment, but Thomas 
Hobbes gave a much more systematic account why the s t a t e alone creates 
m o r a l i t y as w e l l as the law, Geoffrey Goodwin quotes The Leviathan where 
Hobbes notes e x p l i c i t l y : "There i s n e i t h e r m o r a l i t y nor law outside the 
state."-^^ M o r a l i t y , i t i s maintained, depends e n t i r e l y upon the existence of 
an a c t u a l s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , a l b e i t i m p l i c i t rather than e x p l i c i t ; "By 
covenant we are obliged; by law we are held t o our o b l i g a t i o n . "==-^  
Therefore, i t i s argued, members of one s t a t e (whether i n d i v i d u a l s or the 
government i t s e l f ) cannot have o b l i g a t i o n s towards members of another i f 
they have not made a co n t r a c t w i t h each other. However even i f the existence 
of law presupposes such a c o n t r a c t , i t does not f o l l o w t h a t m o r a l i t y does so 
too. Howard Warrender observes t h a t : 
"A moral o b l i g a t i o n t o obey the c i v i l law cannot l o g i c a l l y be extracted from 
a system i n which man has no moral o b l i g a t i o n s before or apart from the 
I n s t i t u t i o n of t h a t law"-=^* 
S t r i c t l y speaking Hobbes argues t h a t one must obey the law, and do what one 
does not wish, because otherwise the consequences w i l l be even more 
unpleasant; t h a t , i n t h a t overquoted phrase, l i f e would be " s o l i t a r y , poor, 
nasty, b r u t i s h and short. "-"-'= Once a contract has been made those who give 
t h e i r consent are under an o b l i g a t i o n t o obey the covenant even i f i n 
p r a c t i s e i t i s i n one's i n t e r e s t t o break i t . The n a t u r a l moral vacuum i s 
f i l l e d by the sovereign, a s i n g l e determinate body, who by issuing laws w i l l 
create moral d i s t i n c t i o n s and regulate r e l a t i o n s between men. However i n 
t h i s respect the laws of nature are more l i k e "doctors advice of a 
p e c u l i a r l y compelling kind"^-^' than moral o b l i g a t i o n . Consequently Sabine i s 
led t o the conclusion t h a t , " i n no other sense i s there l o g i c a l l y any 
o b l i g a t i o n whatever i n Hobbes' system, "^ '^  Frankena points out c o r r e c t l y t h a t 
i f an a c t u a l s o c i a l c o n t r a c t forms the basis of our moral o b l i g a t i o n s then 
i t would be v i r t u a l l y impossible t o apply moral judgements t o foetuses, 
young c h i l d r e n and f u t u r e generations, 
Some of the features of p o l i t i c a l l i f e c e r t a i n l y i n d i c a t e a lack of moral 
consideration. The spectacle of man's inhumanity t o man, selfishness and 
i n d i f f e r e n c e combine t o pa i n t a very d i s t u r b i n g p o r t r a i t . In t h e i r 
i n t r o d u c t i o n t o "The M o r a l i t y of P o l i t i c s " Bhikhu Parekh and R,N.Berki 
express t h e i r concern at how, "The standard of l i v i n g has been elevated t o 
the s t a t u s of the highest moral and p o l i t i c a l value." They add t h a t ; 
"The poverty, disease and s t a r v a t i o n of m i l l i o n s are f a c t s apparently 
c o e x i s t i n g w i t h the f r e n z i e d p u r s u i t of material p r o s p e r i t y i n the more 
a f f l u e n t reaches of human s o c i t y , In the domestic p o l i t i c s of most countries 
the same philosophy of narrow se l f i s h n e s s dominates,..placing i n d i v i d u a l or 
s e c t i o n a l s e l f i n t e r e s t before the common good,"^® 
There are perhaps signs t h a t a t t i t u d e s might be changing i n the dawn of a 
Mew World Order, The w i l l i n g n e s s of the US army t o intervene i n Somalia i s 
c e r t a i n l y encouraging, even i f i t can be e a s i l y l o s t s i g h t of i n the face of 
co n t i n u i n g hypocrisy and double standards, However even i f domestic and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i s l a c k i n g signs of moral standards i t would be wrong 
t o suppose t h a t "moral issues are t h e r e f o r e q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t t o p o l i t i c a l 
action.,,"-^-* The s t r e s s must be on what s t a t e s ought t o do rat h e r than what 
s t a t e s a c t u a l l y do. V i r t u a l l y a l l goverments view t h e i r own population very 
d i f f e r e n t l y from the way they view other people, but nevertheless: 
" I t i s hard t o see how moral oughts can apply only t o our r e l a t i o n s t o other 
Americans...it seems t o be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . . . t h a t they apply t o our r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h a l l r a t i o n a l beings i f they apply at all."^° 
Indeed Peter Singer makes the poi n t t h a t e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n must go 
beyond the narrow terms of any p a r t i a l , or s e c t i o n a l group. Moral 
philosophers from the Greeks, those i n the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , Kant, 
Bentham and Rawls a l l "agree t h a t e t h i c s must i n some sense be universal"®^ 
I t i s worth mentioning t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , t h a t moral theory believed by so 
many t o shed most l i g h t on the d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong, was 
thought of by i t s founding f a t h e r s as a, "system of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
d e cision, as o f f e r i n g a c r i t e r i o n and basis of judgement f o r l e g i s l a t o r s and 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . " ^ ^ Given a b e l i e f i n the existence of u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d 
p r i n c i p l e s , u t i l i t a r i a n or otherwise, v a l i d f o r a l l times and a l l places; 
and the acceptance of the n o t i o n of the moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of states, the 
idea of 'dual m o r a l i t y ' must be dismissed. I n the words of former US 
President Woodrow Wilson, "the same standards of m o r a l i t y should apply t o 
st a t e s as apply t o i n d i v i d u a l s . " ^ - ^ 
Assuming the existence of an applicable theory of global d i s t r i b u t i v e 
j u s t i c e , the conduct of i n s t i t u t i o n s , and the i n d i v i d u a l s who act f o r them, 
must be judged by the same standards as p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s when i t comes t o 
judging what they have done t o c o n t r i b u t e towards the s o l u t i o n or otherwise 
of the problems of poverty. The most important d i f f e r e n c e between those i n 
p u b l i c o f f i c e and p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s i s the form t h e i r personal acts might 
take. 
I t i s perhaps open t o question whether every i n d i v i d u a l agent should apply 
the basic p r i n c i p l e s of m o r a l i t y d i r e c t l y , and give a large proportion of 
one's income t o the disadvantaged t o see t h a t some are at lea s t minimally 
w e l l fed, or whether the o b l i g a t i o n f a l l s upon us t o act i n d i r e c t l y through 
p o l i t i c a l means t o ensure t h a t each goverment f u l f f i l l s i t s p o l i t i c a l and 
moral o b l i g a t i o n s . At present the emphasis seems t o most people t o be on the 
former t o some degree, yet i f any s i g n i f i c a n t change i s t o occur t h i s ought 
t o be reappraised. Frankena concludes t h a t : 
".. .what i s most imperative i s f o r a l l of us t o do what we can t o bring i n t o 
existence a n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l set of i n s t i t u t i o n s such t h a t , i f a l l 
agents act on i t s r u l e s . , then everyone's basic needs w i l l be supplied 
i n s o f a r as nature permits" 
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CHAPTER THREE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
" I t i s paradoxical, but hardly s u r p r i s i n g , t h a t the r i g h t t o food has been 
endorsed more o f t e n and w i t h greater unanimity and urgency than most other 
human r i g h t s , while at the same time being v i o l a t e d more comprehensively and 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y than probably any other other r i g h t . " ' 
"A d e c l a r a t i o n of r i g h t s would be but a lop-sided j o b without a d e c l a r a t i o n 
of d u t i e s , "-^  
When seeking f o r a morally secure basis f o r a s s e r t i n g the duties of those i n 
the a f f l u e n t West t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , and counter the p r e v a i l i n g 
poverty i n the Thir d World i t i s fashionable among some campaigners t o focus 
on the r i g h t s of the underprivileged. Encouragement was given t o such 
w r i t e r s , concentrating upon the ' r i g h t s ' idiom, by the U.S. Carter 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the l a t e 1970s f o l l o w i n g the President's commitment t o 
secure "human r i g h t s " overseas. There i s also a close s i m i l a r i t y (as well as 
important d i f f e r e n c e s ) between the concept of moral, human or natural 
r i g h t s and i n s t i t u t i o n a l human r i g h t s entrenched i n national or 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i v e law. 'Rights' jargon i s therefore very a t t r a c t i v e and 
has enormous resonance both w i t h the lay man and wi t h the s p e c i a l i s t , 
whether moral philosopher or j u r i s t . Indeed the r o l e of human r i g h t s i n the 
development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law I s e s p e c i a l l y important. Frequently appeal 
i s made t o the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights(1948) 
and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l d e c l a r a t i o n s and charters. There i s c e r t a i n l y no 
doubt t h a t the r i g h t t o l i f e I s entrenched i n human i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. As a 
r e s u l t i t i s not uncommon t o attempt t o derive an o b l i g a t i o n , both l e g a l and 
moral, t o respect t h i s r i g h t t o l i f e which i n the eyes of Third World 
l o b b y i s t s e n t a i l s a duty t o a i d the poor and hungry. 
There are however, i t ha r d l y needs saying, numerous problems w i t h t h i s 
approach. F i r s t l y the sources of such ambiguous r i g h t s must be considered. 
The r h e t o r i c of r i g h t s i s employed by many w i t h widely d i f f e r i n g concepts of 
m o r a l i t y . As Onora O'Neill p o i n t s out; 
"The ambiguous r h e t o r i c of r i g h t s allows the partisans of various accounts 
of human r i g h t s t o share the s l i p p e r y ground of i n t e r n a t i o n a l declarations 
and c h a r t e r s , " 
I t i s necessary t o discover what, i f any, fundamental e t h i c a l standards 
underpin such i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i f i t i s t o be determined whether these 
r i g h t s are u n i v e r s a l and moral. Secondly i t i s necessary t o decide whether 
the precepts of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law can be considered l e g a l imperatives i n 
the same way as domestic s t a t u t e s . T h i r d l y the question of agency i s v i t a l . 
Rights without s p e c i f i c c o r r e l a t i v e d u t i e s amount t o very l i t t l e . Unless 
holders of 'human r i g h t s ' can c l a i m respect f o r these r i g h t s from s p e c i f i c 
i n d i v i d u a l s or i n s t i t u t i o n s they are p r a c t i c a l l y meaningless. 
Human r i g h t s theory i s considered t o be grounded upon the the o r i e s of 
na t u r a l law developed during the Enlightenment. Theories of na t u r a l law 
st r e s s t h a t i t i s a system of law binding on men by v i r t u e of t h e i r 
humanity. I t i s independent of a l l p o s i t i v e or customary law. Natural law i s 
seen by most t h i n k e r s as underpinned by reason, or r a t i o n a l i t y . As a 
r a t i o n a l being man recognises n a t u r a l law, and i t i s binding upon him 
because he recognises i t . Natural law, however, was f i r s t expounded by 
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philosophers r e l y i n g upon Greek and e s p e c i a l l y Stoic conceptions of j u s t i c e , 
f u n c t i o n i n g as a standard upon which p o s i t i v e law could be judged. Medieval 
philosophers, based f i r m l y i n the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , also employed the 
concept of n a t u r a l law. However, t y p i c a l l y , Aquinas viewed natu r a l law as 
p a r t of the n a t u r a l law of God or d i v i n e law, thereby reducing natural law 
t o a form of p o s i t i v e law, a l b e i t l a i d down by God r a t h e r than man. In f a c t 
Aquinas went as f a r as t o suggest t h a t p o s i t i v e law could i t s e l f be wholly 
generated by d i v i n e law: 
".. .man has a n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n t o know the t r u t h about God and t o l i v e i n 
society. I n t h i s respect, there comes under n a t u r a l law a l l actions 
connected w i t h such i n c l i n a t i o n s . " ' * 
The modern secular t h e o r i e s of n a t u r a l law can be traced back to Hugo 
Grotlus whose enunciation of n a t u r a l law was detatched from r e l i g i o n : 
"Natural law i s so immutable t h a t i t cannot be changed by God himself."'* 
According t o Grotius man has a n a t u r a l impulse t o l i v e peacefully and i n 
harmony w i t h others, and t h e r e f o r e whatever c o n t r i b u t e s towards t h i s natural 
and r a t i o n a l impulse i s r i g h t and j u s t , and whatever upsets the s o c i a l 
harmony and does not c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s impulse i s wrong and unjust. 
Since at l e a s t the Enlightenment n a t u r a l law has been recast i n order t o 
prescribe n a t u r a l r i g h t s , which have subsequently been remoulded i n the 
r h e t o r i c of human r i g h t s , and which can be defined as those p r i n c i p l e s which 
d i c t a t e how men ought t o be t r e a t e d i r r e s p e c t i v e of custom or i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Natural r i g h t s are s a i d t o be r i g h t s belonging t o a l l human beings by v i r t u e 
of the f a c t t h a t they are human. Perhaps the most famous natural law 
t h e o r i s t s are Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Locke argued t h a t man had a 
n a t u r a l r i g h t i n defence of " l i f e , l i b e r t y , and estate"'^, implying t h a t at 
l e a s t man's r i g h t t o l i f e i s i n a l i e n a b l e , as w e l l as u n i v e r s a l . According t o 
Locke such r i g h t s e x i s t independently of the s o c i a l order; the law of nature 
being implanted by God i n a l l reasonable beings. 
Such reasoning might immediately be questioned by the modern reader. Such 
metaphysical f a c t s as the law of nature which are supposedly ready t o be 
discovered are as u n i n t e l l i g i b l e and as o b j e c t i v e nonsense t o many today as 
they were t o Bentham who f i r m l y s t a t e d t h a t " n a t u r a l r i g h t s i s simple 
nonsense: n a t u r a l and i m p r e s c r i t b l e r i g h t s , r h e t o r i c a l nonsense -nonsense 
upon s t i l t s . ""^^ Moreover i f the r i g h t t o l i f e i s an u l t i m a t e moral p r i n c i p l e 
w i t h p r i o r i t y over a l l others, then i t commits one t o a p o s i t i o n of absolute 
pacifism, which most would not be happy with. But i f i t i s j u s t one of many 
r i g h t s i t collapses i n t o a mere r u l e of thumb which can be e a s i l y 
disregarded. Jonathon Glover p o i n t s out t h a t a case of s i m i l a r coherence 
could be made f o r there being a " r i g h t t o happiness"^ 
A philosophy of ' r i g h t s ' i s also problematical because i t i s unclear whether 
such r i g h t s are merely r i g h t s of freedom from the i n t e r f e r e n c e of others 
( i . e . " l i b e r t y r i g h t s " ) , or whether they should Include p o s i t i v e or "welfare 
Rights". The l a t t e r concept of r i g h t s imposes a duty on others, e i t h e r 
i n d i v i d u a l s or the s t a t e , t o intervene and act as the provider of c e r t a i n 
services or goods not otherwise accessible. To suggest t h a t noninterference 
respects the r i g h t s of others i f i t denies them the minimum sustenance to 
exercise these r i g h t s , i s described by Henry Shue, among others, as fatuous: 
"The c l a s s i c l i b e r a l ' s main preoccupation f o r the good l i f e - do not 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h thy neighbour- i s the only poison they need."** 
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I r o n i c a l l y , since respect f o r the ' r i g h t s ' of man would seem t o e n t a i l 
p o s i t i v e a c t i o n as w e l l as noninterference, those who employ the r h e t o r i c of 
r i g h t s are o f t e n the very same people whon do nothing worthwhile t o respect 
such ' r i g h t s ' , Alan Gewirth notes t h a t : 
"For a person t o have human r i g h t s , then, i s f o r him t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o 
make morally j u s t i f i e d s t r i n g e n t , e f f e c t i v e demands on other persons that 
they not i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s having the necessary goods of a c t i o n and that 
they also help him t o a t t a i n those goods when he can not do so by h i s own 
e f f o r t s , " - ^ 
In e f f e c t unless any corresponding i n d i v i d u a l has a corresponding duty t o 
give food t o the hungry refugee, any ' r i g h t s ' t h a t he or she might have are 
rendered wholly academic, A s o c i a l contract t h e o r i s t would argue th a t the 
s t a t e i s obliged t o respect such r i g h t s " ^ , but where the s t a t e has broken 
down or i s not i n a p o s i t i o n t o o f f e r any t a n g i b l e assistance, such 
o b l i g a t i o n s are harder t o a l l o c a t e . Focussing upon r i g h t s alone i s a 
mistake, i t seems, whether or not one accepts t h a t they o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t . 
While many f r e q u e n t l y invoke the concept of r i g h t s , t h i s i s perhaps more t o 
do w i t h the existence of quasi-analogous r i g h t s established i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
i n the p o s i t i v e law of many sta t e s , than anything else. 
The place of human r i g h t s i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s of modern states goes back at 
le a s t two hundred years, American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s were born i n the 
eighteenth century and drew h e a v i l y on contemporary European ideas. Paine's 
"Rights of Man"(1791) was a strong defence of the d e c l a r a t i o n of natural 
r i g h t s and of r e v o l u t i o n i n t h i s cause, w r i t t e n very much i n the s p i r i t of 
Locke and in f l u e n c e d by the French Revolution(1789) and U,S, Independence, 
I t was Paine's views about r i g h t s which were adopted by the Founding Fathers 
of American Independence, The U,S, Declaration of Independence(1776) states 
t h a t : 
" , , , a l l men are created equal, , . , they are endowed by t h e i r Creator with 
c e r t a i n i n a l i e n a b l e Rights, , , , L i f e , L i b e r t y and the p u r s u i t of 
Happiness, " ' 
Such r i g h t s now form the basis of many i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s now established 
i n the p o s i t i v e law of many countries: the r i g h t t o l i f e , t o free speech, 
and t o assembly f o r example. 
Despite the p h i l o s o p h i c a l shortcomings of such a concept of r i g h t s , based as 
i t i s on n a t u r a l law, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l human r i g h t s movement draws heavily 
upon American c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . A f t e r the b r u t a l i t y of the a t t r o c i t i e s 
associated w i t h Nazism, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the search f o r immutable 
p r i n c i p l e s which would p r o t e c t humanity from such deeds should come back 
i n t o fashion. Professor D, Sidorsky explains t h a t : 
"To f i n d l o g i c a l f a u l t s i n the theory of e q u a l i t y of persons i n society 
where human worth i s respected i s one t h i n g ; t o i n t e l l e c t u a l l y undermine the 
theory when human d i g n i t y i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y denied i s another t h i n g . " ^ ^ 
The existence of 'fundamental human r i g h t s ' was a declared a r t i c l e of f a i t h 
by the "Peoples of the United Nations"''* i n the U.N. Charter. The Universal 
D e c l a r a t i o n of Human Rights notes t h a t : 
"Recognition.,. of equal and i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s of a l l members of the human 
f a m i l y i s the foundation of freedom, j u s t i c e and peace i n the world,,,"'® 
S i m i l a r l y a r t i c l e 55 of the U.N. Charter s t a t e s t h a t : 
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"Respect f o r , and observance of, human r i g h t s w i l l help create conditions of 
s t a b i l i t y and well-being which are necessary f o r peaceful and f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s among nations . . . " " ^ 
The post-war Z e i t g e i s t i s captured n e a t l y by Professor H.L.A. Hart: 
"... i t i s p l a i n t h a t a theory of r i g h t s i s urg e n t l y c a l l e d f o r . During the 
l a s t h a l f century man's inhumanity t o man has been such t h a t the most basic 
and elementary freedoms and p r o t e c t i o n s have been denied t o innumerable men 
and women. . . I t remains t o be seen whether i t w i l l have as much success as 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n changing the p r a c t i c e s of governments f o r human good."'® 
Whether or not the widespread i n t e l l e c t u a l and r h e t o r i c a l employment of 
human r i g h t s w i l l lead t o the "human good" i s , perhaps, the c e n t r a l question 
which needs t o be examined. There i s no doubt t h a t the idiom of human r i g h t s 
i s a very u s e f u l r h e t o r i c a l t o o l , recognised i n argument by almost a l l . But 
t h e r e i n , I propose, l i e s i t s weakness. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights i s t y p i c a l of cha r t e r s of i t s kind by v i r t u e of i t s e c l e c t i c nature, 
designed t o appeal t o diverse peoples governed by diverse p o l i t i c a l systems, 
and thus i t s framers shunned p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p l o r a t i o n of anything but a 
s u p e r f i c i a l nature. I t i s t h e r e f o r e characterised i n such a way tha t i t i s 
impossible t o describe i t as simply u t i l i t a r i a n , i n t u i t i v e or natural 
rights-based. 
However despite the lack of any coherent or p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e 
basis t o the concept of human r i g h t s as expounded by the U.N. , t h i s 
renalsance of human r i g h t s theory may s t i l l be j u s t i f i e d by i t s supposed 
b e n e f i c i a l i n f l u e n c e . I t i s argued t h a t i f c e r t a i n human r i g h t s such as 
freedom and the r i g h t t o l i f e are accepted as norms then a c e r t a i n form of 
s o c i e t y w i l l develop; and i f such a s o c i e t y i s desirable one should adopt 
such norms and c a l l them absolute p r i n c i p l e s . Such a c i r c u l a r or 
t a u t o l o g i c a l argument i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
F i r s t , i t must be examined whether the r e c o g n i t i o n of such p r i n c i p l e s by the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Community has i n f a c t had a b e n e f i c i a l impact. Experience 
suggests t h a t nothing more than l i p - s e r v i c e has been paid t o the sentiments 
behind such U,N. A r t i c l e s i n the m a j o r i t y of cases, though the manner i n 
which they were d r a f t e d has made i t easier t o f o l l o w the actual l e t t e r of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. For example although most c o u n t r i e s outwardly respect the 
' r i g h t t o l i f e ' , since i t apparently e n t a i l s no c o r r e l a t i v e p o s i t i v e 
d u t i e s , t h i s means l i t t l e t o the s t a r v i n g and diseased. Second, i t must be 
discovered whether there are w a t e r t i g h t e t h i c a l arguments behind the r i g h t s 
which are ascribed by i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i v e law. Unless one i s 
au t o m a t i c a l l y o b l i g e d t o respect such r i g h t s merely by t h e i r status as 
tenets of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, i t i s necessary t o discover independent moral 
reasons i n order t o f e e l o b l i g e d t o act i n t h e i r accordence. As Jerome 
Shestack notes: 
"By p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y d i v o r c i n g a l e g a l system from the actual foundations of 
soc i e t y , the system lacks any motive f o r f u t u r e development."'"'' 
Such a p o s i t i v i s t outlook i s widely c r i t i c i z e d , not least because i t 
encourages the b e l i e f t h a t law, however morally abhorrent, must be obeyed 
because i t i s the law. No doubt t h i s was the j u s t i f i c a t i o n many people gave 
f o r t h e i r compliance w i t h the misdeeds of the Thir d Reich. There undoubtedly 
appears t o be confusion between moral and l e g a l r i g h t s . Indeed much of the 
argument of the human r i g h t s l o b b y i s t s appears t o be based on the view t h a t 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law demands a i d f o r the Th i r d world, and therefore an 
o b l i g a t i o n of not only a l e g a l nature, but also a moral nature e x i s t s t o 
provide i t . This i s understandable i n s o f a r as since such le g a l r i g h t s are 
unenforceable another motive f o r a c t i o n i s necessary. 
However there are important d i f f e r e n c e s between l e g a l and moral r i g h t s . 
F i r s t , moral r i g h t s are u n i v e r s a l wheras l e g a l r i g h t s are not. Legal r i g h t s 
d i f f e r from person t o person according t o age or s t a t u s but moral r i g h t s 
s u r e l y remain the same. Second, moral r i g h t s are equal r i g h t s and cannot be 
possessed t o a greater degree by the peoples of one country than another, as 
argued i n Chapter Two. L a s t l y moral r i g h t s are i n a l i e n a b l e and cannot be 
t r a n s f e r r e d or l e n t t o another whereas l e g a l r i g h t s can by agreement be 
given up or sold. Legal j u s t i c e and moral j u s t i c e may coincide, but on the 
other hand they may not. Moral laws may not be recognised as l e g a l laws and 
l e g a l laws may not per se be morally j u s t . Hence merely i f a r i g h t t o a i d 
the poor e x i s t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and t h i s i s by no means c e r t a i n , i t 
cannot be immediatly assumed t h a t a moral o b l i g a t i o n e x i s t s as w e l l . I t i s 
u n l i k e l y t h a t such a law would be immoral but a moral judgement must be made 
independently. 
Indeed the powerful i n f l u e n c e of moral a t t i t u d e s i s shown i n domestic law by 
the f a c t t h a t laws tend t o be transgressed r e g u l a r l y i f p u b l i c disapproval 
does not f o l l o w d e t e c t i o n of such transgressions. For example i n B r i t a i n 
non-payment of the Community Charge was endemic p r e c i s e l y because the 
overwhelming view of the p u b l i c was t h a t the law was u n f a i r and immoral. 
S i m i l a r l y assuming i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does i n s i s t on a t r a n s f e r of resources 
from r i c h t o poor, one of the reasons why i t w i l l not occur i s because the 
m a j o r i t y of governments, and the p u b l i c i n the West, do not f e e l morally 
obliged t o do so. L i t t l e i s l i k e l y t o change unless stronger reasons, other 
than various statements i n the U.H. Charter, t o t r a n s f e r resources from the 
West t o the T h i r d World can be found t o e x i s t . 
Furthermore i t i s even d o u b t f u l whether the l e t t e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law does 
i n s i s t t h a t the West make e f f o r t s t o p r o t e c t T h i r d world c i t i z e n s from 
s t a r v a t i o n or poverty. This i s c l e a r l y argued by P h i l i p Alston: 
" I n the area of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law d e a l i n g w i t h food, the p r o p o s i t i o n that 
the c o n t i n u a t i o n of hunger i n the world i s unacceptable and t h a t the notion 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s have a r i g h t t o not t o d i e from hunger and not t o s u f f e r 
, . . from m a l n u t r i t i o n . . , , have long been accepted by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community. Whether i n the context of gl o b a l statements of p o l i c y such as the 
Universal D e c l a r a t i o n on the Eradi c a t i o n of Hunger and M a l n u t r i t i o n or the 
s t r a t e g y f o r the T h i r d United Nations Development Decade . . . a l l s t ates have 
unambiguously committed themselves t o these p r i n c i p l e s [ i s uncertain] . . , By 
and la r g e , i n t e r n a t i o n a l law dealing w i t h food issues has succeeded i n 
remaining h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed from human r i g h t s considerations,""^ 
In the context of world poverty and famine, the r i g h t t o food i s the most 
p e r t i n e n t element of a wide range of human r i g h t s instruments. The sole 
d i r e c t reference t o food i s contained i n A r t i c l e 25 paragraph 1 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
"Everyone has the r i g h t t o a standard of l i v i n g adequate f o r the health and 
well-being of himself and h i s f a m i l y , i n c l u d i n g , food, c l o t h i n g , housing and 
medical care and necessary s o c i a l services."*^' 
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Although the Universal D e c l a r a t i o n was conceived at i t s time of adoption not 
as i n t e r n a t i o n a l law i n i t s e l f , but r a t h e r as a "common standard of 
achievement" t o which a l l aspired, 
" i t has since been argued- t h a t I t now forms p a r t of binding i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law by v i r t u e f i r s t l y of the f a c t t h a t i t i s an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the Chater p r o v i s i o n s , and secondly of the extent t o which i t has been 
r e a f f i r m e d and c i t e d by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and i n d i v i d u a l States"=^' 
For a more d e t a i l e d and s p e c i f i c reference t o the r i g h t t o food, a t t e n t i o n 
must be turned t o the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Covenant on Economic, Social and 
C u l t u r a l Rights which was accepted by the U.N. General Assembly i n 1966 and 
came i n t o e f f e c t i n 1976. A r t i c l e 11 s t a t e s t h a t there e x i s t s ; 
"A r i g h t of everyone t o an adequate standard of l i v i n g f o r himself and h i s 
f a m i l y , i n c l u d i n g adequate food ,,,[and a] . . . r i g h t of everyone t o be free 
from hunger."^^ 
Furthermore A r t i c l e 2(1) of the Covenant commits those s t a t e s which r a t i f y 
i t ^ - ^ t o "take steps" towards the r e a l i s a t i o n of those r i g h t s "recognised i n 
the present covenant" and t o use " a l l appropriate means" i n doing so, " t o 
the maximum of i t s a v a i l a b l e resources",^* I t would appear th a t t h i s at 
l e a s t suggests t h a t nations should give p r i o r i t y t o s o c i a l welfare over 
a l l o c a t i o n of resources t o other areas such as defence or i n d u s t r i a l 
development. 
One of the most important questions i s whether the Economic Covenant obliges 
Developed Countries i n the West t o render assistance t o Third World Nations 
i n order t o promote economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l r i g h t s i n those countries 
where perhaps most needs t o be done t o gain t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n . While A r t i c l e 
11 demands t h a t a l l s t a t e s take steps t o r e a l i s e the r i g h t t o an adequate 
standard of l i v i n g f o r a l l , i n c l u d i n g " i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation", t h i s i s 
s a i d t o be based upon " f r e e consent". Moreover the Carter Administration i n 
the USA noted t h a t : 
" I t i s also understood t h a t paragraph 1 of a r t i c l e 2, as w e l l as A r t i c l e 
11... imparts no l e g a l l y binding o b l i g a t i o n t o provide a i d t o f o r e i g n 
c o u n t r i e s . 
And Trubeck notes t h a t : 
"One could read a r t i c l e s 11 and 23 of the Economic Covenant as support f o r 
the argument t h a t the d r a f t e r s wished t o leave the question of assistance 
from developed c o u n t r i e s up t o i n d i v i d u a l states, ... i t would seem 
in a p p r o p r i a t e t o t r y and ground such an o b l i g a t i o n on the Economic 
Covenant..." ^''^  
However Alston draws a d i f f e r e n t conclusion. He s t a t e s t h a t : 
" ' f r e e consent' cannot be reasonably be i n t e r p r e t e d as rendering the 
commitment t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation ...as e n t i r e l y meaningless . . . I t 
should thus be taken as meaning t h a t while an o b l i g a t i o n e x i s t s , the form 
which such cooperation w i l l take i s t o be determined i n accordance w i t h the 
f r e e consent of the State concerned."^"'' 
On t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the proposed r e s e r v a t i o n , noted above, t o be attached 
t o t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n by the U.S. Government would have been inadmissable. 
What, however, i s not u n c e r t a i n i s the f a c t t h a t A r t i c l e 11, the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and C u l t u r a l Rights as a whole, the Universal Declaration, 
and most U.N. d e c l a r a t i o n s and charters are a l l framed i n such a way t h a t i t 
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makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o draw any f i r m conclusions. Alston i s forced t o 
conclude t h a t one reaches "a somewhat ambivilant conclusion as t o the 
present s t a t u s of the r i g h t t o food now i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. "^ '^  The 
p r o v i s i o n s made i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law lack both s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l and c l a r i t y 
t o make anything else possible. Both the c y n i c a l and the pragmatic w i l l 
doubtless r e a l i s e t h a t the framers had l i t t l e o p tion t o do anything 
d i f f e r e n t l y . Trubeck concludes t h a t : 
"A p r i n c i p a l purpose of t h i s chapter has been t o h i g h l i g h t the weakness of 
the e x i s t i n g machinery t o implement i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic, s o c i a l and 
c u l t u r a l r i g h t s . "•-"-* 
The immense chasm between r e a l i t y and the r h e t o r i c employed by I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
statesmen and bureacrats, and c o d i f i e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, suggests that 
t h i s 'human r i g h t s ' approach has been unsuccessful. I n r e a l i t y world poverty 
and m a l n u t r i t i o n i s not a high p r i o r i t y f o r most governments. In t h i s l i g h t 
the examination of the problem of hunger from a human r i g h t s perspective 
appears t o be an unsuccesssful and u l t i m a t e l y f u t i l e academic exercise. 
Alston o p t i m i s t i c a l l y believes t h a t "focussing on the r i g h t t o food provides 
a r a l l y i n g p o i n t around which t o mobilise the s t a r v i n g masses.""'° However, 
unless i t i s passible t o address those i n a u t h o r i t y , these c a l l s w i l l simply 
remain unanswered. 
Because " r i g h t s discourse o f t e n only c a r r i e s w i t h i t only a vague message t o 
those whose a c t i o n i s needed t o secure respect f o r r i g h t s " ^ ' , there i s 
i n e v i t a b l y a widespread f a i l u r e t o secure respect f o r such r i g h t s . Legal and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s c a r r y w i t h them c o r r e l a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s . For instance 
the r i g h t t o one's property i n domestic law means t h a t others are obliged 
not t o trespass or t o s t e a l , However , despite t h e i r pseudo-legal character, 
'human r i g h t s ' do not seem t o have s i m i l a r c o r r e l a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s . Whatever 
the s t a t u s of the United Nations and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (and t h i s i s an area 
which i s beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s ) , the character of many of i t s 
d e c l a r a t i o n s on issues such as development appear t o be of a moral nature. 
The Importance of such moral norms can e a s i l y be understated because they do 
at the l e a s t : 
"serve t o underline the e t h i c a l / m o r a l dimensions of issues which are too 
o f t e n portrayed as excessively t e c h n i c a l matters. 
However, as has been shown, proclaimed programmes of human r i g h t s lack 
coherence as a j u s t i f i a b l e set of e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n themselves. I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e hardly s u r p r i s i n g i f governments are r e l u c t a n t t o be persuaded to 
act i n t h e i r accordance. I t i s t h e r e f o r e necessary t o discover whether such 
r i g h t s e x i s t as secondary p r i n c i p l e s derived from the moral o b l i g a t i o n 
incumbant upon a government. I n e v i t a b l y t h i s demands an enquiry i n t o 
normative e t h i c s , i n other words an attempt t o determine those p r i n c i p l e s by 
which i n d i v i d u a l s , and f o r t h a t matter large i n s t i t u t i o n s and governments as 
w e l l , ought morally t o be guided. This i s a process which cannot be avoided 
by a p p l i e d e t h i c i s t s i f c o r r e c t moral judgements are t o be a r r i v e d at. To do 
t h i s i t necessary t o examine a l t e r n a t i v e moral systems which i n which one 
might s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ground an o b l i g a t i o n t o a i d the poor and st a r v i n g . 
J e n n i f e r Trusted argues t h a t : 
" I n our s o c i e t y anyone who i s s t a r v i n g has a r i g h t t o food and t h i s i s 
because we t h i n k t h a t one of the d u t i e s of the s t a t e i s t o care f o r the 
d e s t i t u t e . . . I t i s now obvious t h a t r i g h t s can only e x i s t w i t h i n society 
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because they are a r e s u l t of o b l i g a t i o n s between people, not a. cause of such 
o b l i g a t i o n s . "-'-=' 
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CHAPTER FOUR: UTILITARIANISM AND JUSTICE 
"Nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain 
and pleasure. I t i s f o r them alone t o p o i n t out what we ought t o do, as well 
as t o determine what we s h a l l do."^ 
"The u t i l i t a r i a n h a b i t of mind has brought w i t h i t a new abstract c r u e l t y t o 
p o l i t i c s , a d u l l d e s t r u c t i v e p o l i t i c a l righteousness: a mechanical, 
q u a n t i t a t i v e t h i n k i n g , leaden academic minds s e t t i n g out t h e i r moral 
c a l c u l a t i o n s i n leaden a b s t r a c t prose , and more c i v i l i s e d and more 
s u p e r s t i t i o u s people destroyed because of enlightened c a l c u l a t i o n s t h a t have 
proved wrong. 
Many moral philosophers w r i t i n g on the subject of poverty and famine i n the 
T h i r d World attempt t o avoid the problems encountered by viewing the 
s i t u a t i o n from the perspective of the r i g h t s of the poor by looking instead 
at the o b l i g a t i o n s of the a f f l u e n t . Rather than attempting t o locate what 
r i g h t s human beings possess and then decide who has a duty t o ensure t h a t 
these r i g h t s are not v i o l a t e d , i t i s accepted by many t h a t i t i s more 
p r o f i t a b l e t o discover what o b l i g a t i o n s or d u t i e s each agent might have and 
what i n the circumstances of world hunger one must -do t o meet them. 
Obviously t h i s immedlatly r a i s e s the question of how such o b l i g a t i o n s are t o 
be established; t h a t i s , how one i s t o decide what d u t i e s one has an 
o b l i g a t i o n t o perform. Furthermore i t i s commonplace t o sub-divide such 
o b l i g a t i o n s i n t o those one merely 'ought' t o do and those i t would be wrong 
not t o do. I n such circumstances i t i s normal f o r moral philosophers t o 
appeal t o a general moral p r i n c i p l e , and then argue from these p r i n c i p l e s t o 
various p r e s c r i p t i o n s . 
Whilst i t i s c o r r e c t t o say t h a t " i t i s doubtless an exaggeration t o suggest 
t h a t . . . [ u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ] ... i s widely accepted as an u l t i m a t e moral p r i n c i p l e 
by p l a i n men and philosophers alike"®, i t i s nevertheless t r u e t h a t many 
modern moral philosophers have appealed t o the general consequentialist 
p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y i n order t o J u s t i f y t h e i r respective p o s i t i o n s on the 
debate on T h i r d World Aid, and f o r t h a t matter on every point of e t h i c a l 
dispute. The f i r s t philosopher t o e x p l i c i t l y promulgate the theory of 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m was Jeremy Bentham, who as mentioned i n chapter 2, p r i m a r i l y 
saw i t as a means t o p r o v i d i n g a c r i t e r i o n f o r l e g i s l a t o r s and other s o c i a l 
d e c i s i o n makers. However not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h i s was d i f f i c u l t t o i s o l a t e from 
p r i n c i p l e s of p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y , and John Stuart M i l l i n h i s celebrated t e x t 
" U t i l i t a r i a n i s m " f i r s t developed the d o c t r i n e t o apply t o personal moral 
d e l i b e r a t i o n . I n the f o l l o w i n g 130 years much has been w r i t t e n on the 
subject and f o r every c r i t i c there has been at l e a s t another ready t o 
advocate a u t i l i t a r i a n approach, w i t h or without some s l i g h t reformulation. 
However w i t h i n the context of poverty and famine the f a c t t h a t arguments f o r 
the West t o f u r t h e r a i d the poor, t o give no a i d t o the poor, or t o maintain 
the s t a t u s quo immediatly r a i s e s suspicion as t o the adequacy of such an 
approach. 
The basis of the u t i l i t a r i a n d o c t r i n e i s the Greatest Happiness P r i n c i p l e 
whereby the m o r a l i t y of an a c t i o n i s assessed i n terms of the happiness i t 
produces, or perhaps the diminuation of human s u f f e r i n g i t causes. Just as 
an i n d i v i d u a l when he or she has only himself or h e r s e l f t o consider, makes 
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up h i s or her mind what t o do i n terms of what w i l l give the greatest 
pleasure, so a member of s o c i e t y concerned w i t h the i n t e r e s t s of others as 
we l l as as h i s or her own, must make up h i s or her mind i n terms of what 
w i l l produce the grea t e s t happiness f o r the greatest number. Thus according 
t o the theory of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a c t i o n s are t o be judged s o l e l y i n terms of 
t h e i r consequences;in terms of the pleasure and happiness they involve: 
"By the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y i s meant the p r i n c i p l e which approves or 
disapproves of every a c t i o n whatsoever, according t o the tendency which i t 
appears t o have t o augmeiit or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
i n t e r e s t i s i n question: or, what i s the same t h i n g i n other words, t o 
promote or t o oppose t h a t happiness."" 
"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals. U t i l i t y , or the 
Greatest Happiness P r i n c i p l e , holds t h a t actions are r i g h t i n pro p o r t i o n as 
they tend t o promote happiness, wrong as they tend t o promote the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness i s intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the p r i v a t i o n of pleasure."^ 
There i s no doubt t h a t the u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e has proved a powerful 
reforming weapon. Bentham himself worked hard f o r s o c i a l reform, f i g h t i n g 
against slavery, f o r the extension of the franchaise and f o r the improvement 
of penal c o n d i t i o n s . Furthermore he put forward forward t h i n k i n g plans f o r 
f r e e education, sickness b e n e f i t and even a minimum wage, not yet even 
accepted today. I n the past u t i l i t a r i a n t h i n k i n g has c o n t r i b u t e d towards the 
undermining of p o s i t i o n s of p r i v i l e g e and helped elevate the well-being of 
the whole community t o be the primary o b j e c t i v e of both p o l i t i c a l and 
economic a c t i o n . 
Moreover u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s also an a t t r a c t v e e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e on a 
t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l f o r several reasons. Above a l l i t avoids any appeal t o 
transcendental notions of r i g h t and wrong, p r e f e r r i n g an appeal t o the 
simple concept of happiness t o metaphysical or r e l i g i o u s speculation. Indeed 
f o r many i t i s merely commonsense t h a t happiness i s good and t h a t 
unhappiness i s bad. Few a f t e r a l l would claim t h a t the aim of happiness i s 
anything other than i n d i s p u t a b l e . Both Bentham and M i l l believed t h i s t o be 
s e l f - e v i d e n t : happiness they believed t o be the u l t i m a t e end of a l l actions 
and should be acknowledged as s e l f - e v i d e n t l y good needing no f u r t h e r appeal 
f o r support. This theory i s i n t e l l i g i b l e and simple, r e s t r i c t i n g i t s e l f t o 
the f a c t s and avoiding the s o r t of f a n c i f u l notions and i d e a l i s t i c chatter 
o f t e n associated w i t h m o r a l i t y . Concepts such as n a t u r a l r i g h t s (dismissed 
by Bentham as "nonsense on s t i l t s " ) are avoided and the m o r a l i t y of an 
a c t i o n can supposedly be e a s i l y determined, merely by assessing the u t i l i t y 
of the consequences. A l l cases of moral ob s c u r i t y are merely matters of 
t e c h n i c a l l i m i t a t i o n where the consequences of an a c t i o n might be deemed to 
be i n doubt. Furthermore such a d o c t r i n e also almost complete sidesteps the 
problem of agency, discussed i n chapter 2. I t matters not whether an 
i n d i v i d u a l , a m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporation, or goverment c a r r i e s out an act: 
i t s moral worth can be assessed i n the same way each case. As O'Neill notes: 
" [ U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ] s h i f t E s ] e a s i l y between t a l k i n g about the o b l i g a t i o n s of 
nations and those of i n d i v i d u a l s . This ambidexterity has been a part of the 
u t i l i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n of thought ever since Bentham wrote " P r i n c i p l e s of 
Morals and L e g i s l a t i o n . " ^ 
This i s e s p e c i a l l y important i n a context such as world poverty where as 
p r e v i o u s l y concluded governmental a c t i o n alone w i l l make much impact on the 
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s i t u a t i o n . Also w i t h p a r t i c u l a r regard t o the issues covered i n t h i s t h e s i s 
u t i l i t a r i a n t h i n k i n g avoids the problems created by the geographical 
distance o f t e n between the s u f f e r i n g and those i n a p o s i t i o n t o do sonething 
about i t . Often i t i s argued t h a t since the d e s t i t u t e and poor might be i n a 
d i f f e r e n t country, or because one i s not i n any special r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
such people i t t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w s t h a t one has no o b l i g a t i o n s at a l l . 
U t i l i t a r i a n arguments cut through such objections: i t matters not whether 
those a f f e c t e d by one's a c t i o n s are near or f a r away, whether they are 
neighbours or strangers, f e l l o w countrymen or foreigners. What matters alone 
i s the net u t i l i t y of each a c t i o n . Hence Peter Singer argues t h a t : 
" I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how any sound moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the view that 
distance, or community membership, makes a c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e t o our 
o b l i g a t i o n s . "^ 
Despite t h i s , or i n some people's minds because of some of the above 
reasons, u t i l i t a r i a n i s m has a t t r a c t e d a great deal of c r i t i c i s m . One of the 
most powerful c r i t c i s m s comes i n Bernard Williams' "A C r i t i q u e of 
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m " . Williams concludes h i s work thus: 
" U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ....runs against the complexities of moral thought: 
....because of i t s consequentialism ....view of happiness ....great simple-
mindedness. The demands of p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and complexities of p o l i t i c a l 
thought are o b s t i n a n t l y what they are, and i n the face of them the simple-
mindedness of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m d i s q u a l i f i e s i t t o t a l l y ...The day cannot be 
too f a r o f f i n which we hear no more of i t . ' " ^ 
To run through a l l the c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against Bentham and M i l l would be 
both too time consuming and beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . I t i s more than 
adequate t o concentrate on three main areas of c r i t i c i s m , each powerful 
enough t o render u t i l i t a r i a n i s m useless as a doctrine f o r assessing moral 
judgements. The f i r s t revolves around the issue of happiness: how i t can be 
defined, whether i t i s o b j e c t i v e and how i t can be measured. The importance 
of e m p i r i c a l evidence and knowledge of the f u l l outcome of each ac t i o n w i l l 
also be stressed. The second concerns the d i f f e r e n c e or s i m i l a r i t y between 
acts c a r r i e d out and those which are not, commonly r e f e r r e d t o as the acts 
and omissions d o c t r i n e . The t h i r d area of discussion w i l l be the connection 
between u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and j u s t i c e . A common c r i t i c i s m l e v e l l e d against 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s t h a t i t appears t h a t no a c t i o n can be defined as unjust or 
a b s o l u t e l y wrong. I t appears t h a t p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , or ra t h e r the greatest 
happiness f o r the greatest number might e a s i l y be allowed t o override what 
i s commonly assumed t o be j u s t . 
Bentham believed t h a t the happiness of p a r t i c u l a r actions could be 
c a l c u l a t e d through a system of ' f e l i c i f i c calculus', whereby seven aspects 
of the happiness of an a c t i o n would be taken ino account: i t s i n t e n s i t y , 
d u r a t i o n , c e r t a i n t y or u n c e r t a i n t y , p r o p i n q u i t y or remoteness, fecundity, 
p u r i t y , and extent.-' However i t has t o be said t h a t i t i s v i r t u a l l y 
impossible t o reduce happiness t o measurable and comparable q u a n t i t i e s i n 
such easy terms. As O'Neill p o i n t s out; 
" I f we assess Bentham's system soberly and discout some of h i s enthusiasm, 
we might conclude t h a t i t s scope i s large but i t s p r e c i s i o n spurious. For i f 
we can't do the c a l c u l a t i o n s , we won't get answers a t a l l . " " ^ 
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M i l l was more s c e p t i c a l about the f e l l c l f i c calculus, and also pointed out 
t h a t there also q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s between d i f f e r e n t kinds of 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between higher and lower pleasures: 
" I t i s b e t t e r t o be a human being d i s s a t i s f i e d than a p i g s a t i s f i e d ; b e t t e r 
t o be Socrates d i s s a t i s f i e d than a f o o l s a t i s f i e d . And i f the f o o l , or the 
pig , i s of a d i f f e r e n t opinion, i t i s because they only know t h e i r own side 
of the question. The other p a r t y t o the comparison knows both sides."'^ 
Despite M i l l ' s s c epticism he s t i l l obviously believed t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
was r i g h t i n theory. However such p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s do mean t h a t any 
serious u t i l i t a r i a n w i l l encounter insurmountable problems i n d a i l y l i f e . 
How the moral agent should equate physical pleasures such as eating or 
sexual i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h more a e s t h e t i c or s p i r i t u a l pleasures i s l e f t very 
much unanswered. Moreover happiness or pleasure i s a very subjective 
experience: what some people f i n d enjoyable may b r i n g pain t o others. 
U t i l i t a r i a n t h i n k e r s and l e g i s l a t o r s tend t o base t h e i r judgements on the 
p a t e r n a l i s t assumption t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l desires the same things as 
everyone else. For instance humanitarian a i d i s provided on the assumption 
t h a t the poor desire food and clean water. However were the actual 
preferences of those i n the T h i r d World taken i n t o account, i t i s pausible 
t o assume t h a t there might be cases where many "care as much (or more) about 
land, caste, t r i b e , t r a d i t i o n a l ways of l i f e and r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n s as 
they do about m a t e r i a l needs."'^ 
D i f f i c u l t i e s are also encountered i f one considers how one can compare the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of one thousand pounds t o one person w i t h the same amount 
d i v i d e d between one thousand? More people w i l l b e n e f i t i n the l a t t e r case 
but t h e i r reward w i l l be f a r less considerable than i f i t were a l l donated 
t o j u s t one person. I f one i s forced t o make Judgements such as t h i s each 
time one makes a de c i s i o n then one would be forced t o l i v e a very "morally 
strenuous l i f e " . 
The need t o assess the r e s u l t s of an a c t i o n so c a r e f u l l y i n a 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t theory such as u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , also places a v i t a l 
importance on the v a l i d i t y of one's f a c t u a l premises. Unlike some moral 
t h e o r i e s such as Kantianism, where the motive of the agent assumes 
predominance; u t i l i t a r i a n i s m demands t h a t the moral agent bears f u l l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the complete consequences of every a c t i o n committed. 
Thomas Nagel captures the absurdity of such complete concentration on the 
consequences by n o t i n g t h a t by such c r i t e r i a : 
" I f one n e g l i g e n t l y leaves the bath running w i t h the baby i n i t one w i l l 
r e a l i s e , as one bounds up the s t a i r s , towards the bathroom, t h a t i f the baby 
has drowned one has done something awful, whereas i f i t has not one has 
merely been careless."''^ 
Furthermore c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t t h i n k i n g also demands t h a t when assessing the 
r e l a t i v e m e r i t s or demerits of p a r t i c u l a r courses of a c t i o n one considers 
the long-term as w e l l as short-term r e s u l t s . Bearing i n mind the chain 
r e a c t i o n t h a t even the most inocuous a c t i o n s might have t h i s leaves the 
moral agent i n a very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible p o s i t i o n . 
" U t i l i t a r i a n s may s t a r t out wanting t o be r e a l i s t s who can soberly c a l c u l a t e 
the outcomes and the odds; but there seems t o be no n a t u r a l stopping p o i n t 
before they f i n d themselves t r y i n g t o be f u t u r o l o g i s t s who seek to uncover 
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the impact of t h e i r a c t i o n s , or t h a t of t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n a vast and 
complex web t h a t extends i n d e f i n i t e l y i n t o the f u t u r e . "^ '^  
This o b j e c t i o n might be thought t o be very much an abstract problem and not 
i n i t s e l f conclusive, but the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p r a c t i c a l e t h i c a l reasoning 
are very great. The problems caused are very w e l l h i g h l i g h t e d by the 
d i f f e r i n g conclusions reached by various moral t h i n k e r s a l l i n the 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , and who can a l l be roughly described as 
" u t i l i t a r i a n " , as t o the moral s t a t u s of famine r e l i e f . I n the opening 
chapter reference was made t o the "ffeo-Malthuslan" and "Developmentalist" 
schools of thought. Representatives of the f i r s t , such as Garret Hardin or 
Joseph Fletcher, believe t h a t the West or the r i c h ought not t o r e l i e v e 
famine. On the other hand others w i t h a more developmentalist perspective or 
more o p t i m i s t i c neo-Malthusians, such as Nick Eberstadt or Peter Singer, 
believe t h a t on the contary the a f f l u e n t do have an o b l i g a t i o n t o ensure 
t h a t famine i s r e l i e v e d . 
Both Hardin and Fletcher base t h e i r conclusions on the b e l i e f t h a t a i d i s 
l i k e l y t o do more harm than good and i s wrong, not because they believe t h a t 
the l i v e s of the s t a r v i n g are worthless and do not deserve saving, but 
because i n the long term i t would lead t o more s t a r v i n g and more deaths. 
Hardin s t a t e s t h a t : 
"However humanitarian our I n t e n t , every Indian l i f e saved through medical or 
n u t r i t i o n a l assistance from abroad diminishes the q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r those 
who remain, and f o r subsequent generations."^® 
Hardin employs a l i f e b o a t metaphor t o describe the problems c o n f r o n t i n g the 
world. He believes t h a t a f f l u e n t c o u n t r i e s can be l i k e n e d t o l i f e b o a t s 
f l o a t i n g i n a sea where the peoples of the poor countries are swimming. He 
then asks whether the passengers aboard each l i f e b o a t should l e t others j o i n 
the l i f e b o a t , and i f so by what c r i t e r i a they should be chosen. Hardin 
accepts t h a t the people i n the l i f e b o a t s have the capacity t o help some of 
those drowning i n the sea, but believes t h a t i n r e a l i t y t h i s can only be a 
very small number of people, and t h a t i n the long run such moves would be 
disasterous; 
"The boat swamps, everyone drowns. Complete j u s t i c e , complete 
catastrophe."^ ^ 
Hardin reaches t h i s conclusion on the assumption t h a t once some of those 
who were drowning are rescued they w i l l m u l t i p l y at an unsustainable rate 
c r e a t i n g a demand on the world's f i n i t e resources which f a r o u t s t r i p s 
supply. S i m i l a r l y Fletcher argues t h a t the population of some countries i s 
so large t h a t s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i s impossible. Therefore t o give a i d i n times 
of c r i s i s i s wrong because i t merely stores up problems f o r the f u t u r e , and 
deprives other people of the l i m i t e d amount of a i d a v a i l a b l e where i t might 
be put t o b e t t e r e f f e c t ; 
"We w i l l contend t h a t i n at l e a s t a few cases c e r t a i n c ountries have 
exceeded t h e i r b i o l o g i c a l c a r r y i n g capacity, and therefore t o give them food 
i s immoral, "'^ 
Instead Fletcher believes t h a t a i d should be a l l o c a t e d on a t r i a g e 
principle,'® I n other words t h i s means t h a t resources should be given t o 
those who can b e n e f i t most: a i d should n e i t h e r be given t o those who can 
probably get by without i t , nor t o those who i t probably wouldn't help 
37 
survive, Instead i t should be given t o those who can b e n e f i t most, l a b e l l e d 
by Fletcher as "T h i r d and Fourth World countries", as opposed t o " F i f t h 
World c o u n t r i e s " , "which are u n l i k e the T h i r d and Fourth World countries 
because they are b i o l o g i c a l l y stymied, without a r a t i o n a l l y founded hope 
unless they reduce t h e i r population and r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r soil",'® 
In sum Fl e t c h e r believes t h a t : 
"Even i f we f e e l we ought t o help Third and f o u r t h World countries (as I f o r 
one do), we ought not t o send food t o the chronic-famine countries no matter 
how saddened or upset we are by t h e i r plight,,.Our wealth and a b i l i t y t o 
r e l i e v e hunger are morally i r r e l e v a n t , because the consequence sometimes of 
feeding the s t a r v i n g i s t o make thi n g s worse i n terms of human well-being. 
Feeding the hungry i n some co u n t r i e s only keeps them a l i v e longer t o produce 
more hungry b e l l i e s and disease and death. "'^'^  
Hardin, and Fletcher t o a lesser s p e c i f i c degree, have been widely 
c r i t i c i s e d . For example the mataphor employed by Hardin i s not flawless. As 
pointed out by O'Neill-"-' persons i n l i f e b o a t s o f t e n have a r i g h t t o t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n s , on the other hand the West i n many cases appears t o have acquired 
i t s wealth through the past and present e x p l o i t a t i o n of the Thir d world, and 
th e r e f o r e may not be e n t i t l e d t o what they have. I t may very w e l l be the 
case t h e r e f o r e t h a t they have a duty t o give up t h e i r places i n the 
l i f e b o a t . Moreover those i n l i f e b o a t s do not generally share the same 
i n t e r e s t s as those drowning - f u r t h e r rescue attempts jeopardise the 
wellbelng of those already aboard whereas i t i s not cle a r t h a t the wellbeing 
of the a f f l u e n t i s put i n serious danger by famine r e l i e f . Indeed as O'Neill 
puts i t h e r s e l f ; 
"The i n t e r e s t s of the r i c h and the poor are o f t e n congruent, while those of 
the rescued and the drowning are d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed. Everybody has an 
i n t e r e s t i n the preservation of peace and i n the prevention of 
ecocatastrophes, 
More important, since u l t i m a t e l y Hardin's argument i s not dependant upon the 
use of the l i f e b o a t metaphor, are c r i t i c i s m s regarding h i s re l i a n c e upon 
p e s s i m i s t i c neo-Malthusian premisses. F i r s t , Hardin tends t o argue t h a t the 
globa l population i s reaching a poi n t which can no longer be supported by 
the world's resources. He makes a spec i a l p o i n t of arguing t h a t only a small 
p r o p o r t i o n of those drowning can be rescued by the l i f e b o a t s of the a f f l u e n t 
c o u n t r i e s . Others however have argued t h a t the world can support a 
population f a r l a r g e r than even the l a r g e s t projected popuation i n the next 
century, Nick Eberstadt, f o r instance, argues t h a t Hardin merely contributes 
towards the "Myths of the Food C r i s i s " , and provides evidence t h a t the world 
could produce enough food f o r "between t h i r t y - e i g h t and f o r t y - e i g h t b i l l i o n 
people on a European diet."*'-' Present estimates however suggest t h a t the 
world's population w i l l s t a b i l i s e a t 10.1 b i l l i o n by the year 2045.='' 
Furthermore he also argues t h a t each country should be able given the r i g h t 
c o n d i t i o n s t o provide enough food f o r the whole of i t s population destroying 
Fletcher's contention t h a t many countries have exceeded t h e i r b i o l o g i c a l 
c a r r y i n g capacity. 
Second, Hardin assumes t h a t population growth w i l l continue t o grow at 
present l e v e l s i n the T h i r d World even i f resources are t r a n s f e r r e d from the 
West, quoting Alan Gregg who i t i s alleged: 
" . . . l i k e n e d the growth and spread of humanity over the surface of the earth 
t o the spread of cancer i n the human body, remarking t h a t "cancerous growths 
demand food; but as f a r as I know, they have never been cured by g e t t i n g 
i t . " 
However i n the West a demographic t r a n s i t i o n took place f o l l o w i n g an 
improvement i n the general standard of l i v i n g and there i s no reason t o 
suppose t h a t t h i s might not happen i n the poorest countries of the world 
today. Economic growth and an improvement i n nourishment and medical 
a t t e n t i o n , a l l of which can be stimulated by Western I n t e r v e n t i o n , i t must 
be assumed, w i l l lead t o a h a l t i n the r a p i d r i s e i n population rather than 
vice-versa. 
By c o n t r a s t those u t i l i t a r i a n s viewing the s i t u a t i o n from a more o p t i m i s t i c 
perspective believe t h a t the duty t o a i d the poor i s obvious. Eberstadt 
concludes t h a t : 
"There i s no l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r hunger of any kind anywhere; enough 
food i s produced each year t o feed anyone on the earth comfortably. "=^"^'' 
Peter Singer adds t h a t : 
"We have an o b l i g a t i o n t o help those i n absolute poverty which i s no less 
s t r o n g than our o b l i g a t i o n t o rescue a drowning c h i l d from a pond."^'' 
Singer reaches h i s conclusions i n h i s i n f l u e n t i a l a r t i c l e 'Famine, Affluence 
and Morality'^-'-" from a set of apparently uncontroversial premises. The f i r s t 
i s t h a t poverty i s bad, a premiss t h a t would be disputed by few, whose 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c p o s i t i o n s need not be worried about anyway. The second i s t h a t 
i f we can prevent something bad without s a c r i f i c i n g anything of "comparable 
moral s i g n i f i c a n c e " , we ought t o do i t . Singer here i s d e l i b e r a t l y vague 
here i n an attempt t o appeal t o those p u t t i n g more store by i n d i v i d u a l 
r i g h t s , e q u a l i t y or the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y as well as 
u t i l i t a r i a n s . Elsewhere Singer reveals h i s strong u t i l i t a r i a n leanings and 
f o r the purposes of t h i s discussion t h i s second assumption can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d as an appeal t o the Greatest Happiness P r i n c i p l e . The t h i r d 
premiss, upon which the argument as a whole r e l i e s , i s t h a t there i s some 
absolute poverty which can be prevented without s a c r i f i c i n g anything of 
comparable moral s i g n i f i c a n c e . Broadly speaking t h i s can be i n t e r p r e t e d as 
saying t h a t g i v i n g money t o the T h i r d World w i l l cause more happiness or 
diminuation of unhappiness than spending the same money on, say, a family 
holiday or new clothes. This c o n t r a d i c t s the p e s s i m i s t i c neo-Malthusian 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t a i d i s counterproductive, leading merely t o a worsening of 
the s i t u a t i o n ; 
"So i f we t h i n k t h a t we ought t o do acts t h a t w i l l prevent or reduce 
s u f f e r i n g , or s t i l l b e t t e r , produce happiness, then i t seems t h a t there i s 
l i t t l e doubt t h a t we ought t o r e l i e v e famine, even i f i t costs us a f a i r 
amount of minor unhappiness t o do so."^-" 
There appears l i t t l e divergence i n the moral t h i n k i n g of Singer or Eberstadt 
and Hardin or Fletcher. However they reach s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t conclusions 
due t o t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion as t o the effect i v e n e s s of famine 
r e l i e f . The P r i n c i p l e of U t i l i t y demands t h a t one allows nature t o take i t s 
course according t o Hardin, and i t demands t h a t one intervene i n what ever 
manner i s p r a c t i c a l i n order t o r e l i e v e s u f f e r i n g according t o Singer. 
C l e a r l y these two conclusions are incompatible and both cannot be correct. 
On. t h i s basis i t may be argued t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m has f a i l e d i n i t s task t o 
define what i s r i g h t and wrong. C l e a r l y e m p i r i c a l evidence can be studied i n 
order t o judge whether famine r e l i e f or other a i d i s l i k e l y t o be 
b e n e f i c i a l , and i n my opinion the overwhelming evidence i s t h a t there are 
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forms i n which i t i s more than l i k e l y t h a t i t w i l l be. But t h i s cannot be 
determined i n each i n d i v i d u a l case where a decision must be made whether 
money should be given over t o the Th i r d World a i d cause, and i f so i n which 
exact manner. Unless u t i l i t a r i a n s are " f u t u r o l o g i s t s " they cannot be c e r t a i n 
of the precise e f f e c t s of t h e i r actions and th e r e f o r e cannot be sure whether 
proposed a c t i o n are morally r i g h t , wrong or i n d i f f e r e n t . Therefore one might 
have an o b l i g a t i o n t o those f a r away, whose i n d i v i d u a l circumstances are not 
known t o us, but on the other hand one might not, depending upon whether or 
not a i d " a c t u a l l y causes more pain than i t alleviates."®*-"' I t must be 
repeated t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s concerned w i t h r e s u l t s alone and confronts 
the moral agent w i t h impossible c a l c u l a t i o n s . 
The second main area of c r i t i c i s m , l e v e l l e d against u t i l i t a r i a n d octrine, t o 
be considered i s what i s commonly r e f e r r e d t o as acts and omissions 
d o c t r i n e . I n essence t h i s i s the p o s i t i o n , o f t e n r e c i t e d i n the euthanasia 
debate, t h a t k i l l i n g and a l l o w i n g t o die have an i n t r i n s i c moral difference. 
The d o c t r i n e i t s e l f s t a t e s t h a t i n c e r t a i n contexts the f a i l u r e t o perform 
an act, w i t h c e r t a i n forseen consequences, i s morally less bad than t o 
perform another act w i t h forseen bad consequences of an i d e n t i c a l kind. For 
instance P h i l i p p a Foot argues t h a t i t i s : 
"nonsense t o , , , [ n o t ] , , . make a d i s t i n c t i o n between allowing people die i n 
underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s t o die of s t a r v a t i o n and sending them poisoned 
food."=='' 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y at face value t h i s d o c t r i n e receives a l o t of i n t r i n s i c 
support. Many would" consider i t ludicrous t h a t each and every one of us 
should be branded a murderer j u s t because of our f a i l u r e t o support famine 
r e l i e f and other a i d p r o j e c t s t o a s u f f i c i e n t degree. The abandonment of i t 
would place an i n t o l e r a b l e burden upon everybody, and Jonathan Glover 
suggests t h a t the acts and omissions d o c t r i n e i s i m p l i c i t l y accepted by our 
use of moral language.®^' I t can be pointed out t h a t there are also many 
e x t r i n s i c differences.For example o f t e n the v i c t i m of an ommission cannot be 
located or t h a t the c e r t a i n t y of any harm a r i s i n g cannot always be known. 
Moreover i t can be pointed out t h a t many omissions simply occur through 
ignorance. The d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t the widespread adoption of such a doctrine 
might cause can also be pointed t o . 
However any serious philosopher appealing t o a p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y must 
r e j e c t the acts and omissions do c t r i n e . I n reaching h i s conclusion t h a t 
one's duty t o r e l i e v e absolute poverty i s incumbent upon one u n t i l a point 
of marginal u t i l i t y , where g i v i n g would cause more s u f f e r i n g than i t would 
prevent. Singer appeals t o the argument t h a t k i l l i n g and al l o w i n g t o die 
have no i n t r i n s i c moral d i f f e r e n c e . This i n c i d e n t a l l y might be disputed by 
those more concerned w i t h i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s or equity and i s one of the 
reasons why Singer's argument can only be s e r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d as a 
u t i l i t a r i a n t r a c t , despite h i s attempts t o give i t wider appeal. I t i s 
however a f a c t which f o r a u t i l i t a r i a n cannot be disputed. 
Singer and other u t i l t a r i a n s such as Louis Pascal argue t h a t i t r e a l l y 
doesn't matter whether one played any causative r o l e i n the p l i g h t of the 
poor, one s t i l l has a duty t o give a i d : 
"Imagine you are walking along a r i v e r bank when you come upon a man 
drowning j u s t a few f e e t offshore. There i s a rope l y i n g on the bank, but 
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you do not throw i t t o him. . . I n my book, you are as much a murderer as i f 
he had by v a l i a n t l y s t r u g g l i n g made i t t o the bank, and you had had pushed 
him back i n . . . W r itten i n t h i s way, we can see c l e a r l y why the sins of 
omission are as serious as the sins of commission: there i s r e a l l y no such 
t h i n g as omission. "'"'"^  
Therefore according t o L.Pascal r e f u s a l t o give a i d w i l l i n e f f e c t make one 
as g u i l t y as the man on the riverbank. Moreover the more one examines such a 
scenario the more complicated i t becomes: what i f the problem i s being 
caused by a government which refuses t o spend any money importing g r a i n or 
a g r i c u l t u r a l know-how but i n s i s t s on i n v e s t i n g i n the l a t e s t h i t e c m i l i t a r y 
hardware, or i f the indigenous people refuse t o give up an a g r i c u l t u r a l l y 
nomadic l i f e s t y l e , even though environmental changes mean t h a t t h i s i s no 
longer f e a s i b l e ? Many w i l l consider t h a t one doesnt have a duty t o keep 
throwing the rope i n t o the r i v e r , i f everytime the helpless v i c t i m i s pushed 
back i n t o the r i v e r by h i s government. I n f a c t the more one considers 
Pascal's analogy the more inadequate i t becomes. Throwing a nearby rope i n t o 
a r i v e r while l e i s u r e l y walking on the bank takes comparatively l i t t l e time 
or e f f o r t . Taking a c t i v e steps t o r e l i e v e poverty i n the Third World could 
never be considered so easy. 
One encounters d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the same way when one considers along the 
same l i n e s how f a r those on the Thir d World should be aided. Pascal, as well 
as Singer, argues t h a t one must continue t o provide a i d up t o a point of 
marginal u t i l i t y . Most though would regard t h i s as p l a c i n g a supei-erogatory 
o b l i g a t i o n upon oneself. But by the same p r i n c i p l e s i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o 
argue, as some have t r i e d , t h a t one has only a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o ensure that 
the poor have enough t o eat so t h a t they do not starve t o death. Such a l i n e 
of reasoning accords a sp e c i a l s t a t u s t o l i f e i n i t s e l f (akin t o the 
B i b l i c a l s a n c t i t y of l i f e ) which has no place i n u t i l i t a r i a n thought. 
However i f one does not attempt t o do t h i s , there appears l i t t l e reason why 
one should not attempt t o help, or even enforce one's aid, upon those i n any 
country where the standard of l i v i n g , or amount of pleasure o v e r a l l , i s not 
as high as i t could be, due f o r example t o the i n e f f icencies of a 
c e n t r a l i s e d economy, or a very p u r i t a n i c a l , s t a t e r e l i g i o n . Michael D. 
Bayles^" p a i n t s out t h a t many w r i t e r s i n t h i s f i e l d of e t h i c s concentrate on 
preventing something bad, implying t h a t i f famine does not take place then 
there i s no need f o r a i d . But he c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s out t h a t by the same token 
such f a c t o r s as s h o r t e r l i f e expectancy must also be addressed and p o s i t i v e 
a i d provided. Yet he i s quick t o admit t h a t such things as 'normal' l i f e 
expectancy would be impossible t o define. 
Another e f f e c t of the Importance of acts of omission, or negative 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s t h a t , as Williams argues, i t tends t o debase the moral 
currency. An a c t i v e and conscious u t i l i t a r i a n must be prepared t o carry out 
pre-emptive acts i n order t o prevent bad acts from being c a r r i e d out. Thus 
i n e f f e c t one "must always be j u s t i f i e d i n doing the lea s t bad t h i n g which 
i s necessary t o prevent the worst t h i n g t h a t would otherwise happen i n the 
circumstances."-^** Thus a form of Gresham's Law operates as bad men e l i c i t 
a cts from b e t t e r men which would be bad themselves i n other circumstances. 
For instance i f i t i s known t h a t a t e r r o r i s t Intends t o murder three people 
i t i s presumably r i g h t t o k i l l him f i r s t . However the o v e r a l l e f f e c t of t h i s 
according t o Williams i s t h a t an e s c a l a t i o n of preemptive a c t i v i t y must be 
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expected, the o v e r a l l consequences of which, by u t i l i t a r i a n standards as 
w e l l as any other, w i l l be worse than i f none were ever c a r r i e d out at a l l . 
Accordingly i t seems u t i l i t a r i a n s must not l i v e l i f e according t o the 
p r i n c i p l e s which they themselves hold dear. 
Attempts t o solve t h i s problem lead t o the t h i r d area of controversy t o be 
examined; t h a t of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and j u s t i c e . The lack of regard f o r matters 
of j u s t i c e i s a common c r i t i c i s m of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . Joseph Butler, f o r 
instance, h i g h l i g h t e d the numerous crimes which might be j u s t i f i e d i n the 
name of benevolence, arguing t h a t the p r o t e c t i o n of happiness must be 
contained w i t h i n the l i m i t s of " v e r a c i t y and j u s t i c e " . Consequently many 
u t i l i t a r i a n s have argued t h a t i n the long run i t i s f o r the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number t h a t everyone should be granted basic 
r i g h t s which considerations of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t should not be allowed t o 
overide. 
This i s e s s e n t i a l l y the d i f f e r e n c e between a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and r u l e -
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . A c t - u t i l i t a r i a n s , such as Bentham himself, argue t h a t the 
r i g h t n e s s or wrongness of an a c t i o n should be judged by the consequences of 
each a c t i o n I t s e l f . R u l e - u t i l i t a r i a n s however believe t h a t u t i l i t y can be 
served best i f some act i o n s are c a r r i e d out a t a l l times, i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
the p a r t i c u l a r consequences i n each instance. The Greatest Happiness 
P r i n c i p l e demands t h a t maxims such as 'Do not k i l l innocent people' are 
obeyed at a l l times i t i s believed, even i f by doing i n one case the l i v e s 
of t e n others might be saved. Some argue t h a t by t h i s method one can avoid 
debaseing the moral currency as described e a r l i e r . 
One p a r t i c u l a r type of u t i l i t a r i a n r u l e are those r u l e s of j u s t i c e , 
although they are s p e c i a l i n the mind of M i l l and many others. According t o 
M i l l o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e are those which t o which others have a r i g h t . 
M i l l e x plains how j u s t i c e concerns s e c u r i t y , and t h a t those r i g h t s which 
others are obliged t o respect r e l a t e t o one's need t o be secure against 
attack. This i s why i t i s unjust t o k i l l or imprison an Innocent person, or 
s t e a l h i s property. Duties of beneficence however, i t i s argued, cannot be 
claimed by others and thus can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from d u t i e s of Justice. 
O'Neill describes the r e l a t i o n s h i p w e l l : 
"As a u t i l i t a r i a n , one may have an o b l i g a t i o n t o share one's good fortune 
w i t h needy others, since doing so would presumably increase the t o t a l 
happiness of humankind. But one cannot share w i t h a l l others, since they are 
too many, and i t i s not possible t o t e l l who has the best claim t o 
beneficence. There are no r i g h t s t o beneficent acts as there are r i g h t s t o 
acts of J u s t i c e , "®'=^  
I t i s very common f o r u t i l i t a r i a n t h i n k e r s t o appeal t o the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between j u s t i c e and beneficence i n order t o avoid reaching the same 
conclusions as Peter Singer t h a t one should give a i d t o the needy up t o a 
p o i n t of marginal u t i l i t y , P h i l i p p a Foot f o r instance argues t h a t one has a 
negative duty t o r e f r a i n from acts of i n j u s t i c e such as k i l l i n g , but merely 
a p o s i t i v e duty t o give money t o T h i r d World C h a r i t i e s , She suggests that 
negative d u t i e s are f a r more important than p o s i t i v e duties. I t i s 
f r e q u e n t l y asserted t h a t i t i s morally wrong not t o observe one's duties of 
j u s t i c e , and t h a t while one 'ought' t o be beneficent i t i s not s t r i c t l y 
u n just or wrong not t o be. 
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However while the d i s t i n c t i o n between j u s t i c e and benevolence may prove t o 
be an e x c e l l e n t device i n determining the o b l i g a t i o n s of the West w i t h 
respect t o the T h i r d World, i t i s d o u b t f u l whether i t i s d i f f e r e n c e which 
u t i l i t a r i a n s are l o g i c a l l y able t o make. This i s because a u t i l i t a r i a n must 
derive a l l d u t i e s from an appeal t o u t i l i t y . U t i l i t a r i a n Rules of Justice, 
l i k e any other r u l e s derived from the P r i n c i p l e of U t i l i t y by r u l e -
u t i l i t a r i a n s w i l l collapse i n t o mere r u l e s of thumb i f adequatly formulated. 
J. J, C, Smart accepts H. J,McClosky's argument t h a t i f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s 
c o r r e c t then a s h e r i f f may be forced t o frame an innocent man i f t h i s saves 
l i v e s from a threatened r i o t . I n some cases i t might be b e t t e r i n the long 
run not t o do so, and avoid possibly weakening the respect f o r the law, 
which might happen were the s h e r i f f t o be found out, or cause i n s e c u r i t y 
among other innocent people. But i n other cases the l i v e s saved could e a s i l y 
j u s t i f y such t h r e a t s . Even M i l l acknowledged t h a t there might be times when 
r u l e s of j u s t i c e might be overridden: 
" P a r t i c u l a r cases may occur i n which some other s o c i a l duty i s so important, 
as t o overrule any one of the general maxims of j u s t i c e . Thus t o save a 
l i f e , i t may not only be allowable but a duty, t o s t e a l , or take by force 
the necessary food or medicine, or t o kidnap, and compel t o o f f i c i a t e the 
only q u a l i f i e d medical p r a c t i t i o n e r . " ^ ' ' 
Smart, himself an ardent u t i l i t a r i a n , admits t h a t " i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o 
show t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m could, i n c e r t a i n exceptional circumstances, have 
some very h o r r i b l e consequences."^® The ' t r i a g e ' p r i n c i p l e described e a r l i e r 
could e a s i l y f i t i n t o j u s t such a category. Preserving as many l i v e s as 
possible would appear t o be a u t i l i t a r i a n goal, yet t o d e l i b e r a t l y s a c r i f i c e 
the l i v e s of some would appear t o many as unjust and hence immoral. 
S i m i l a r l y the advice of Hardin t o allow nature t o take i t s course i n famine-
s t r i k e n areas also appears t o be morally abhorrent. Even Singer, who 
probably argues t h a t the West should go f u r t h e r t o a i d the poor than anyone 
else, takes on a neo-Malthusian stance of s o r t s i n " P r a c t i c a l Ethics". He 
sees no o b l i g a t i o n t o give food a i d i n a country where f o r r e l i g i o u s reasons 
contraception i s banned and where our help today w i l l merely mean t h a t there 
are more hungry mouths t o feed tomorrow. This, i s undoubtedly extremely harsh 
on s t a r v i n g I n d i v i d u a l s who have l i t t l e or no c o n t r o l upon t h e i r 
government's p o l i c i e s , on account of which they are nevertheless condemned 
t o die. Even mass genocide could t h e o r e t i c a l l y be j u s t i f i e d on a 
u t i l i t a r i a n basis i f i t were shown t h a t by such means greater s u f f e r i n g 
could be avoided i n the long run. 
J u s t i c e f o r many i s f a r more important than the consequences of any given 
a c t i o n . Richard Watson takes the view t h a t a l l human beings are moral equals 
w i t h equal r i g h t s t o the n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e : 
"The higher moral p r i n c i p l e i s of human eq u i t y per se. Consequently the 
moral a c t i o n i s t o d i s t r i b u t e a l l food equally, whatever the consequences. . . 
No p r i n c i p l e of m o r a l i t y absolves one of behaving immorally simply t o save 
one's l i f e or n a t i on... Indeed i n the m i l i e u of m o r a l i t y i t i s immaterial 
whether the human species survives,"®'^ 
Whether or not one accepts the importance of j u s t i c e t o t h i s degree, i t i s 
c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t most people hold conceptions of j u s t i c e which are 
incompatible w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y but equally s e l f - e v i d e n t . Justice 
i s i t s e l f not a simple concept, but i t i s safe t o observe t h a t happiness 
must be subservient t o i t . A s t r i c t a t i l i t a r l a n can never pronounce th a t any 
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a c t i o n i s a b s o l u t e l y wrong, a conclusion t h a t most w i l l i n t u i t i v e l y 
question. 
I t may of course be t r u e t h a t "there i s no e t h i c a l theory which w i l l be 
conformable w i t h a l l our attitudes"'^'^ but the concept of Justice i s such a 
fundamental idea t h a t i t needs t o be. f u r t h e r examined, and may very well not 
be able t o be squared w i t h t h a t of u t i l i t y . Nevertheless while arguments 
based on u t i l i t a r i a n Judgements are i n my mind u l t i m a t e l y flawed, there i s 
no doubt t h a t those such as Singer have made an important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
the debate. Above, a l l else Singer has voiced the opinion t h a t i t may not be 
f e a s i b l e f o r the West t o wash i t s hands of a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and claim that 
poverty and famine i n the T h i r d World is. not i t s problem. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: KANTIAN JUSTICE AND MORAL OBLIGATION 
"Act only on t h a t maxim through which you can at the same time w i l l t h a t i t 
should become a u n i v e r s a l law."' 
"The c l a s s i c l i b e r a l ' s main p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r the good l i f e -do not i n t e r f e r e 
w i t h thy neighbour - i s the only poison they need."^ 
Since 'The Republic' was w r i t t e n , Plato's question "What i s Justice?" has 
been at the heart of both moral and p o l i t i c a l philosophy, and i s considered 
by many, from A r i s t o t l e t o Rawls, t o be the most Important question t h a t can 
be considered i n p o l i t i c a l thought. For most u t i l i t a r i a n t h i n k e r s j u s t i c e i s 
a concept which cannot e a s i l y be described coherently. As explained i n the 
previous chapter, r u l e s of j u s t i c e , i f r e a l l y based upon p r i n c i p l e s of 
u t i l i t y and adequately formulated, w i l l collapse i n t o r u l e s of thumb. 
Jus t i c e must t h e r e f o r e relegated t o being a d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t can be applied 
t o those actions commonly seen t o most beneficent. This i s a d e s c r i p t i o n 
t h a t f a i l s t o f u l l y describe the concept of j u s t i c e and t h a t Kant f o r one 
would be extremely unhappy wi t h . 
J u s t i c e i s commonly regarded as being the most fundamental moral category, 
d e s c r i b i n g considerations which cannot be e a s i l y disregarded i n the name of 
u t i l i t y . Moreover the d i s t i n c t i o n between j u s t i c e and beneficence i s 
f r e q u e n t l y employed t o e x p l a i n the d i f f e r e n c e between those actions which 
one i s under a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o c a r r y out and which others have a 
c o r r e l a t i v e r i g h t t o demand from one, and those actions which may merely 
described as morally r i g h t . For example one has an o b l i g a t i o n not t o k i l l 
and a l s o a r i g h t not t o be k i l l e d , but although i t i s reasonable t o argue 
t h a t one i s also morally obliged t o be generous one cannot demand tha t 
others are generous t o us. 
" I f we have a duty or o b l i g a t i o n ...then we ought, other t h i n g s being equal, 
t o do the t h i n g i n question, but there are t h i n g s we ought to do t h a t are 
not d u t i e s or o b l i g a t i o n s proper. When one has a duty or o b l i g a t i o n t o 
someone else . . . then t h a t soneone else has a r i g h t t o the t h i n g involved; 
but, where one simply ought t o do something, t h i s i s not so."^' 
As Frankena himself admits such subtle d i s t i n c t i o n s are d i f f i c u l t t o apply 
i n e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g because many w r i t e r s , as w e l l as the p u b l i c at large, 
have a tendency t o employ the terms ' o b l i g a t i o n ' , 'duty', 'ought' and 
' r i g h t ' as i f they were synonymous, i n the same way as 'good', ' e t h i c a l ' and 
'moral' are also c a r e l e s s l y used. Precise d e f i n i t i o n however should be a l l 
t h a t i s needed t o overcome any such problems, allowing one t o i n v e s t i g a t e 
the concept of j u s t i c e and the ways t h a t i t might p o i n t t o the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s one has t o a l l e v i a t i n g poverty i n the Third World and 
elsewhere without reaching the same supererogatory o b l i g a t i o n s as the theory 
of marginal u t i l i t y . 
A l l d e o n t o l o g i s t s are u n i t e d by the view t h a t people are wronged when 
t r e a t e d u n j u s t l y , i r r e s p e c t i v e of the o v e r a l l consequences t h a t such an 
a c t i o n may have. For t h i s reason alone i t i s necessary t o r e j e c t 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t t h e o r i e s such as u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . I n j u s t i c e may be defined 
as i n v o l v i n g "the v i o l a t i o n of basic moral rights"'*, assigniable and 
claimable r i g h t s which only the " v i c t i m " or claimant can waive. Perhaps the 
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most celebrated d e o n t o l o g i s t , whose lead many have followed i n the l a s t two 
hundred years, was Immanual Kant. Following the t r a d i t i o n of many who are 
convinced t h a t t h e i r basic c o n v i c t i o n s .about j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e cannot be 
c h i m e r i c a l , i t i s the work of Kant and i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s "Categorical 
Imperative" t o which t h i s t h e s i s s h a l l t u r n . 
The "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals"(1795) stands as a milestone i n 
the h i s t o r y of normative e t h i c s , t h a t i s the enquiry i n t o those p r i n c i p l e s 
by which a l l f r e e , r a t i o n a l beings ought t o be morally guided. Asking what 
character one's moral concepts and precepts must have t o make m o r a l i t y as i t 
i s possible, Kant concludes t h a t the answer i s t o be found i n the w i l l t o do 
one's duty " f o r the sake of duty"®, which presents i t s e l f as the obedience 
t o a law t h a t i s u n i v e r s a l l y binding on a l l r a t i o n a l beings. 
Kant t h e r e f o r e argues t h a t one's maxim, the general r u l e which one would 
formulate i n j u s t i f y i n g one's a c t i o n , i s moral i f and only i f one can w i l l 
t h a t i t should become a u n i v e r s a l law. On the other hand those maxims which 
cannot be u n i v e r s a l i z e d c o n s i s t e n t l y cannot be regarded as a t r u e moral, or 
a c a t e g o r i c a l imperative. By t h i s formal t e s t maxims are d i v i d e d i n t o moral 
and nonmoral, c a t e g o r i c a l and h y p o t h e t i c a l . I n c a l l i n g moral Imperatives 
c a t e g o r i c a l Kant c o n t r a s t s them w i t h h y p o t h e t i c a l imperatives. The l a t t e r 
are c o n d i t i o n a l upon the desire t o a t t a i n a c e r t a i n end, but t h i s i s not 
t r u e of the former. There i s no " i f " i n the c a t e g o r i c a l Imperative, one has 
an o b l i g a t i o n t o act i n l i n e w i t h the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative simply because 
one should. 
For Kant the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative i s not an u l t i m a t e and mysterious claim 
t h a t came, as I t were, out of the blue. I t i s grounded above a l l i n a 
human's nature as a r a t i o n a l being. I t i s Independent of human desires or 
i n c l i n a t i o n s which change w i t h a l t e r i n g circumstances, but i s Instead a 
c r i t e r i o n of a c t i o n which i s demanded by r a t i o n a l i t y . Hence the essent i a l 
requirements of m o r a l i t y are s a i d t o be r e a l l y b u i l t i n t o the concept of 
r a t i o n a l i t y i t s e l f . Thus they must be a p r i o r i and acknowledged by any 
r a t i o n a l being as binding. According t o Kant only a body of p r i n c i p l e s of 
a c t i o n corresponding t o our p r i n c i p l e s of m o r a l i t y can be c o n s i s t e n t l y , and 
thus r a t i o n a l l y , be u n i v e r s a l l y adopted by a community of r a t i o n a l beings. 
The c a t e g o r i c a l imperative, i n c o r p o r a t i n g the concept of u n i v e r s a l i t y , i s 
the supreme p r i n c i p l e of m o r a l i t y i n the mind of Kant. I t i s an essent i a l 
p a r t of a moral a t t i t u d e , he argues, t h a t any reason f o r or against a 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n must be capable of being s t a t e d i n general terms and must 
apply t o anybody without exception given s i m i l a r circumstances. I t would be 
wrong t o assume t h a t Kant believes t h a t one ought t o act according t o every 
p r i n c i p l e which could be u n i v e r s a l l s e d , but he does hold t h a t one ought not 
t o a ct according t o any p r i n c i p l e which could not be universalised. 
Kant argues t h a t there i s a c e r t a i n category of p r i n c i p l e s , the 
u n i v e r s a l i s a t l o n of which i t i s impossible f o r man t o w i l l . A c l a s s i c 
example given by Kant i s t h a t of the breaking of promises. The precept t h a t 
'one may always break a promise when i t i s i n one's i n t e r e s t ' cannot be 
w i l l e d t o be u n i v e r s a l l y acknowledged and acted upon. This i s because one 
could not desire a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n which everybody always made any 
promise one chooses without any I n t e n t i o n of keeping i t since there would be 
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then no p o i n t i n making promises as they would count f o r nothing and not be 
believed: 
can by no means w i l l a u n i v e r s a l law of l y i n g ; f o r by such a law there 
could p r o p e r l y be no promises a t a l l , since i t would be f u t i l e t o profess a 
w i l l f o r f u t u r e a c t i o n t o others who would not believe my profession or who 
...would pay me back i n l i k e c o i n ...and consequently my maxim would be 
bound t o annul i t s e l f . 
In s hort i t can be s a i d t h a t two important general e t h i c a l p oints have been 
made through the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative. These are 
f i r s t l y t h a t the a r b i t a r y making of exceptions i n one's own i n t e r e s t i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y immoral and secondly t h a t i f an act i s r i g h t f o r one t o do i t 
must also be r i g h t under the same co n d i t i o n s f o r everybody else. 
According t o Kant the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative can also be restated as the 
Formula of the End i n I t s e l f and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: 
"Act i n such a way t h a t you always t r e a t humanity, whether i n your own 
person or i n the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at 
the same time as an end."'' 
"So act t h a t the w i l l could regard i t s e l f at the same time as making 
uni v e r s a l law through i t s own maxim."'-' 
The metaphysical l o g i c employed by Kant t o show each as equivalent i s very 
complicated and need not be examined i n depth. The p o i n t Kant i s t r y i n g t o 
make i s t h a t human beings, as r a t i o n a l beings, alone have an unconditioned 
and absolute value and t h e r e f o r e i t i s wrong t o use them as a means t o an 
end which only has r e l a t i v e value. Therefore the maxim of an a c t i o n must not 
e n t a i l the use of others as mere means, r a t h e r others must be t r e a t e d as 
ends i n themselves. This however, argues Kant, i s only possible i f one 
imagines oneself as a member of an i d e a l community: the 'kingdom of ends'. 
For example Kant shows t h a t one cannot d e l i b e r a t l y make a f a l s e promise t o 
another f o r one's own exclusive i n t e r e s t and at the sanK time t r e a t that 
person as an end i n i t s e l f : 
"For the man whom I seek t o use f o r my purposes cannot possibly agree with 
my way of behaving t o him, and so cannot himself share the end of the 
a c t i o n . "'^  
In other words: 
"To use someone as a mere means i s t o involve them i n a scheme of a c t i o n t o 
which they could not i n p r i n c i p l e consent""-' 
Therefore the second f o r m u l a t i o n of the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative c l e a r l y 
outlaws those a c t i o n s which might be described as "the moral p r o h i b i t i o n s of 
common sense". ' ' One could not c o n s i s t e n t l y respect the r i g h t s of others t o 
be t r e a t e d as ends i n themselves and simultaneously commit murder, rape, 
t h e f t , dishonesty, f r a u d and other such acts commonly regarded as 'immoral' 
(as w e l l as i n most circumstances i l l e g a l ) . Furthermore i t provides 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o support those notions of j u s t i c e t h a t most i n t u i t i v e l y 
f e e l , a goes a long way t o p r o t e c t the " r i g h t s " of others. Indeed Jennifer 
Trusted, among others, describes the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative as a form of 
secular i n t u i t i o n i s m . Mot only does i t conform w i t h many of our 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i n t u i t i o n s about m o r a l i t y , but also as already shown Kant 
stressed t h a t a l l human beings possessed an innate moral sense. 
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Though a t f i r s t glance the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative may appear t o have few 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the problems of poverty and hunger i n the Th i r d World, 
Kantian e t h i c s does r e q u i r e t h a t one does not t r e a t others u n j u s t l y , or i n 
other words not as a mere means. Therefore i t must be concluded t h a t one has 
a moral o b l i g a t i o n not t o t r e a t famine v i c t i m s and the poor i n general as a 
mere means, though presumably one i s under no o b l i g a t i o n t o a i d the poor and 
s u f f e r i n g p r o v i d i n g t h a t one has played no part i n t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Though 
the demands imposed by such Kantian j u s t i c e are f a r fewer than those imposed 
by u t i l i t a r i a n moral t h e o r i s t s such as Singer, i t i s nevertheless possible 
t o argue t h a t they are nevertheless demanding and f a r more precise. Above 
a l l i n common w i t h Singer's p r i n c i p l e s , a p p l i c a t i o n of the Formula of Ends 
i s enough t o demonstrate cogently t h a t the s t a t u s quo i s unacceptable. 
Kant's dictum t h a t one should never t r e a t others merely as a means implies 
as already s t a t e d t h a t one cannot J u s t l y involve another i n a scheme of 
a c t i o n t o which they couldn't i n p r i n c i p l e consent. Consequently t h i s 
precludes both deception and coercion. The i n d i v i d u a l one deceives cannot 
know what one's r e a l i n t e n t i o n s are and therefore does not have the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o consent. S i m i l a r l y one cannot t r u l y consent t o an a c t i o n i f 
one does not have the op t i o n t o r e s i s t . Deception and coercion are thus said 
t o be wrong and unjust. 
"Successful f a l s e promising depends on deceiving the person t o whom the 
promise i s made about what one's r e a l maxim i s . And since the person who i s 
deceived doesn't know the r e a l maxim, he or she can't i n p r i n c i p l e consent 
t o h i s or her p a r t i n the proposed scheme of a c t i o n . . . I n Kant's view, i t i s 
t h i s t h a t makes f a l s e promising wrong... Another standard way of using 
others as a mere means i s by coercing them. " 
On t h i s basis i n order t o avoid being unjust t o famine v i c t i m s and others on 
the poverty l i n e one must play no p a r t i n any p r a c t i c e s employed against the 
T h i r d World i n which coercion and deception play a part. Not only would t h i s 
preclude p l a y i n g a r o l e i n the ki n d of a c t i o n t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y was often 
employed i n the c o l o n i a l i s a t i o n and subsequent economic penetration of the 
T h i r d World, but also i t would appear, i n much of the f i n a n c i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l manipulation i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r a c t i s e d today. The o f f e r of free 
powered baby milk t o mothers i n the , T h i r d World by a well-known 
m u l t i n a t i o n a l company would appear t o be unjust because mothers are both 
deceived i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h i s i s good f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n and also 
because t h i s w i l l soon mean t h a t they are unable t o resume breast feeding 
and w i l l be expected t o begin paying f o r the powdered milk a f t e r an 
i n t r o d u c t o r y period. They are thus coerced i n t o buying a p a r t i c u l a r product 
t h a t most can i l l a f f o r d . S i m i l a r l y moneylenders o f t e n make o f f e r s t o 
reschedule payments or renew a loan at o f t e n adverse terms to the borrower; 
an o f f e r the debtor might be unable t o refuse i f threatened w i t h the forced 
takeover of land upon which the debtor may depend f o r h i s livelyhood. The 
moneylender thus t r e a t s the debtor as a mere means and coerces him i n t o an 
agreement he wouldn't otherwise make. 
As noted i n Chapter One such deception and coercion occurs on a vast scale. 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations and Western governments c o n t r o l much of the land 
and i n d u s t r y i n the T h i r d World and d i c t a t e how much of the remaining land 
i s used. I n 1985 T h i r d World Debt t o the West stood at some $865 b i l l i o n 
meaning t h a t annual debt service payments stood at $139 b i l l i o n . By 1981 
debt service accounted f o r 75.3% of a l l new loans, and a staggering 85% of 
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a l l new loans i n L a t i n America. Such a s i t u a t i o n has led i n the minds of 
many r a d i c a l economists t o "debt peonage or enslavement"' Warnock notes 
t h a t : 
"The 'degree of e x p l o i t a t i o n of labour and resources' i s reminiscent of the 
o l d c o l o n i a l days when the im p e r i a l s t a t e d i r e c t l y intervened on behalf of 
c a p i t a l t o suppress wages, make land grants t o f o r e i g n enterprises, and 
c o n t r o l t r a d i n g r i g h t s so as t o be sure of making p r o f i t s outside the more 
competitve world market.""* 
Indeed the scale of these loans which many poorer countries are unable t o 
cope w i t h , coupled w i t h world-wide recession i n the e a r l y 1980s led t o a 
rescheduling of loans t o many Th i r d World countries. However such 
resceduling has p r i m a r i l y been t o serve the i n t e r e s t s of overstretched banks 
and safeguard the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l system r a t h e r than t o protect the 
debtor nations. I n r e t u r n f o r the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of debt repayments t o 
s l i g h t l y more manageable proportions, many countries have been forced t o 
surrender "considerable sovereignty over i n t e r n a l economic decision-
making"'® t o employees of the IMF f r e q u e n t l y given the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o 
oversee the settlement. Governments have standardly been requested t o 
devalue t h e i r currency, s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduce spending on s o c i a l programmes, 
reduce food subsidies, and l i m i t t h e i r borrowing. For instance health 
spending i n L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s where the IMF was involved was cut by 
60% between 1980 and 1985, This was accompanied i n most of these countries 
by a dramatic increase i n m a l n u t r i t i o n as food subsidies were cut. In Peru 
pre-school m a l n u t r i t i o n rose from 41% t o 68% between 1980 and 1983."^ 
There i s no doubt t h a t debt repayments have drained many Third World 
c o u n t r i e s of f o r e i g n currency, forced them t o s t r u c t u r e t h e i r economies 
around the need t o repay debt and " f o r a great many people i n the under-
developed world, the c r i s i s has brought a reduced standard of l i v i n g and a 
poorer diet."'"'' They were deceived by promises of a Western-style f u t u r e 
i n t o accepting loans, and then coerced i n t o making changes i n domestic 
p o l i c y i n order t o meet repayments. Much m a l n u t r i t i o n i n the Third World i s 
caused by the f a c t t h a t farmers are forced t o c u l t i v a t e cash-crops and s e l l 
much of the food t h a t they produce i n order t o earn f o r e i g n currency t o 
repay f o r e i g n loans. Moreover such measures have done nothing t o improve the 
long-term prospects i n these countries. I n Kantian terms such p o l i c i e s 
c a r r i e d out by Western banks and governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s are unjust. 
The above example i s an example of deception and coercion w i t h perhaps the 
gravest consequences but i t i s by no means unique. I n Kantian terms i t would 
also be wrong t o force s t e r i l i s a t i o n upon women t o c o n t r o l population 
growth, t o threaten t o use m i l i t a r y force t o win commercial or m i l i t a r y 
advantages, or t o make a i d c o n d i t i o n a l at a l l . C l e a r l y there are many more 
examples of common p r a c t i c e which a Kantian must condemn. I t i s as dicussed 
i n Chapter Two ('Ethics and P o l i t i e s ' ) fashionable t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between 
the o b l i g a t i o n s of an i n d i v i d u a l and those of i n s t i t u t i o n s , however t h i s 
does not make coercion and deception permissable f o r government's t o carry 
out. As O'Neill notes: 
"Kantians would g e n e r a l l y play down any d i s t i n c t i o n between a person's own 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and h i s or her r o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . . . we add t o our 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s those t h a t the j o b requires; but we do not lose those that 
are already r e q u i r e d of us."'® 
50 
I t was pointed out i n Chapter Two t h a t a government i t s e l f i s not a 
p e c u l i a r l y amoral i n s t i t u t i o n but r a t h e r a body composed of i n d i v i d u a l moral 
agents, which can only act through the actions of i n d i v i d u a l persons. I t 
w i l l a l s o be r e c a l l e d t h a t President Woodrow Wilson argued t h a t "the same 
standards of m o r a l i t y should apply t o s t a t e s as apply t o i n d i v i d u a l s " . 
Morover there i s no p a r t i c u l a r reason why the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative should 
not apply t o a government as an i n s t i t u t i o n , since i t i s reasonable t o argue 
t h a t a govei-nment i s a p a r t i a l l y r a t i o n a l being i n the same way as human 
beings. 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t , i n the context of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , coercion 
and deception are sometimes d i f f i c u l t t o i d e n t i f y . P o l i t i c a l and commercial 
n e g o t i a t i o n always c a r r i e s w i t h i t an element of t h r e a t , and the point at 
which i t becomes o v e r t l y coercive i s d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible t o define. 
However i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t the examples described above are 
c e r t a i n l y coercive, The agreement of t r e a t i e s and trade deals cannot be 
described as non-coercive simply i f they are agreed by the representative of 
sovereign powers. Outward agreement may w e l l conceal i m p l i c i t t h r e a t s or 
blackmail. 
The demands of Kantian j u s t i c e are more strenuous t h e r e f o r e than i t f i r s t 
appears: The Formula of an End i n I t s e l f has considerable i m p l i c a t i o n s upon 
the a c t i v i t i e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s , m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations or governments 
may j u s t i f i a b l y engage i n . However u n l i k e the demands of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
which were seen t o be supererogatory, those imposed by the c a t e g o r i c a l 
imperative might s t i l l appear t o go too f a r i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n . I t 
can too e a s i l y be taken t o imply t h a t p r o v i d i n g t h a t one goes through l i f e 
without doing any harm then one i s a morally Just person. Hot s u r p r i s i n g l y 
many describe t h i s as "an extremely erroneous, a l b e i t very seductive way of 
t h i n k i n g . " '-^  
Even i f changes were made i n the global economy so t h a t one could 
J u s t i f i a b l y c l a i m innocence from a l l charges of coercion and deception, 
there would without doubt remain, t o some extent, areas of poverty i n the 
world. Poverty and hunger are caused by a m u l t i p l i c i t y of f a c t o r s , and 
c e r t a i n l y not always by the a c t i o n s of Western Nations. The West might 
always be i n a p o s i t i o n t o o f f s e t the consequences of famine or poverty but 
i t i s c e r t a i n l y not always the cause. Poverty can be caused by c i v i l war, 
n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r or other f a c t o r s outside the c o n t r o l of the Developed 
World. T h i r d World co u n t r i e s might be b e t t e r equipped t o deal w i t h such 
problems i f not weakeiied by the coercive and deceptive p o l i c i e s c u r r e n t l y 
employed by the r i c h , but i t cannot be s a f e l y assumed t h a t outside 
assistance and a i d would never be needed. The b e l i e f t h a t i f l e f t t o 
themselves T h i r d World Nations would a u t o m a t i c a l l y become r i c h e r and 
eradicate hunger i s Utopian, and i n any case poverty i s a world-wide 
phenomenon and i s c e r t a i n l y not confined t o the poorest countries. 
Kantians might argue t h a t an o b l i g a t i o n t o give a i d i n such circumstances 
can be derived from the general Kantian duty of beneficence. The p r i n c i p l e 
of non-beneficence cannot be u n i v e r s a l i z e d and so i t f o l l o w s t h a t a l l 
complying Kantians must be beneficent. However even though " r e l i e f of famine 
must stand very high among d u t i e s of beneficence"^'^, i t i s a weak basis upon 
which t o ground an o b l i g a t i o n t o a i d those i n desperate need. Such 
o b l i g a t i o n s place the duty t o help the s u f f e r i n g upon no p a r t i c u l a r 
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i n d i v i d u a l s , and any m i l d l y beneficent i n d i v i d u a l can c l a i m t h a t he or she 
i s already f u l f i l l i n g h i s or her Kantian o b l i g a t i o n s . William Aiken points 
out w i t h much J u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t : 
"The b e l i e f t h a t a person i n d i r e need has no stronger claim against those 
who can help him or her than a plea f o r benevolence (which i s no r e a l claim 
at a l l ) i s unacceptable. Dire need creates o b l i g a t i o n s and r i g h t s . ... I t i s 
a reprehensible neglect of moral duty."^' 
Indeed i t i s a common c r i t i c i s m of the c a t e g o r i c a l Imperative t h a t i t i s 
l a r g e l y s i l e n t about what one ought t o do, concentrating instead on what one 
ought not t o do: break promises, cheat, k i l l , commit suicide etc.. In e f f e c t 
Kant gives l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n as t o the d i r e c t i o n i n which one's l i f e ought 
to go, and t o the a c t i v i t i e s one ought t o engage i n . Either he believes 
t h a t m o r a l i t y sanctions any way of l i f e which i s compatible with those acts 
p r o h i b i t e d by the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative; or he believes over o p t i m i s t i c a l l y 
but i n a manner c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Enlightenment thought, t h a t man w i l l be 
brought t o a consensus as t o the good l i f e through the exercise of reason. 
Furthermore there i s also no obvious way t o rank those actions t h a t the 
c a t e g o r i c a l imperative does demand i n any p a r t i c u l a r order of merit when 
they c o n f l i c t or need t o be p r i o r i t i s e d . Those actions w i t h maxims t o s o l e l y 
f o s t e r the ends of others, while o b l i g a t o r y i n a general sense are not so i n 
any s p e c i f i c sense. There appears t o be no prima f a c i e o b l i g a t i o n t o help 
any p a r t i c u l a r s t a r v i n g i n d i v i d u a l , and even Q'Neill's claim t h a t famine 
r e l i e f must f o r a Kantian be one of the most important forms of beneficence 
seems more i n t u i t i v e than anything else. For these reasons there i s a 
powerful case f o r c l a i m i n g t h a t Kantianism i s dependent and p a r a s i t i c upon 
some form of e x i s t i n g m o r a l i t y . 
l e v e r t h e l e s s Kantianism r e t a i n s i t s appeal f o r many, and such a theory does 
have many obvious a t t r a c t i o n s . The p r i n c i p l e of u n t v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y i s 
fundamental t o the conception of e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g held by most. Kant was one 
of the f i r s t moral philosophers t o s t r e s s the importance of the need f o r 
moral p r i n c i p l e s t o be s t a t e d i n general terms and t o applicable t o 
everybody without exception i n given circumstances. By t h i s p r i n c i p l e i t 
must f o l l o w t h a t i f persons i n B r i t a i n have a moral r i g h t t o l i f e then they 
must, too, i n every n a t i o n of the world. 
The autonomy of e t h i c s i s also an extremely a t t r a c t i v e feature of 
Kantianism. The "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals" begins w i t h the 
statement t h a t the only t h i n g which i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y good i s goodwill, 
which "shines f o r t h l i k e a precious jewel. "^^ The goodwill's only motive t o 
act i s f o r the sake of duty and t h i s i s contrasted w i t h every other kind of 
i n c l i n a t i o n . The r a t i o n a l being u t t e r s commands of m o r a l i t y t o himself. Thus 
no e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y can provide c r i t e r i a f o r morality: what i s r i g h t or 
wrong i s s a i d t o be independent of r e l i g i o n , custom or convention and needs 
no j u s t i f i c a t i o n from above. Indeed Kant argues t h a t i n c l i n a t i o n belongs t o 
the heteronomous w i l l of the sensible world which i s a l i e n t o the wholly 
r a t i o n a l w i l l of the i n t e l l i g i b l e world. Moral o b l i g a t i o n i s argued t o be a 
r e s u l t of the c o n f l i c t between these two dimensions of the w i l l : 
"The moral ' I ought' i s thus an ' I w i l l ' f o r man as a member of the 
i n t e l l i g i b l e world; and i t i s conceived by him as an ' I ought' only i n s o f a r 
as he considers himself at the same time t o be a member of the sensible 
world. 
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I n c l i n a t i o n and desire are argued to.be a l i e n t o one's r a t i o n a l nature and 
t h e r e f o r e t o one's duty. Such an argument purports t o demonstrate t h a t any 
appeal i n e t h i c s t o happiness i s f a l l a c i o u s and wrongheaded. The appeal of 
such a p o s i t i o n i s obviously t h a t i n j u s t i c e cannot be j u s t i f i e d i n the name 
of u t i l i t y . Hugo A. Bedau notes t h a t : 
"... t h i s amounts t o the c l a i m t h a t when the p r i n c i p l e of o v e r a l l s o c i a l 
welfare c o n f l i c t s w i t h the moral p r i n c i p l e of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o 
l i f e , the l a t t e r s h a l l p r e v a i l . " ^ ^ 
Indeed Kantianism i s considered a t t r a c t i v e because i t denies any appeal t o 
the consequences of an a c t i o n . A t t e n t i o n i s . focussed from the outset on an 
agent's motives and i n t e n t i o n s , r a t h e r than the actual consequences of an 
a c t i o n . Neo-Malthusian u t i l i t a r i a n s such as Hardin might argue t h a t famine 
r e l i e f i s wrong however w e l l i n t e n t i o n e d the motives, but nevertheless most 
would probably s t i l l agree t h a t the idiom of m o r a l i t y applies a special 
importance t o the motives of an agent ra t h e r than any p a r t i c u l a r unforseen 
consequences. 
The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the Kantian c a t e g o r i c a l imperative i s apparent t o 
O'Neill, one of the most p r o l i f i c w r i t e r s on poverty i n the Third World and 
moral o b l i g a t i o n . Despite s t a t i n g , i n her a r t i c l e "The Moral Complexities of 
Famine R e l i e f " t h a t the Kantian demands on one i n such circumstances are 
"harder t o see"--^, O'Neill nevertheless i n "Faces of Hunger" bases her 
p r e s c r i p t i o n on a Kantian, a l b e i t "maverick", assessment. O'Neill's 
conclusions have already been the r e f e r r e d t o when discussing the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of Kantian w i t h regard t o world poverty and hunger. However i t 
d i f f e r s from pure Kantianism i n two ways: 
"The theory proposed here i s mainly Kantian i n o r i g i n and i n a s p i r a t i o n , but 
supplen^nted i n two ways. F i r s t l y i t seems human beings.not as abstract or 
i d e a l r a t i o n a l choosers but as f i n i t e and vunerable r a t i o n a l beings, who 
must take other's v a r i e d l i m i t a t i o n s i n t o account when asking what 
o b l i g a t i o n s they have t o others. Secondly, i t Includes a theory of e t h i c a l 
d e l i b e r a t i o n which suggests how we can move from the abstract and widely 
understood p r i n c i p l e s of o b l i g a t i o n to. t h e i r determinate i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
p a r t i c u l a r circumstances."^'^ 
One of O'Neill's o v e r i d i n g aims i s t o overcome the common c r i t i c i s m of 
Kantianism t h a t the Categorical Imperative i s both incomprehensible and too 
a b s t r a c t t o s u f f i c i e n t l y guide a c t i o n . However as already discussed the 
o b l i g a t i o n not t o act u n j u s t l y , i n p a r t i c u l a r not t o deceive and coerce, 
does have very p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . Depending upon the context and one's 
p o s i t i o n , O'Neill explains how t h i s could oblige one t o t r y and secure 
s t a b l e commodity p r i c e s , guarantee secure markets f o r the exports of poor 
co u n t r i e s , demand l a r g e r and more e f f e c t i v e ' a i d payments', ensure th a t 
investment i s made i n appropriate t e c i n o l o g y f o r the Th i r d World, or prevent 
the export of hazardous waste t o poor countries. I n d i r e c t l y , she argues, one 
could t r y and secure some of these aims, or others through p o l i t i c a l action, 
education, p u b l i c i t y or campaigning.^^ Kantian j u s t i c e , i t i s argued, does 
not demand p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i f i c a c t i o n from i n d i v i d u a l s because i t depends on 
t h e i r a b i l i t i e s and s o c i a l p o s i t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . But once these 
f a c t o r s are known a b s t r c t p r i n c i p l e s can be converted i n t o very tangible 
actions. 
O'Neill also, attempts t o meet the c r i t i c i s m . t h a t the demands of Kantianism 
are i n s u f f i c i e n t , demanding too l i t t l e .from. the a f f l u e n t and leaving the 
53 
many problems of the poor t o be remedied merely by i s o l a t e d acts of 
benevolence. F i r s t , she argues, t h a t t o not place f u r t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s upon 
the a f f l u e n t would take no account of the human l i m i t a t i o n s of the v i c t i m 
which mean t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e are i n f a c t much greater than at 
f i r s t thought. Second, i t i s argued, t h a t the l i m i t a t i o n s of the agent mean 
t h a t acts of benificence are nevertheless unavoidably selective'. 
Accordingly O'Ueill states: 
"Any j u s t g l o b a l order must at l e a s t meet standards of material j u s t i c e and 
provide f o r the the basic m a t e r i a l needs i n whose absence a l l human beings 
are overwhelmingly vulnerable t o coercion and deception"^'^ 
Kant's f a i l u r e t o appreciate the physical v u n e r a b i l l t y of human beings means 
t h a t he d i d not recognise t h a t those w i t h i n s u f f i c i e n t food t o weet t h e i r 
m a t e r i a l needs were almost unavoidably the subject of coercion, argues 
O'liTeill. Those w i t h m a t e r i a l needs are unable t o act autonomously and thus 
are coerced i n t o c e r t a i n a c t i o n s and i n t o r e f r a i n i n g from others. While t h i s 
i s i n a sense l o g i c a l i t does not go f a r enough or s u f f i c i e n t l y place the 
burden upon any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s , 
O'Neill s t a t e s t h a t one's basic m a t e r i a l needs must be met but does not 
believe i t necessary t h a t "high standards of l i v i n g or of s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
desires be achieved. "^ '^  However the s o r t of gross i n e q u a l i t y prevalent i n 
western s o c i e t i e s i s l i k e l y t o be equally coercive. While the poorest might 
have enough t o survive there are powerful s o c i a l and psychological pressures 
urging them t o aspire t o l e v e l s of wealth they cannot reach. Consequently 
the poorest members of even the r i c h e s t s o c i e t i e s are coerced i n t o accepting 
employment co n d i t i o n s , unreasonable hours, or e x p l o i t a t i v e loans which they 
would otherwise r e j e c t . J u s t i c e must address questions of d i s t r i b u t i o n as 
we l l as minimum standards of welfare. 
Furthermore O'Neill does not adequately address who must ensure t h a t a j u s t 
g l o b a l order i s achieved. As noted above the o b l i g a t i o n s of each i n d i v i d u a l 
are s a i d t o be dependent upon t h e i r p o s i t i o n and a b i l i t y . However the 
o b l i g a t i o n t o be non-coercive and non-deceptive does appear as i f i t could 
be completely met by an i n d i v i d u a l or whole nation i f i t completely 
withdraws from i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h others. I f a nation became t o t a l l y s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t i t would not be coercing or deceiving others but on the other 
hand i t would not appear t o be j u s t , assuming t h a t there were others who 
were poor and hungry, Neither O'Neill nor Kant appear t o make any 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n t h a t ommissions are as important as acts. Ommissions, as 
discussed i n the previous chapter, i t would appear, are a u t i l i t a r i a n or 
co n s e q u e n t i a l i s t concept. 
O'Neill might respond t o t h i s charge w i t h the r e t o r t t h a t such a s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t n a t i o n would be f a i l i n g i n i t ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o be beneficient. 
Wholly r a t i o n a l beings, argues O'Neill, would l i v e i n a completely j u s t 
s o c i e t y (akin t o the 'kingdom of ends') where beneficence would be 
unnecessary, but the v u n e r a b i l i t y and f i n i t u d e of humans i n t h i s world 
makes them dependent upon the beneficence of others: 
"Human v u l n e r a b i l i t y a l so e n t a i l s t h a t j u s t i c e cannot be the only human 
o b l i g a t i o n . There are also p r i n c i p l e s of imperfect duty t o others f o r 
f i n i t l y r a t i i o n a l beings who are l i m i t e d i n various others ways...[which] 
r e q u i r e s conformity t o p r i n c i p l e s of mutual respect and help and 
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development, without which the agency of needy and l i m i t e d beings i s 
insecure. "^ "^  
Even i f i t i s accepted t h a t such o b l i g a t i o n s e x i s t and are o b l i g a t o r y i n the 
same sense as o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e , problems s t i l l p e r s i s t , O'Neill 
concedes h e r s e l f t h a t : 
"Since no agency or agent can meet a l l needs or develop a l l t a l e n t s (so much 
f o l l o w s from human f i n i t u d e ) o b l i g a t i o n s t o help those i n need and t o 
develop needed s k i l l s and c a p a c i t i e s are unavoidably s e l e c t i v e . "'^ '^ 
While t h i s i s p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , and indeed a product of common sense, 
i n c o n d i t i o n s where a l l basic demands of those s u f f e r i n g from lack of food 
and l i v i n g i n poverty are met by the o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e ; i t i s not so 
acceptable where j u s t i c e might merely ensure t h a t the poor are not harmed 
but not a c t u a l l y aided. O'Neill o f f e r s l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n as t o the extent of 
beneficence morally expected from each i n d i v i d u a l , and t o the c r i t e r i a t o be 
employed when deciding the object of one's benificence. I s someone who i s 
kind t o h i s neighbours and supports the l o c a l animal hospice, but who 
ignores appeals f o r a i d t o the s t a r v i n g i n f a r - o f f lands adequately 
beneficent? This seems t o be a question f o r which there are no ready 
answers. I f one bases one's decisions upon where the greatest need e x i s t s or 
where one's money or energies w i l l be put t o best e f f e c t , one appears t o be 
employing a form of f e l i c i f i c c alculus, so a l i e n t o the s p i r i t of 
Kantianism. While i t i s t r u e t h a t the amount of 'good work' anybody can do 
i s l i m i t e d , i t i s morally objectionable i f i t i s l e f t t o the i n d i v i d u a l t o 
decide whether or not t o t r y and save l i v e s . 
O'Neill's 'Faces of Hunger' does go some way t o making Kantianism both more 
accessible and more p r e s c r i p t i v e . Quite r i g h t l y she concludes t h a t 
" p r a c t i c a l reasoning about hunger has an audience only when i t reaches those 
w i t h the power t o b r i n g t h a t change."^-- However O'Neill f a i l s t o counter 
many of the main charges l e v e l l e d against Kant. Most importantly perhaps i s 
the f a c t t h a t Kant, i n d i v o r c i n g m o r a l i t y from s e l f i n t e r e s t or happiness, 
takes i t too f a r from the consequences of one's actions and thus from 
r e a l i t y . For example i n instances where moral p r i n c i p l e s clash, Kant 
accepted t h a t one might take the consequences of an act i n t o account before 
deciding whether t o take a p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n - l y i n g t o save l i f e 
perhaps- and acknowledged t h a t i t might have a great p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t . 
Nevertheless i t i s s a i d t o have no influence on the m o r a l i t y of an act 
i t s e l f . This can be c r i t i c i s e d w i t h much a u t h o r i t y since most would regard 
themselves under an o b l i g a t i o n t o save l i f e a t a l l costs. S i m i l a r l y O'Neill 
maintains t h a t some acts of i n j u s t i c e can be j u s t i f i e d t o prevent greater 
i n j u s t i c e s (enforced s t e r i l i z a t i o n t o prevent an un c o n t r o l l a b l e population 
explosion i s her example). This however cannot be s t r i c t l y J u s t i f i e d on 
Kantian grounds. Morover Kant denied t h a t any moral worth could be accorded 
t o a c t i o n s i f not morally motivated however w e l l they might conform w i t h the 
moral law. I t does however appear strange t o deny moral merit t o an act i o n 
merely i f c a r r i e d out more through a sense of love than of duty. 
With two hundred years between them, Kant and O'Neill both importantly spend 
much time e l a b o r a t i n g a concept of j u s t i c e . U l t i m a t e l y , i n my opinion, 
n e i t h e r succeeded i n producing a concept s u f f i c i e n t l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o 
address p r o p e r l y the problems of poverty and famine. The v i t a l l y important 
questions such as 'how f a r one must a i d others?' and 'what s o r t of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l order i s required?' are l e f t unanswered. Nevertheless 
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the value of human l i f e i s t r u l y recognised. Unlike the i n e v i t a b l e 
consequences i n a s t r i c t l y u t i l i t a r i a n s o ciety, 
"nobody w i l l have been made an instrument of other's s u r v i v a l or happiness 
i n the s o c i e t y of complying Kantians. "^ ^^  
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CHAPTER SIX: RAWLS, SOCIAL JUSTICE & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
"...the guiding idea i s t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e f o r the basic 
s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y are the object of the o r i g i n a l agreement. They are the 
p r i n c i p l e s t h a t f r e e and r a t i o n a l persons concerned t o f u r t h e r t h e i r own 
i n t e r e s t s would accept i n an i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n of e q u a l i t y as d e f i n i n g the 
fundamental terms of t h e i r associaton. These p r i n c i p l e s are t o regulate a l l 
f u r t h e r agreements; they s p e c i f y the kinds of s o c i a l cooperation t h a t can be 
entered i n t o and the forms of government t h a t can be established. This way 
of regarding the p r i n c i p l e s of Jus t i c e I s h a l l c a l l j u s t i c e as fa i r n e s s . " ' 
"Our problem, then, i s t o r e l a t e the Just p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s r e g u l a t i n g 
the conduct of st a t e s t o the c o n t r c t d o c t r i n e and t o explain the moral basis 
of the law of nations from t h i s p o i n t of view. "^ 
Sawls' work, the culmina t i o n of a s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s and papers ste t c h i n g 
back t o "J u s t i c e as Fairness" i n 1958-*, not only presents a consistent and 
l o g i c a l l y coherent theory of Jus t i c e but also attempts t o reconcile a major 
p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n between l i b e r a l and e g a l i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n s . Issues raised 
by the American c i v i l r i g h t s movement or the Black L i b e r a t i o n Movement i n 
the 1970s h i g h l i g h t e d the tension i n modern democatic s o c i e t i e s between 
strands of the l i b e r t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n , s t r e s s i n g the importance i n d i v i d u a l 
freedoms as a r t i c u l a t e d i n the eighteenth century, and strands of 
e g a l i t a r i a n or s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s , s t r e s s i n g the need f o r the f a i r 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of mat e r i a l goods, which combine t o form the basis upon which 
Western democracies are founded. C r i t i c s from the r i g h t argue th a t 
goverments have undermined the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l t o earn and dispose 
of income as he pleases, while c r i t i c s from the l e f t argue t h a t welfare 
programs and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e t a x a t i o n are under t h r e a t and do not go f a r 
enough. Rawls, standing as a mediator between these two schools of thought, 
argues t h a t the l i b e r t y of the i n d i v i d u a l i s compatible w i t h an equitable 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth. His work can thus be seen as a philosophical defence 
of the s o r t of l i b e r a l democratic s o c i e t y t h a t e x i s t s i n large parts of the 
Developed World. 
John Rawls' "A Theory of J u s t i c e " has been h a i l e d as a c l a s s i c c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o p o l i t i c a l and moral philosophy since i t s p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1971. Brian 
Barry, while arguing t h a t as a theory of j u s t i c e i t i s u l t i m a t e l y flawed, 
s t i l l b elieves t h a t i t s in f l u e n c e w i l l be permanent. Stuart Hampshire 
descibes i t as "the most s u b s t a n t i a l and i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n t o moral 
philosophy since the war"'^ - and Robert Nozick goes as f a r as t o say th a t one 
"must e i t h e r work w i t h i n Rawls' theory or ex p l a i n why not"® Indeed most 
would now rank Rawls' c o n t r i b u t i o n t o moral and p o l i t i c a l theory alongside 
such recognised masterpieces as John Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" 
or M i l l ' s "On L i b e r t y " . 
Rawls' theory of j u s t i c e i s consequently of great I n t e r e s t t o those wishing 
t o address p r a c t i c a l moral problems, n a t u r a l l y i n c l u d i n g poverty and famine 
i n the T h i r d World, without subscribing t o the predominant u t i l i t a r i a n point 
of view. For those concerned t o have a t h e o r e t i c a l l y sound basis upon which 
t o base t h e i r p r e s c l p t i o n s i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Rawls should generate 
so much i n t e r e s t . Rawls, himself, admits t h a t contemporary t h i n k e r s : 
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"... o f t e n seem forced t o choose between u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and i n t u i t i o n i s m . 
Most l i k e l y we s e t t l e upon a v a r i a n t of the u t i l i t y p r i n c i p l e circumscibed 
and r e s t r i c t e d i n c e r t a i n adhoc ways by i n t u i t i o n i s t i c constraints."*^ 
Such a predicament i s w e l l h i g h l i g h t e d by the current debate on poverty and 
famine i n the T h i r d World. I n the l i g h t of the problems faced when 
attempting t o apply any of the t r a d i t i o n a l moral theories, demonstrated i n 
the previous two chapters, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t many are e i t h e r forced 
or f i n d i t more p r o f i t a b l e t o appeal t o basic i n t u i t i o n s and accepted norms. 
Rawls f r e e l y admits t h a t : 
"... there are questions which we f e e l sure must be answered i n a c e r t a i n 
way. For example, we are confident t h a t r e l i g i o u s intolerance and r a c i a l 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n are unjust."'^ 
A good example of such an approach i s provided by M. D. Bayles i n " M o r a l i t y 
and Population Policy". I n short Bayles argues t h a t the poor must be helped 
so t h a t they can a t t a i n a minimum q u a l i t y of l i f e , and the a f f l u e n t must 
make a s u b s t a n t i a l s a c r i f i c e at some p o i n t between zero and marginal 
u t i l i t y , i n v o l v i n g a s a c r i f i c e of one's ' l i f e s t y l e ' i f not one's 
' l i f e p l a n s ' : 
" I f people i n Developed Countries can promote a minimum q u a l i t y of l i f e i n 
Less Developed Countries without a more than s u b s t a n t i a l s a c r i f i c e , they 
have duty t o do so."'-' 
Bayles argues t h a t t h i s might J u s t i f y a s i g n i f i c a n t s a c r i f i c e of material 
goods since they p e r t a i n t o one's l i f e s t y l e r a t h e r than l i f e p l a n , and that 
h i s argument applies t o both i n d i v i d u a l s and governments, the most e f f e c t i v e 
and l a r g e s t provider of a i d . Such a d o c t r i n e , though not without i t s f a u l t s 
(not l e a s t the f a c t t h a t the commitment t o p r o v i d i n g a minimum q u a l i t y of 
l i f e f o r each i n d i v i d u a l i s disi-egarded when the a c t i v i t i e s of t h a t person's 
country are deemed as a whole t o be unacceptable) i s nonetheless very 
a t t r a c t i v e . This however i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g when one takes account of the 
basis of Bayles' d o c t r i n e : 
" . . . c o r r e c t moral p r i n c i p l e s are those which reasonable s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d 
persons w i t h l i m i t e d benevolence have good reasons t o accept."^ 
While Bayles avoids reference t o any strange epistemological roots, i t does 
nevertheless appear t o be a r a t h e r a r t i f i c i a l theory based upon p r e e x i s t i n g 
codes of m o r a l i t y . Indeed Bayles remarks t h a t : 
"Appeals may be made t o gen e r a l l y accepted moral p r i n c i p l e s such as those i n 
the U.N. Decl a r a t i o n of Human Rights ...the f a c t of t h e i r widespread 
r e c o g n i t i o n i s some evidence t h a t reasonable persons have good reasons t o 
accept them. " ' 
However as Chapter 3 was designed t o demonstrate, f u r t h e r evidence than 
widespread adoption i s needed i f any moral p r i n c i p l e i s to be deemed 
s a t i s f a c t o r y and t r u l y 'moral'. For example i t was u n i v e r s a l l y agreed i n 
Ancient Sparta t h a t s i c k i n f a n t s should be l e f t on the mountainside t o die, 
but few today would agree t h a t i t was r i g h t then any more than i t i s today. 
However while many p e r s i s t t o base t h e i r moral Judgements upon u t i l i t a r i a n 
p r i n c i p l e s modified by i n t u i t i o n i s t c o n staints, the influence of i n t i t l o n i s m 
as a f o r m l moral theory, as proposed by G.B. Moore and others, has waned 
since the beginning of the century, This i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g when one 
considers t h a t there I s simply no answer t h a t one can make should two people 
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' i n t u i t ' opposite conclusions: t h a t the hungry should or should not be fed 
f o r example. The argument t h a t one's i n t u i t i o n s are also h e a v i l y dependent 
upon one's 'moral upbringing' i s also very persuasive. 
Eawls, of course, while acknowledging a r o l e f o r one's i n t u i t i o n s , based h i s 
theory of j u s t i c e f i r m l y i n the t r a d i t i o n of Locke, Rousseau and Kant, 
r e a l i s i n g t h a t "an i n t u i t i o n i s t conception of j u s t i c e i s ...but h a l f a 
conception."'' While Rawls' work does mark a re-emergence of Natural Law 
theory i t does, i n c e r t a i n respects, also represent a cle a r break from the 
Kantian t r a d i t i o n : 
"The uniqueness of Eawls' approach i s t h a t r a t h e r than make an appeal t o 
reason he devises a decision-making technique designed t o provide a 
perspective from which a f a i r , unbiased and unanimous choice of p r i n c i p l e s 
t o s r u c t u r e can be made, I n arguing t h a t some p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e provide 
a reasonable foundation f o r the s t r u c t u r e of soc i e t y and others do not, 
Rawls appeals t o economic game theory t o provide an ob j e c t i v e basis 
analogous t o u t i l i t a r i a n c a l c u l u s , " ' ^ 
The remainder of t h i s chapter w i l l be di v i d e d i n t o two cle a r sections. The 
f i r s t w i l l c o n s i s t of a consideration of Rawls's theory of j u s t i c e . 
P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n w i l l be paid t o the basis upon which i t i s constucted 
i n c l u d i n g the concept of the " o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n " and also t o c r i t i c i s m of 
the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e derived therefrom. The l a t t e r s e c t i o n of the 
chapter w i l l concern whether the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e devised by Rawls t o 
lay down p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i a l j u s t i c e w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l c i v i l s o c i e t i e s can 
be a p p l i e d as p r i n c i p l e s of global j u s t i c e and th e r e f o r e p e r t a i n t o the 
debate on world poverty and famine. 
The primary aim of Rawls "A Theory of Justice" i s t o develop a "viable 
a l t e r n a t i v e " theory of s o c i a l j u s t i c e t o u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . Closely connected 
t o t h i s i s the i n t e r r e l a t e d subject of the general moral judgements made by 
man. Rawls also proposes t o account f o r these i n developing several general 
p r i c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . Rawls o u t l i n e s h i s p o s i t i o n i n the f i r s t chapter: 
"Many d i f f e r e n t kinds of t h i n g s are sai d t o be j u s t and unjust: not only 
laws, i n s t i t u t i o n s , and s o c i a l systems, but also p a r t i c u l a r actions of many 
kinds, i n c l u d i n g decisions, judgements, and imputations. We also c a l l the 
a t t i t u d e s and d i s p o s i t i o n s of persons, and persons themselves j u s t and 
unjust. Our t o p i c , however, i s t h a t of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . " ' 
Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , viewed as the general concept of r i g h t , i n 
t h e i r f i n a l form are: 
" F i r s t P r i n c i p l e . Each person i s t o have an equal r i g h t t o the most 
extensive t o t a l system of equal basic l i b e r t i e s compatible w i t h a s i m i l a r 
system of l i b e r t y f o r a l l . 
Second P r i n c i p l e , Social and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s are t o be arranged so 
th a t they are both: 
(a) t o the greatest b e n e f i t of the lea s t advantaged, consistent w i t h the 
j u s t savings p r i n c i p l e , and 
(b) attached t o o f f i c e s and p o s i t i o n s open t o a l l under conditions of f a i r 
e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . " " * 
As already mentioned these two p r i n c i p l e s apply t o the basic s t r u c t u r e of 
soci e t y , i n c l u d i n g a l l major p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
This, i n Rawls' mind, i s the most important area of j u s t i c e because i t 
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e xerts such i n f l u e n c e upon an i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e from b i r t h t o death. The 
i n e q u a l i t i e s of an unjust s t r u c t u r e t o so c i e t y d i s c r i m i n a t e against some and 
advantage others fa v o u r i n g " c e r t a i n s t a r t i n g places t o others".^"' The F i r s t 
P r i n c i p l e , described by Rawls as the P r i n c i p l e of Greatest Equal L i b e r t y , 
concentrates on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of "basic l i b e r t i e s " . By these Rawls means 
p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y (the r i g h t t o vote and stand f o r p u b l i c o f f i c e ) , freedom 
of speech and assembly, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom 
t o h o l d personal property and freedom from a r b i t a r y a r r e s t . Rawls describes 
these as " l i b e r t i e s of c i t i z e n s h i p " and contrasts them w i t h the goods of 
wealth, income, power and a u t h o r i t y which are the concern of the Second 
P r i n c i p l e , Together they are described by Rawls as "primary goods" which he 
descibes as " t h i n g s t h a t every r a t i o n a l man i s presumed t o want. These goods 
normally have a use whatever a person's r a t i o n a l plan of l i f e . " ^ " ^ 
The P r i n c i p l e of Greatest Equal L i b e r t y s t a t e s t h a t each person must have 
equal r i g h t t o the l i b e r t i e s of c i t i z e n s h i p described above, and t h a t such 
l i b e r t i e s can only be r e s t r i c t e d i f the r e s u l t i s tha t a more extensive 
system of l i b e r t i e s f o r a l l r e s u l t s . The Second P r i n c i p l e i s divided i n t o 
two p r i n c i p l e s : the Difference P r i n c i p l e and the P r i n c i p l e of Fair Equality 
of Opportunity. The Difference P r i n c i p l e requires t h a t i n e q u a l i t i e s i n 
obt a i n i n g wealth, income and the remaining primary goods must be arranged 
to be t o the greatest b e n e f i t of the le a s t advantaged. The P r i n c i p l e of Fair 
E q u a l i t y of Opportunity r e q u i r e s t h a t equal o p o r t u n i t i e s e x i s t f o r those of 
comparable s k i l l s and a b i l i t i e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r s o c i a l p o s i t i o n . As 
Rawls notes: 
"While the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income and wealth need not be equal, i t must be 
t o everyone's advantage, and at the same time, p o s i t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y and 
o f f i c e s of command must be accessible t o a l l . " ' ' ^ 
However as Barry comments "merely t o s t a t e the two p r i n c i p l e s , however i s 
only h a l f the s t o r y and t h a t , perhaps, the less important h a l f . " " ^ The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i s the p r i o r i t y t h a t they 
are given. The F i r s t P r i n c i p l e i s l e x i c a l l y p r i o r t o the Second, and the 
second p a r t of the Second P r i n c i p l e , the P r i n c i p l e of Fai r Equality of 
Opportunity i s l e x i c a l l y p r i o r t o the f i r s t , the Difference P r i n c i p l e , In 
other words: 
"This o r d e r i n g means t h a t a departure from the i n s t i t u t i o n of equal l i b e r t y 
r e q u i r e d by the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e cannot be j u s t i f i e d by, or compensated f o r , 
by greater s o c i a l and economic advantages. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth and 
income, and the hier a c h i e s of a u t h o r i t y , must be consistent w i t h both the 
l i b e r t i e s of equal c i t i z e n s h i p and e q u a l i t y of opportunity."'-' 
The J u s t i f i c a t i o n provided by Rawls f o r h i s p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t r a c t a r l a n . However, i n contra s t t o others i n the s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t t r a d i t i o n , Rawls' co n t r a c t i s not an h i s t o r i c a l event and therefore 
overcomes some of the problems encountered by c o n t r a c t a r i a n t h e o r i s t s , 
dicussed i n Chapter Two. Rather i t i s a hy p o t h e t i c a l contract which he 
claims t h a t r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l s would make under c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c 
c o n d i t i o n s : 
" J u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s begins from the idea t h a t the most appropriate 
conception of Jus t i c e f o r the basic s t r u c t u r e of democratic society i s one 
t h a t i t s c i t i z e n s would adopt i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i s f a i r between them and 
i n which they are represented as free and equal moral persons. This 
s i t u a t i o n i s the o r i g i n a l position..."^-'-' 
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According t o Rawls the most important c o n d i t i o n t o apply t o those drawing up 
the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i n the " o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n " i s a " v e i l of 
ignorance" which deprives them of the knowledge of most p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s 
about t h e i r s o c i e t y and the place i n i t t h a t they would eventually occupy. 
In t h i s way people are said t o be deprived of the knowledge needed t o 
f u r t h e r t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s . For t h i s reason the p a r t i e s t o the 
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n are unaware of t h e i r gender, race, wealth, physical and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t i e s or the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l , economic or c u l t u r a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e i r society. However they are aware t h a t they are 
contemporaries and t h a t they know the general f a c t s about human society, 
i n c l u d i n g the p r i n c i p l e s of economic theory, the basis of so c i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n , and the laws of human psychology. I n other words Rawls argues 
t h a t the p a r t i e s have s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of a l l general information t o 
make informed choices without knowing how d i f f e r e n t choices w i l l a f f e c t 
t h e i r personal circumstances: 
"The p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are chosen behind a v e i l of ignorance. This 
ensures t h a t no one i s advantaged or disadvantaged i n the choice of 
p r i n c i p l e s by the outcome of n a t u r a l chance or the contingency of so c i a l 
circumstances. Since a l l are s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d and no one i s able t o design 
p r i n c i p l e s t o favour h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n , the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are 
the r e s u l t of f a i r agreement or bargain."^' 
Given t h i s conception of the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n Rawls argues th a t those 
c o n s t r u c t i n g the basic s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y would choose the two p r i n c i p l e s 
of j u s t i c e already set out. This i s because what i s at issue f o r the p a r t i e s 
t o the hy p o t h e t i c a l c o n t r a c t are purely "primary goods" which being 
"ge n e r a l l y necessary as s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s and all-purpose means t o enable 
human beings t o r e a l i s e and exercise t h e i r moral powers and pursue t h e i r 
f i n a l ends"-^^- are goods desired by a l l , regardless of whatever else i s 
desired. Furthermore Rawls argues t h a t the p a r t i e s t o the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n 
would choose t o maximise t h e i r primary goods and not choose t o lower t h e i r 
expectations t o the advantage of others. 
Such a decision, where the p a r t i e s are required t o choose p r i n c i p l e s which 
w i l l profoundly a f f e c t t h e i r l i v e s unsure how any p a r t i c u l a r set w i l l a f f e c t 
them personally, i s described by deci s i o n t h e o r i s t s as the "problem of 
r a t i o n a l choice under u n c e r t a i n t y . " ^ ^ I n such circumstances Rawls argues 
t h a t the maximin r u l e applies. I n e f f e c t the maximin r u l e d i r e c t s one t o 
choose the safest a l t e r n a t i v e , maximising the payoff t o the lea s t advantaged 
p o s i t i o n i r r e s p e c t i v e of others f a r e . Rawls describes t h a t i n s e l e c t i n g 
a l t e r n a t i v e s one must imagine t h a t one's worst enemy assigns one's p o s i t i o n 
i n s o c i e t y , which t h e r e f o r e would be the le a s t advantaged p o s i t i o n . 
Therefore "we are t o adopt the a l t e r n a t i v e the worst outcome of which i s 
superior t o the worst outcomes of the others. "•^"^' 
According t o Rawls the P r i n c i p l e of Greatest Equal L i b e r t y , along w i t h the 
P r i n c i p l e of Fai r E q u a l i t y of Opportunity and the Difference P r l c i p l e would 
provide the best outcome f o r the l e a s t advantaged. Rawls contrasts the 
outcome under these p r i n c i p l e s w i t h the outcome based on t o t a l or average 
u t i l i t y . The i n t e r e s t s of the worst-off i n society could j u s t i f i a b l y be 
s a c r i f i c e d under u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s (as also argued i n the f o u r t h 
chapter of t h i s t h e s i s ) f o r the sake of o v e r a l l u t i l i t y . On the other hand 
the Rawls' P r i n c i p l e of Greatest Equal L i b e r t y guarantees standards of basic 
l i b e r t y f o r a l l preventing such u t i l i t a r i a n t r a d e - o f f s from occurring. 
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Moreover the Difference P r i n c i p l e ensures t h a t " i n e q u a l i t i e s are 
permissiable [ o n l y ] when they maximise, or at le a s t c o n t r i b u t e t o , the long-
term expectations of the l e a s t f o r t u n a t e i n society."^*-" 
Despite the a t t e n t i o n drawn and importance attached t o Rawls' theory i t has 
nevertheless a t t r a c t e d a great deal of c r i t i c i s m . The f i r s t main area of 
c r i t i c i s m surrounds the concept of the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . The argument has 
been put forward by some t h a t h y p o t h e t i c a l agreements i n the o r i g i n a l 
p o s i t i o n provide no c r i t e r i a f o r f a i r n e s s i n the r e a l world. For example 
Ronald Dworkin argues t h a t the mere f a c t t h a t somebody would agree t o do 
something i n the circumstances of the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n provides no reason 
why he should s t i c k t o such an agreement i n everyday l i f e . Dworkin provides 
an example of an unvalued p a i n t i n g . Supposing, he argues, one would agree t o 
s e l l i t t o another f o r $100. I f one then discovers t h a t i t i s worth a great 
deal more, the f a c t t h a t e a r l i e r one was prepared t o s e l l i t f o r less does 
not o b l i g e one not t o demand the f u l l value i n the l i g h t of t h i s extra 
knowledge. However t h i s argument does not necessarily mean tha t no 
hy p o t h e t i c a l agreements are morally binding anymore than Rawls argument 
i m p l i e s t h a t a l l h y p o t h e t i c a l agreements are morally binding. By analogy 
James Sterba argues t h a t the f a c t t h a t some actual agreements are not 
binding (he c i t e s an agreement t o commit murder), does not mean tha t a l l 
a c t u a l agreements are not binding.'-^"'' 
Others have argued t h a t the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n "requires us t o view persons 
s t r i p p e d of t h e i r r i g h t f u l n a t u r a l and s o c i a l assets."^® I n other words 
c r i t i c s such as Nozick i n "Anarchy, State and Utopia", believe t h a t Rawls' 
contention t h a t a person's n a t u r a l and i n i t i a l s o c i a l assets must be 
regarded as common assets f a i l s t o pay s i g n i f i c a n t a t t e n t i o n t o the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between people. However t o others Rawls' purpose i s merely t o 
question t o what extent c o n s t r a i n t s must be placed on the use of one's 
n a t u r a l and s o c i a l assets i n the p u r s u i t of one's personal goals. Even 
l i b e r t a r a r i a n s , such as Nozick, argue t h a t one should not i n t e r f e r e or harm 
others. Rawls however argues t h a t one must go f u r t h e r and p o s i t i v e l y ensure 
t h a t the basic minimum i s provided f o r others. Therefore Nozick's argument 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y the charge t h a t Rawls goes too f a r and places too many 
c o n s t r a i n t s on the a c t i v i t i e s of others. However i n the absence of 
o v e r r i d i n g arguments why t h i s i s so, such c r i t i c i s m s can be s a f e l y ignored. 
Indeed i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o argue w i t h Rawls t h a t : 
"... once knowledge i s excluded the requirement of unanimity i s not out of 
place and the f a c t t h a t i t can be s a t i s f i e d i s of great importance. I t 
enables us t o say of the p r e f e r r e d conception of j u s t i c e t h a t i t represents 
a genuine r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s , "^ '^  
The second main area of c r i t i c i s m centres around the p r i n c i p l e s of Justice 
derived from the h y p o t h e t i c a l contract i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . Many 
c r i t i c s s t r o n g l y contest the p r i o r i t y given by Rawls t o l i b e r t y , questioning 
h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t beyond a c e r t a i n p o i n t basic l i b e r t y should never be 
s a c r i f i c e d i n the name of a d d i t i o n a l wealth. Such an argument c a l l s t o mind 
the example of l i f e i n the Chinese Republic where c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l 
l i b e r t i e s are g r e a t l y r e s t r i c t e d but where the standard of l i v i n g i s 
considerably higher than i n many comparable nations i n the Third World. 
Rawls reacted t o such challenges by i n t r o d u c i n g i n t o h i s argument the premis 
t h a t the p a r t i e s i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n have the capacity f o r both a sense 
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of j u s t i c e and a sense of the good. The former capacity implies the capacity 
t o understand, t o apply, and t o be motivated t o act from p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e . The l a t t e r capacity implies the a b i l i t y t o form, and pursue a 
conception of what i s regarded as a worthwhile l i f e . As Rawls states: 
"We take moral persons t o be characterized by two moral powers and by two 
corresponding highest-order i n t e r e s t s i n r e a l i z i n g and exercising these 
powers. The f i r s t power i s the capacity f o r an e f f e c t i v e sense of j u s t i c e 
...The second moral power i s the capacity t o form, t o rev i s e , and r a t i o n a l l y 
t o pursue a conception of the good."^ *-"' 
Given Rawls' r e v i s i o n of h i s argument i n "A Theory of Ju s t i c e " i t i s not 
d i f f i c u l t t o argue t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r s of the basic s t r u c t u r e of society 
would indeed make l i b e r t y sacrosanct, even i f i t does mean t h a t i t i s 
possible t o argue t h a t the premises employed are too i d e a l i s t i c . As Rawls 
expresses i t "the p a r t i e s are simply t r y i n g t o guarantee and t o advance the 
r e q u i s i t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r e x e r c i s i n g the powers t h a t characterise them as 
moral persons."-^' 
Barry also s t r o n g l y contests the 'safety f i r s t ' stategy of Rawls' two 
p r i n c i p l e s arguing t h a t : 
"A man w i t h a n e u t r a l a t t i t u d e t o r i s k w i l l r a t i o n a l l y accept a small r i s k 
of a c a t a s t r o p h i c outcome f o r a high p r o b a b i l i t y of a moderate gain. I t 
would appear t h a t most of us w i l l r a t i o n a l l y accept a small r i s k s of 
catastrophe; we take planes across the A t l a n t i c instead of going by ship, we 
d r i v e cars instead of t a k i n g t r a i n s and we t r a v e l instead of staying at 
home... Since i t i s not a p r i o r i i r r a t i o n a l t o accept r i s k s of catastrophe 
i n t h i s way i t cannot be sai d t o be a p r i o r i i r r a t i o n a l f o r those i n the 
' o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ' t o be prepared t o accept catastrophic outcomes. "^^ 
Indeed those such as Barry believe t h a t there i s no reason why the p a r t i e s 
t o the h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n t r a c t should deem i t necessary t o be so cautious, 
arguing t h a t I t i s equ a l l y r a t i o n a l t o gamble upon c r e a t i n g a more l i b e r a l 
basic s t r u c t u r e t o s o c i e t y where the rewards f o r the successful are higher 
but where the p e n a l t i e s f o r the unsuccessful are greater. Barry and Buchanan 
both p o i n t out t h a t the maximin r u l e i s not the only decision r u l e t h a t has 
been proposed f o r making decisions under uncertainty. I t i s argued by some 
t h a t those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , since t h e i r place i n so c i e t y w i l l not 
be chosen by t h e i r greatest enemy but i n f a c t w i l l depend upon chance, w i l l 
" s e l e c t the a l t e r n a t i v e w i t h the highest average expected utility."^® 
However while on t h i s basis those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n might be seen t o 
favour a s o c i e t y where a poor m i n o r i t y l i v e below the poverty l i n e , but 
where the m a j o r i t y are much b e t t e r o f f than they might otherwise hope t o be, 
there i s no reason why the d i s t r i b u t i o n of u t i l i t y payoffs would not be 
taken i n t o account. On t h i s basis a less wealthy but more e g a l i t a r i a n 
s o c i e t y would be selected. Bearing i n mind the moral nature of those i n the 
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n i t i s t h i s f a c t o r which would appear t o be decisive. 
Moreover i t i s important t o recognise t h a t i n the l i b e r a l world t h a t e x i s t s 
today a m a j o r i t y happen t o l i v e i n poverty. 
Though one of the major concerns of Rawls' "A Theory of Justice" i s t o 
provide an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the u t i l i t a r i a n account of s o c i a l j u s t i c e , i t has 
been argued t h a t "the argument does not appear t o r i n g the deathknell f o r 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . "'•^'' Rawls' two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e do c e r t a i n l y , i n a 
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sense, r e l y upon c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t moral judgements: value judgements r e l y 
upon an appeal t o the j u s t i c e r a t h e r than the happiness of t h e i r 
consequence. However Rawls d i f f e r s from u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n three important 
ways. 
F i r s t , p r o v i d i n g t h a t i t maximises the l e v e l of o v e r a l l u t i l i t y , 
u t i l i t a r i a n s can accept any i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t might a r i s e i n which some 
b e n e f i t i s gained at the expense of others. Second, u t i l i t a r i a n s can have no 
i n t r i n s i c o b j e c t i o n t o the r e s t r i c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s or the l i m i t a t i o n 
of l i b e r t y . Providing, again, i t maximises o v e r a l l u t i l i t y u t i l i t a r i a n s can 
not object per se t o c o n d i t i o n s of slavery or serfdom. Third, Rawls' primary 
goods such as l i b e r t y and opportunity, income and wealth, and self-respect, 
are made a v a i l a b l e ; they are are not converted i n t o p e r c e p t i b l e welfare 
goods as i n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . 
The extent t o which Rawls stands as a mediator between d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s 
i s demonstrated by the f a c t t h a t others, i n c l u d i n g Rawls himself, argue th a t 
there i s a Kantian foundation t o h i s theory of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . Stephen 
Darwall s t a t e s t h a t : 
"The Kantian i d e a l s of autonomy and respect f o r r a t i o n a l nature and h i s view 
of the connection between m o r a l i t y and reason, themes which l i e at the very 
center of Kant's moral thought, f i n d expression, Rawls believes, i n the 
conception of j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s . "-^'^  
As explained i n the previous chapter, Kant explains how an autonomous agent 
i s motivated by r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than miscellaneous desires. 
Furthermore Kant explains how r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s are u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e , 
s e r v i n g as p r i n c i p l e s f o r everyone. S i m i l a r l y , under the s u b t i t l e "The 
Kantian I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , Rawls explains t h a t those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n 
also act autonomously since the v e i l of ignorance excludes knowledge of 
one's personal desires, meaning t h a t one i s motivated as much by a sense of 
i n t e r e s t i n selves, or i n d i v i d u a l s , as such, as egoism or s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 
Such m o t i v a t i o n i s almost i d e n t i c a l t o the Kantian demand t h a t one t r e a t s 
others as an end i n themselves. Furthermore there e x i s t s a formal 
c o n s t r a i n t on those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t those p r i n c i p l e s chosen 
must be u n i v e r s a l i z a b l e meaning t h a t they w i l l be r a t i o n a l i n the Kantian 
sense. Rawls f i r m l y r o o t s himself i n the Kantian t r a d i t i o n , arguing t h a t : 
"My suggestion i s t h a t we t h i n k of the o r i g i n a l p ostlon as the p o i n t of view 
from which noumenal selves see the world... Properly understood, then, the 
desire t o act j u s t l y . . . derives i n part from the desire t o express most 
f u l l y what we are or can be, namely f r e e and equal r a t i o n a l beings with a 
l i b e r t y t o choose."®'"' 
I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s t o explore any more deeply the 
s i m i l a r i t i e s and divergences of Rawlsian theory and the Categorical 
Imperative. I t i s adequate f o r my purposes t o note t h a t Rawls manages to 
Incorporate i n t o h i s theory the fundamental Kantian concepts of 
u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y , of the autonomy of e t h i c s and the connection between 
m o r a l i t y and reason. However i n c o n t r a s t , Rawls manages t o derive 
conclusions from h i s theory w i t h considerable i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s o c i a l , 
p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s of the contemporary world. One of the 
biggest obstacles t o Kant's Categorical Imperative i s i t s t h e o r e t i c a l nature 
and i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y . Darwell concludes t h a t : 
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e g a l i t a r i a n than humanitarian nature i n the eyes of son^) demand t h a t the 
Vest r e f r a i n from executing p o l i c i e s t h a t might presently harm the Third 
World and i n i t i a t e a huge t r a n s f e r of resources from r i c h t o poor. 
Global j u s t i c e may cause spec i a l problems f o r "Justice as Fairness", since 
f o r the most part questions of global r e d i s t r i b u t i o n are ignored. However 
Beitz i s of the opinion t h a t : 
" I do not believe t h a t Rawls' f a i l u r e t o take account of these questions 
marks a p i v o t a l weakness i n h i s theory."'*'-' 
I f t h i s i s so, then i t i s worth r e t a i n i n g the Rawlsian p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e as a framework w i t h i n which t o work. Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of Justice 
purport t o " u n d e r l i e and account f o r the various considered moral judgements 
we make i n p a r t i c u l a r circumstances" i n c l u d i n g those moral evaluations made 
about " p a r t i c u l a r actions, laws, p o l i c i e s , i n s t i t u t i o n a l practices, etc."'*^ 
But i n so doing Rawls also develops a theory of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . P a r a l l e l s 
can be drawn w i t h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , which i t s e l f was regarded by Bentham as 
more a system of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n than a moral theory i n the 
s t r i c t sense. Indeed one of Rawls' main aims i s t o assert the s u p e r i o r i t y of 
" j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s " as a theory of s o c i a l j u s t i c e over u t i l i t a r i a n theory. 
The advantages shared by both i s t h a t they are e a s i l y accessible t o agents 
of a l l types, whether i n d i v i d u a l s or governments. I t was concluded i n 
Chapter 2 t h a t the the moral o b l i g a t i o n s incumbent upon a government and 
i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r only i n the way t h a t they might be executed and therefore 
when determining what these o b l i g a t i o n s might be i t i s important t h a t the 
same p r i n c i p l e s can be a p p l i e d i n each instance. 
Rawls makes i t very c l e a r at the beginning of "A Theory of Justice" t h a t the 
two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h domestic s o c i a l 
j u s t i c e and do not characterise "the j u s t i c e of the law of nations and 
r e l a t i o n s between states."*'^-' However i t i s l a t e r suggested by Rawls th a t a 
s i m i l a r procedure t o t h a t which i s employed t o a r r i v e at the p r i n c i p l e s f o r 
domestic s o c i a l j u s t i c e can be u t i l i s e d t o derive and j u s t i f y p r i n c i p l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e . I n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , i t i s suggested, could be 
governed by those p r i n c i p l e s selected by p a r t i e s t o a hypothetical 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l contract. Rawls does not explore the i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
such a c o n t r a c t t o any s i g n i f i c a n t degree but comments t h a t : 
"there would be no s u r p r i s e s since the p r i n c i p l e s chosen would, I t h i n k , be 
f a m i l i a r ones. The basic p r i n c i p l e of the law of nations i s a p r i n c i p l e of 
e q u a l i t y . '"^-^  
Rawls r e i n t e r p r e t s the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference 
attended by "re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of d i f f e r e n t nations", each there t o advance 
the i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e s they represent, who must s e l e c t "the fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s t o adjudicate c o n f l i c t i n g claims among states": 
"Following out the conception of the i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n , I assume t h a t these 
re p r e s e n t a t i v e s are deprived of various kinds of information. While they 
know t h a t they represent d i f f e r e n t nations each l i v i n g under normal 
circumstances of human l i f e , they know nothing about the p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances of t h e i r own s o c i e t y ...Once again the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s , i n 
t h i s case, representatives of states, are allowed only enough knowledge to 
make a r a t i o n a l choice t o p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s but not so much t h a t the 
more f o r t u n a t e among them can take advantage of t h e i r special s i t u a t i o n . 
This o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n i s f a i r between nations; i t n u l l i f i e s the 
contingencies and biases of h i s t o r i c a l fate."'^"^' 
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The p r i n c i p l e s selected by those p a r t i e s t o an I n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l contract 
include, according t o Rawls, s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and "the r i g h t of a people 
t o s e t t l e i t s own a f f a i r s without the i n t e r v e n t i o n of f o r e i g n powers. 
Rawls goes on t o l i s t p r i n c i p l e s of self-defence, t h a t t r e a t i e s must be 
kept, and p r i n c i p l e s d e f i n i n g the j u s t cause of war and j u s t i c e i n the 
course of war ( j u s ad bellum and j u s i n b e l l o ) . Furthermore the desire f o r 
world power and n a t i o n a l g l o r y , and the use of war t o make economic gains or 
acquire t e r r i t o r y are s a i d t o be "contary t o the conception of Justice that 
defines a s o c i e t y ' s l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t . "'^^^  
The i m p l i c a t i o n s of Rawls' few remarks on i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e are l i m i t e d . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t i t i s unjust f o r c o u n t r i e s t o operate a p o l i c y of economic 
imp e r i a l i s m or t o invade other c o u n t r i e s f o r t h e i r own gain. However i t 
would also appear t o be the case t h a t Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
j u s t i c e preclude f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the Horn of A f r i c a t o prevent 
s t a r v a t i o n and also i n areas of i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t such as the former 
Yugoslav Republics. 
Such r e s t r i c t i o n s on the g l o b a l r i g h t s and d u t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l states are 
the r e s u l t of the basic p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y among states. I t i s important 
t o note t h a t Rawls assumes t h a t "independent peoples organised as states 
have c e r t a i n fundamental equal r i g h t s " , i n the same way as independent 
i n d i v i d u a l s . While the presupposition of a p r i n c i p l e which recognises and 
requires respect f o r the autonomy of the i n d i v i d u a l as f r e e and equal moral 
agents i s acceptable, i t i s not equally p l a u s i b l e t o assert t h a t respect f o r 
the moral e q u a l i t y of n a t i o n - s t a t e s i s a fundamental moral p r i n c i p l e . Since 
the i n t e r n a l j u s t i c e of each of the world's separate states cannot be r e l i e d 
upon i t makes sense t o question "why a p r i n c i p l e which defends a states 
a b i l i t y t o pursue an immoi-al end i s t o count as a moral p r i n c i p l e imposing a 
requirement of j u s t i c e on other states."*^"* The moral e q u a l i t y of nation-
s t a t e s cannot be used as a premis when determining p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e 
among nations without begging the question. 
Another o b j e c t i o n t o Rawls' conclusions i s t h a t he also presupposes each 
n a t i o n - s t a t e t o be l a r g e l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . Although Rawls' very 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of g l o b a l j u s t i c e suggests t h a t he does not believe s o c i e t i e s 
t o be e n t i r e l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d , he envisages cooperation between states t o be 
minimal, Beitz suggests t h a t : 
"Probably he Imagines a world of n a t i o n - s t a t e s which i n t e r a c t only i n 
marginal ways; perhaps they maintain diplomatic r e l a t i o n s , p a r t i c i p a t e i n a 
p o s t a l union, maintain l i m i t e d c u l t u r a l exchanges, and so on. C e r t a i n l y the 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y assumption req u i r e s t h a t s o c i e t i e s have no s i g n i f i c a n t 
trade or economic relations,"-"'^ 
Empirical evidence, however, shows c l e a r l y t h a t t h i s i s f a r from being the 
case. Most economists would agree t h a t many Thir d World countries "are 
unable t o feed themselves"^'-- even i f the reasons why are disputed. Moreover 
some of the r i c h e s t nations i n the world are not s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n food or 
other resources and depend upon cooperation w i t h other nations t o prosper. 
Indeed by common consent, whether f o r good or bad, there today e x i s t a t r u l y 
" g l o b a l economy", 
Rawls' assumption means t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s he o u t l i n e s d i f f e r i n at least 
two ways from those which might be chosen by the p a r t i e s t o an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s o c i a l c o n t r a c t who do not suppose each s t a t e t o be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . F i r s t , 
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Rawls does not suggest t h a t the economic r e l a t i o n s of states ought t o be 
bound by p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . I n a world where the removal of trade 
b a r r i e r s and other r e s t r i c t i o n s has l e d t o a p a t t e r n of interdependence 
which i s designed t o favour the West and impose unavoidable burdens on the 
Thi r d World, t h i s c e r t a i n l y appears t o need r e v i s i n g . As previously 
mentioned, he argues t h a t s t a t e s should not seek world power or use war f o r 
economic purposes, but does not consider whether there should be l i m i t s on 
economic i n t e r f e r e n c e . Indeed the purpose of Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s appears t o be 
merely t o ensure peaceful coexistence between separate nations i n the same 
way as Kant's "Perpetual Peace", but Barry believes t h a t such "minimal 
l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of non-interference and non-aggression are no more than a 
f r a c t i o n of what would be agreed upon..."^^ 
Second, the p a r t i e s t o a more r e a l i s t i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l contract are l i k e l y t o 
be concerned w i t h the issue of n a t u r a l resources i n the same way as those 
p a r t i e s t o the domestic c o n t r a c t are s a i d t o be concerned w i t h natural 
t a l e n t s . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l t a l e n t s and the contingencies of s o c i a l 
circumstance are s a i d by Rawls t o be morally a r b i t a r y . The natural 
d i s t r i b u t i o n i s not j u s t or unjust per se; what i s morally s i g n i f i c a n t i s 
the way t h a t such i n e q u a l i t i e s are d e a l t w i t h by s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Rawls 
argues t h a t i t i s u n f a i r t o the disadvantaged t o expect them t o s u f f e r as a 
r e s u l t of such a r b i t a r y f a c t o r s unless i t i s of b e n e f i t t o them i n r e l a t i o n 
t o the i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n of e q u a l i t y : 
" I n j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s men agree t o share one another's f a t e . I n designing 
i n s t i t u t i o n s they undertake t o a v a i l themselves of the accidents of nature 
and s o c i a l circumstance only when doing so i s f o r the common be n e f i t . The 
two p r i n c i p l e s are a f a i r way of meeting the a r b i t a r i n e s s of fortune ...the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which s a t i s f y these p r i n c i p l e s are just."^® 
S i m i l a r l y the d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l resources i s spread unevenly over the 
world's surface. Wealth and mat e r i a l advancement are commonly conceived t o 
r e s u l t from a combination of land and labour. However the s c a r c i t y of 
s u i t a b l e resources means t h a t some s o c i e t i e s are unable t o a t t a i n the same 
l e v e l s of wealth and standards of l i v i n g as others. For example the B r i t i s h 
i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n and ensuing domination of the world i n the nineteenth 
century was i n no small measure a r e s u l t of the a c c e s s i b i l t y of coal and 
iron - o r e . I n the same way the wealth of many s t a t e s i n the Middle-Bast has 
r e s u l t e d from the reserves of o i l which they have c o n t r o l l e d . On the other 
hand the s c a r c i t y of f e r t i l e land together w i t h the s e v e r i t y of the climate 
i n some T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s means t h a t subsistence alone cannot be taken 
f o r granted. I t would not th e r e f o r e be s u r p r i s i n g f o r those representing 
d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n - s t a t e s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t o view the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources as morally a r b i t a r y , and subject them t o an 
' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Difference P r i n c i p l e ' . Moreover even i f each nation were 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , the p a r t i e s t o the co n t r a c t would nevertheless be j u s t i f i e d 
i n arguing t h a t divergences i n wealth between nations would only be 
permlssable i f i t b e n e f i t t e d a l l . The people of any p a r t i c u l a r nation would 
not acquire the r i g h t t o a l l the wealth t h a t might be derived from the o i l 
f i e l d s w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r y simply because a l l neighbouring countries are 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , not l e a s t because Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s concern f a i r n e s s and 
equal d i s t r i b u t i o n r a t h e r than adherence t o any s p e c i f i c minimum standard. 
As Barry notes: 
"Surely, then the arguments which are said t o lead the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t o i n s i s t on maximising the wealth of the worst-off w i t h i n 
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any given community would even more s t r o n g l y lead t o an insistence t h a t what 
t h i s minimum i s should not depend c a p r i c i o u s l y upon the good luck of being 
born i n t o a r i c h s o c i e t y or the i l l luck of being born i n t o a poor one,'"^^ 
The conclusion t h a t Rawls reaches i s t h e r e f o r e based upon at least two 
premises t h a t are not borne out by the f a c t s of contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s . The loss of p o l i t i c a l autonomy as a r e s u l t of the development of 
a g l o b a l economy also acts t o demonstrate the inadequacy of the view t h a t 
moral o b l i g a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , do not extend beyond the 
n a t i o n a l boundary. This suggestion was considered i n Chapter 2 and seen t o 
be flawed, but the f a c t t h a t s o c i a l cooperation extends f a r beyond the 
boundaries of the n a t i o n - s t a t e serves t o destroy one of stronger, but 
u l t i m a t e l y f a l l a c i o u s , arguments employed by i t s supporters. Considerations 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e must take account of em p i r i c a l evidence and 
exchange a s t a t e - c e n t r e d view of the world f o r a conception of the world as 
a s i n g l e community. Beitz suggests t h a t : 
"The p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s would be the two 
p r i n c i p l e s f o r domestic s o c i e t y w r i t large, and t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n would have 
a very r a d i c a l r e s u l t , given the tendency of the d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e , ""^"^  
Given t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e s t a t e s t h a t economic i n e q u a l i t y i s only 
perralssable i f the l e a s t w e l l - o f f b e n e f i t ; i f the expectations of the least 
advantaged are higher than i f the i n e q u a l i t i e s were less, the consequences 
of the a p p l i c a t i o n of such a p r i n c i p l e on a global l e v e l would involve a 
huge r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources from the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d world to less 
developed count r i e s . Observance of such a p r i n c i p l e would, at the very 
l e a s t , make the duty t o a i d those i n famine-stricken areas unmistakeable. 
Before examining i n more d e t a i l the i m p l i c a t i o n s of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l maximin 
str a t e g y , i t i s worthwhile examining the view t h a t i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s are too 
r a d i c a l and not worth s e r i o u s l y considering. 
The necessity f o r a huge t r a n s f e r i n resources from the West t o poorer 
nations, together w i t h the disregard f o r n a t i o n a l boundaries, s t i l l 
considered t o have an important r o l e i n the minds of ordinary people, leads 
many t o give l i t t l e serious consideration t o the s o r t of proposals which 
emanate from an ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Difference P r i n c i p l e ' . The r e a l i t y of the 
p l i g h t of the poor however suggests t h a t s o l u t i o n s devised t o ease the 
s i t u a t i o n must be r e a l i s t i c enough t o be put i n t o p r a c t i c e . 
With t h i s i n mind, i t perhaps i s worthwhile t o r e t u r n t o Rawls' conception 
of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l c o n t r a c t and determine whether more p r a c t i c a l 
o b l i g a t i o n s can be derived. Mark Wi c c l a i r argues t h a t Rawls' i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c o n t r a c t i s only p l a u s i b l e i f i t i s seen as the second stage i n a two-stage 
sequence.'^' I n the f i r s t stage the p a r t i e s t o the contract consider 
themselves t o be members of the same na t i o n - s t a t e and s e l e c t p r i n c i p l e s i n 
the same way as those p a r t i e s involved i n the domestic s o c i a l contract. In 
other words they s e l e c t p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i c a b l e t o the p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and 
economic arrangements of i n d i v i d u a l nation-states. In the second stage they 
consider themselves t o be representatives of n a t i o n - s t a t e s whose 
I n s t i t u t i o n s s a t i s f y the p r i n c i p l e s selected i n the f i r s t stage, given the 
task of s e l e c t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s t o p r o t e c t the j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangements of the nations which they represent, In t h i s l i g h t , i t i s 
argued an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Difference P r i n c i p l e would not be a r r i v e d a t , but 
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the r u l e s chosen by Rawls himself t o govern i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s would 
also have t o be reexamined. For example: 
"A n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n r u l e would have the s t a t u s of a norm which would apply i n 
the i d e a l or l i m i t i n g case of a world of i n t e r n a l l y j u s t nation-states 
...but t h i s would t e l l us nothing about the legitimacy of i n t e r v e n t i o n i n 
the event t h a t the domestic arrangements of p a r t i c u l a r nation-states are 
unjust. '"^ '^  
Therefore i n an i d e a l world a r u l e of nonintervention would doubtless e x i s t , 
i n c l u d i n g a presumption against i n t e r v e n t i o n on behalf of 'human r i g h t s ' . 
But i n an i d e a l world such abuses of human r i g h t s , as can be seen a l l too 
o f t e n i n the r e a l world, would not occur. I t would therefore appear 
reasonable t o suppose t h a t the modified ' v e i l of ignorance' would not 
exclude knowledge from the p a r t i e s t o the contract i n the second stage of 
the two stage sequence, of the f a c t t h a t some s o c i e t i e s are l i k e l y t o be 
excessively unjust. Such knowledge, one can s a f e l y assume, f a l l s w i t h i n the 
sphere of "general f a c t s " which Rawls explains t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r s possess 
behind the v e i l of ignorance. 
With t h i s i n mind the p a r t i e s t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l contract would be forced 
t o consider the prospect t h a t they might be unfortunate enough t o be 
representing j u s t such a nation. Consequently the maximin p r i n c i p l e , which 
acts as the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e f o r those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , w i l l 
compel the p a r t i e s t o the contract t o s e l e c t p r i n c i p l e s r e g u l a t i n g 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s which take t h i s i n t o account. These p r i n c i p l e s w i l l 
permit, and even demand, i n t e r v e n t i o n by j u s t nations i n the i n t e r n a l 
a f f a i r s of unjust or merely poor nations i n order t o b r i n g about a 
s i g n i f i c a n t improvement i n c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e i r respective s o c i e t i e s . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law would be framed i n such a way t h a t i t would be incumbant 
upon s t a t e s t o intervene and b r i n g about a s i g n i f i c a n t improvement of the 
s i t u a t i o n where basic v i o l a t i o n s of j u s t i c e occur. 
While the form of i n t e r v e n t i o n necessary (the t h r e a t or use of force, 
economic sanctions or c o n d i t i o n s placed upon b i l a t e r a l economic assistance) 
would probably depend upon the circumstances of the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , 
the p a r t i e s t o t h i s r e v i s e d version of the Rawlsian i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l 
c o n t r a c t would, needless t o say, q u a l i f y t h i s r i g h t t o intervene with a 
clause p r o t e c t i n g c o u n t r i e s from i n t e r v e n t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y which would only 
p r o t e c t the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e . Perhaps they might also consider empowering 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n a k i n t o the United nations t o decide when such 
a c t i v i t y was necessary or permissible. 
While W i c c l a i r ' s m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o Rawls' theory allow one t o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
conclude t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y i s permissible, exploding the myth 
t h a t the autonomy of the n a t i o n - s t a t e i s at a l l times sacrosanct and 
p r o v i d i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r some of the world's contemporary i n j u s t i c e s , i t 
remains deeply flawed. W i c c l a i r , i n common w i t h Rawls, considers each nation 
t o be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . When considering the p l i g h t of the Jews during the 
Nazi Holocaust a r i g h t of l i m i t e d I n t e r v e n t i o n appears appropriate. But 
Wiccair concedes t h a t "when one considers, say, the p l i g h t of the poor i n 
less developed nations, i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t occasional i n t e r v e n t i o n 
[analogous to t h a t p r a c t i s e d by the US i n Somalia perhaps] by, r i c h e r , 
i n d u s t r i a l nations would be s u f f i c i e n t or appropriate. "'^='' The conditions of 
poverty i n the T h i r d World have been shown already t o be, at l e a s t i n part. 
a r e s u l t of the e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic and p o l i t i c a l 
arrangements, c a l l i n g f o r a complete r e s t r u c t u r i n g i f global j u s t i c e i s t o 
be achieved. I t i s , f o r instance, never questioned whether the world should 
be d i v i d e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l l y independent and separate nation-states. This i s 
a fundamental de c i s i o n which the c o n t r a c t e r s would doubtless wish t o 
consider. 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s of W i c c l a i r ' s conclusions regarding j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are much more r e s t r i c t e d than those reached by 
Barry and Beitz. Indeed the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of l i m i t e d i n t e r v e n t i o n appears 
very much i n tune w i t h the f o r e i g n p o l i c y adopted since the end of the Cold 
War by the USA. However a very important p o i n t t o consider i s whether the 
f a c t t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r moral conclusion i s easier t o conform t o and more 
i n l i n e w i t h contemporary i n t u i t i v e thought i s of any p a r t i c u l a r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i n assessing i t s value as a moral imperative. For example Peter 
Singer urges t h a t the f a c t t h a t he reaches the conclusion t h a t one i s 
obliged t o give a i d t o the T h i r d World t o a p o i n t of marginal u t i l i t y , i s 
both i m p r a c t i c a l and unacceptable t o many, does nothing t o diminish i t s 
value as what i s morally necessary (though i n Chapter Four other reasons why 
i t i s a f a l l a c i o u s conclusion are o f f e r e d ) . Though he does argue that 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between what i s j u s t and what i s p u b l i c l y advocated i s 
j u s t i f i a b l e because s e t t i n g a lower standard might r e s u l t i n more people 
attempting t o s a t i s f y i t and t h e r e f o r e more a i d being g i v e n . T h i s however 
can only be j u s t i f i e d upon u t i l i t a r i a n grounds. 
However John Rawls does i n f a c t go much f u r t h e r and emphasise t h a t the 
p a r t i e s must consider whether they would be able t o comply w i t h the contract 
t h a t they make: 
" . . . i f we make an agreement', we have t o accept the outcome; and so give an 
undertaking i n good f a i t h , we must not only intend t o honor i t but with 
reason believe we can do so. "'^•-' 
Hence Rawls believes t h a t human nature must be taken i n t o account to 
determine whether compliance w i t h the proposed p r i n c i p l e s i s possible. I f 
not, since the contract i s a sincere agreement, a l t e r n a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s must 
be chosen. N a t u r a l l y h i s two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are s a i d t o meet t h i s 
requirement, Rawls also argues t h a t the " s t r a i n s of commitment", or i n other 
words the psychological costs, must be taken i n t o account. He argues that 
the costs of h i s two p r i n c i p l e s are less than those of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m which 
might demand the s a c r i f i c e of the i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y f o r the sake of 
o v e r a l l happiness. However i t must be considered whether compliance with 
Eawls' theory of j u s t i c e w r i t large i s possible and whether the 
psychological costs are s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher than the costs of the domestic 
s o c i a l c o n t r a c t . Given the r a d i c a l nature of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of a Rawlsian 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t i t i s very possible t h a t on these grounds such 
p r i n c i p l e s might be considered unacceptable. Moreover Rawls notes t h a t the 
n a t u r a l duty of j u s t i c e i s s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d : 
"This duty r e q u i r e s us t o support and t o comply w i t h j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s that 
e x i s t and ...constrains us t o f u r t h e r j u s t arrangements not yet established, 
at l e a s t i f t h i s can be done without too much cost t o ourselves.'"^'^ 
Perhaps the major d i f f i c u l t y f a c i n g the implementation of a Rawlsian theory 
of g l o b a l j u s t i c e i s the f a c t t h a t one would not choose t o begin from the 
p o s i t i o n of the world as i t i s today - a common problem f o r a l l p o l i t i c i a n s 
and s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s . Those i n the West would stand t o lose a great deal i f 
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the world was t r u l y j u s t and an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Difference P r i n c i p l e observed. 
For example the p r i n c i p l e of g l o b a l j u s t i c e overrides v i r t u a l l y a l l other 
o b l i g a t i o n s incumbent upon a government, promoting the claims of Third World 
c o u n t r i e s f o r food a i d , development assistance, and monetary and trade 
reform t o a p o s i t i o n of the utmost importance. The welfare of those i n 
poorer c o u n t r i e s overrides, i t seems, the o b l i g a t i o n s of a government i n a 
r i c h country t o help i t s own c i t i z e n s . Moreover the o b l i g a t i o n t o r e a l i s e 
j u s t i c e also e n t a i l s attempting t o e s t a b l i s h j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s where none 
pr e s e n t l y e x i s t . At a g l o b a l l e v e l t h i s might even e n t a i l securing a United 
Nations w i t h power t o r e d i s t r i b u t e material goods from one country t o 
another, or even e s t a b l i s h i n g a genuine world government. However t h i s 
should not undermine the r o l e of such an i d e a l i n p r o v i d i n g a goal towards 
which one should s t r i v e . 
Rawls appears t o be somewhat cautious i n advocating the use of h i s theory of 
J u s t i c e i n d a i l y l i f e , even arguing t h a t i n r a d i c a l l y unjust circumstances 
one may even be forced t o r e l y upon a u t i l i t a r i a n c a l c u l a t i o n of costs and 
b e n e f i t s balanced by i n t u i t i v e reasoning.'^"'' While i n such circumstances his 
p r i n c i p l e s might lead t o a c o n f l i c t of d u t i e s (considerations of global 
j u s t i c e c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h d u t i e s t o one's own countrymen f o r example) i n the 
same way as a l l d e o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s , i t i s nevertheless not d i f f i c u l t t o 
judge where the balance of these o b l i g a t i o n s l i e . For example i t i s very 
important t o note t h a t considerations of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e , said by Rawls t o 
be c o n d i t i o n a l upon the l e v e l of s a c r i f i c e one makes, are less important 
than considerations of g l o b a l j u s t i c e i t s e l f . Should the demands made by an 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Difference P r i n c i p l e appear supererogatory and unworkable t h i s 
might be a r e s u l t of the scale of present i n j u s t i c e i n the world where two 
t h i r d s of humankind l i v e i n or close t o poverty and the unwillingness of the 
reader t o recognise t h i s f a c t . I t i s as l i k e l y t h a t contemporary 
arrangements are a t f a u l t than the moral theory employed. 
I t i s perhaps necessary at t h i s stage t o reappraise one's goals. Rawls 
himself recognises t h a t " j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s ...moves us closer t o the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l ; i t does not, of course, achieve it."^® I believe that 
any attempt t o s p e l l out an o b j e c t i v e and coherent e t h i c a l theory without 
flaws i s u l t i m a t e l y doomed t o f a i l u r e . This i s not any reason t o give up i n 
one's search or t o abdicate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Rawls adds t h a t " a l l theories 
are presumably mistaken i n places. The r e a l question at any given time i s 
which of the views already proposed i s the best approximation o v e r a l l . " ^ ^ By 
these c r i t e r i o n the f a c t t h a t " j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s " creates problems as well 
as present s o l u t i o n s w i l l d i minish i n importance when the value and 
importance of a theory t h a t equates l i b e r t y w i t h m a t e r i a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
transcends n a t i o n a l boundaries, and i s able t o make allowances f o r empirical 
change i n g l o b a l economic and p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s i s recognised. I r o n i c a l l y 
a p r i n c i p l e which set out t o defend l i b e r a l democracy i n the West does more 
to undermine i t s moral basis than anything else. On Rawlsian grounds i t i s , 
at the very l e a s t , impossible not t o reach the conclusion: 
"That the r i c h c o u n t r i e s f a i l t o devote even one per cent of t h e i r national 
incomes t o a i d , and t h a t they refuse t o co-operate i n arrangements to pay 
the poor c o u n t r i e s a high p r i c e f o r the f o o d s t u f f s and raw materials t h a t 
they export i s scandalously immoral but i t i s not the r e s u l t of any l o g i c a l 
or p h y s i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . " ="=" 
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CHAPTER 7: THE RAWLSIAN SOCIAL CONTRACT & INTERGENERATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
"(we] owe t o p o s t e r i t y concern of the same q u a l i t y and degree th a t [our 
ancestors] ...devoted t o a l l generations f o l l o w i n g t h e i r s and t h a t made our 
present happiness possible."' 
Closely connected t o the question of whether or not one i s morally obliged 
t o o f f e r a i d t o those i n desperate need, i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r n a t i o n a l i t y 
are the e q u a l l y complex issues of whether one must take account of the needs 
of those not yet born and be responsible f o r the actions of one's 
predecessors. Though interconnected, these two problems w i l l be considered 
separately. F i r s t , i t i s necessary t o decide whether present people d i f f e r 
i n m o r ally r e l e v a n t ways from f u t u r e generations, a question described by 
G.Kavka as the " F u t u r i t y Problem"-^ I f i t i s concluded t h a t they do then i t 
w i l l have f a r reaching e t h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h respect both t o the form 
and the amount of a i d given t o poor countries. Not only would i t be 
necessary t o ensure t h a t the a i d given d i d not merely create many more 
hungry humans i n the next generation, but also i t would place upon everybody 
a duty not t o u n f a i r l y deplete the l e v e l of n a t u r a l resources i n the world. 
Second, i t i s p e r t i n e n t t o consider whether e x c o l o n i a l powers l i k e B r i t a i n 
are o b l i g e d t o make amends f o r past e x p l o i t a t i o n i n the Third World. The 
record of neo-colonial powers must also be taken i n t o account, since the 
e x p l o i t i o n through economic means has, i n the post-war era, e a s i l y r i v a l l e d 
t h a t of c o l o n i a l powers i n the past two centuries. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
consider whether rep a r a t i o n s f o r these 'crimes' must be made, and i f so what 
form i t must take. 
I t was concluded i n the previous chapter t h a t , at the very least, Rawls' Two 
P r i n c i p l e s of Ju s t i c e are more consistent w i t h one's considered moral 
judgements than conclusions reached by the a p p l i c a t i o n of any u t i l i t a r i a n 
r u l e s . Indeed, w i t h c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g the need t o widen the 
d e f i n i t i o n of those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t o make the p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l , i t was argued t h a t Rawls' Theory of Justice brings 
one very close t o the "p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l " , the c r i t e r i a t h a t b r i n g one 
closes t t o an o b j e c t i v e e t h i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of r i g h t and wrong. Part of the 
i n t e n t i o n of t h i s exercise i s t o employ the Rawlsian p r i n c i p l e s and 
demonstrate, f u r t h e r , the con t r a s t when compared t o s t r i c t adherence t o 
u t i l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s . To t h i s end, each part of the in t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l 
debate w i l l f i r s t be considered from a u t i l i t a r i a n perspective and only 
then, when the d e f i c i e n c i e s are h i g h l i g h t e d , w i l l the problems be addressed 
from the Rawlsian approach of l i b e r t y and d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . 
In u t i l i t a r i a n terms i t i s almost impossible t o avoid concluding t h a t one's 
o b l i g a t i o n s t o f u t u r e people are u n l i m i t e d . Presumably i f one i s s t r i v i n g t o 
produce the greatest happiness f o r the greatest number, the important f a c t o r 
i s the net u t i l i t y of an a c t i o n , not when the reward w i l l be reaped or the 
happiness enjoyed. Along these l i n e s i t would appear t h a t one could quite 
j u s t i f i a b l y s a c r i f i c e the l i v e s of an e n t i r e generation i f the r e s u l t were 
to be a vast improvement i n the l i v e s of a l l generations t h e r e a f t e r . Such a 
scenario might be a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t t o envisage, but the main point that 
the l i v e s of a l l l i v i n g people could be s a c r i f i c e d i n the name of fu t u r e 
generations cannot be disputed. Furthermore on such a basis, more r e a l i s t i c 
scenarios such as a zero population growth p o l i c y could e a s i l y be j u s t i f i e d . 
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despite the f a c t t h a t i t would v i o l a t e the r i g h t t o l i f e of many Third World 
peasants, f o r whom large f a m i l i e s are the only insurance against an early 
death. While most would accept t h a t the welfare of f u t u r e generations must 
be taken i n t o account, i t i s important a t the same time t o ensure t h a t the 
r i g h t s of the e x i s t i n g poor and s o c i a l l y disenfranchaised are not 
diminished. 
Such a overwhelming regard t o the l i v e s of f u t u r e generations while 
j u s t i f i e d by u t i l i t a r i a n theory i s not r e f l e c t e d i n pra c t i c e . A cursory 
glance at environmental p o l i c y o f f e r s i r r e f u t a b l e evidence t h a t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s a l l too f r e q u e n t l y merely paid t o short term f a c t o r s . While 
the l e v e l of CFC gas emissions have been cut d r a s t i c a l l y as a r e s u l t of 
imminent f e a r s of gl o b a l warming, problems such as widespread environmental 
degradation and the disappearance of the B r a z i l i a n Rainforests have not been 
tackled. Furthermore a i d t o Th i r d World countries o f t e n appears t o take the 
form of emergency food and c l o t h i n g r a t h e r than the form of a i d designed 
e i t h e r t o help the poor and t h e i r c h i l d r e n ' s c h i l d r e n t o permanently leave 
the c o n d i t i o n of poverty, or t o change the circumstances t h a t created 
poverty i n the f i r s t place, whether t h a t mdght be contraceptives t o prevent 
overpopulation or more ambitious measures designed t o prevent the sor t of 
neo-colonialisra which e x i s t today. Other measures which might ensure against 
d i s a s t e r i n the f u t u r e such as a n t i - p o l l u t i o n measure, the conservation of 
non-renewable resources and investment i n " s u r v i v a l sciences" also do not 
appear t o have taken place t o any s i g n i f i c a n t degree. When asked t o make 
s a c r i f i c e s f o r f u t u r e generations Kavka suggests t h a t there are three 
e q u a l l y f a l l a c i o u s reasons o f t e n given why they should be overridden. 
F i r s t , i t i s commonly argued t h a t the temporal l o c a t i o n of f u t u r e people i s 
morally s i g n i f i c a n t . The f a c t t h a t they do not yet e x i s t s means, i t i s 
suggested, t h a t they cannot have ' r i g h t s ' and cannot demand o b l i g a t i o n s from 
those e x i s t i n g i n the present. However Kavka argues t h a t " r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y 
(which concerns the well-being of people) should a t t a c h no i n t r i n s i c 
importance t o the temporal l o c a t i o n of people. "-• I n the same way as i t i s 
r a t i o n a l f o r one t o give equal weight t o one's present and f u t u r e desires, 
i t i s persuasively argued t h a t one should balance the I n t e r e s t s of those i n 
the present w i t h those of those l i v i n g i n the f u t u r e . Temporal l o c a t i o n i s 
no more s i g n i f i c a n t than the one's l o c a t i o n i n space. Kavka concludes tha t : 
" I t may be concluded t h a t while there are sound reasons, when deciding whose 
desires t o s a t i s f y , t o favor present over past people, the dif f e r e n c e i n 
t h e i r temporal l o c a t i o n does not c o n s t i t u t e a reason f o r favouring present 
over f u t u r e people."-* 
Second, and r e l a t e d t o the temporal l o c a t i o n of f u t u r e people, i t i s also 
f r e q u e n t l y argued, by those such as Martin Golding®, t h a t one's r e l a t i v e 
ignorance of f u t u r e people i s morally s i g n i f i c a n t f o r two reasons. Not only 
i s i t argued t h a t the desires of f u t u r e generations are unknown and 
th e r e f o r e unable f o r present generations t o s a t i s f y , but i t i s also argued 
t h a t even i f t h e i r desires were known, one would be less able t o s a t i s f y 
them than those of one's contemporaries because "our a b i l i t y t o shape f u t u r e 
events genei-ally decreases as they become temporally more distant,""^ 
However, as Kavka argues, one's ignorance of f u t u r e generations' conception 
of the good l i f e does not mean t h a t one i s ignorant, t o a very high degree 
of c e r t a i n t y , t h e i r basic b i o l o g i c a l and economic needs. For instance i t i s 
known t h a t food, clean a i r and f u e l w i l l be needed as much by those i n the 
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f u t u r e as by those i n the present. Whether one adopts a Neo-Malthusian 
approach or not, i t i s c l e a r t h a t there are measures t h a t can be taken 
towards s a t i s f y i n g these basic needs. For example energy conservation, a n t i -
p o l l u t i o n laws, and population c o n t r o l s could a l l be enacted. Indeed Kavka 
draws an analogy w i t h the ignorance of an adolescent's needs i n retirement. 
Despite being unaware of h i s or her s p e c i f i c needs i n f o r t y years time, i t 
would make sense f o r a young person t o invest a pr o p o r t i o n of h i s or her 
income and t o eat pro p e r l y and exercise r e g u l a r l y t o ensure t h a t basic needs 
such as s e c u r i t y and good he a l t h are met. Kavka concludes t h a t s i m i l a r l y : 
" M o r a l i t y advises us t o take steps t o insure an adequate supply of resources 
f o r f u t u r e generations, despite our ignorance of the d e t a i l s of the desires 
t h a t f u t u r e people w i l l have."^ 
F i n a l l y , i f the temporal l o c a t i o n of those i n the f u t u r e and our ignorance 
of them are r e j e c t e d as reasons f o r not i n c l u d i n g them i n the same moral 
community as those i n the present, the contingency of f u t u r e people i s said 
t o be a reason why they cannot be included i n the moral equation. The very 
f a c t t h a t the number and i d e n t i t y of f u t u r e people i s dependent upon the 
ac t i o n s taken i n the present, a f f e c t s the moral r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
two, i t i s argued. The needs of those i n the present are said t o take 
p r i o r i t y because people i n the f u t u r e might not e x i s t a t a l l . For example 
i t i s pointed out t h a t i t would be immoral f o r a poor couple, w i t h three 
c h i l d r e n and i n t e n d i n g t o have three more, t o deprive t h e i r e x i s t i n g 
c h i l d r e n of e s s e n t i a l resources i n the i n t e r e s t s of those yet t o be born. 
However while under c o n d i t i o n s of s c a r c i t y the needs of those i n the present 
take p r i o r i t y over those whose existence i s dependent upon the decisions of 
those i n the present, t h i s does not mean t h a t they must take p r i o r i t y over 
the i n t e r e s t s of those whom i t i s known w i l l e x i s t . I f the poor couple are 
determined t o have three more c h i l d r e n and cannot be persuaded t o change 
t h e i r mind t h e n . i t makes sense, i n u t i l i t a r i a n terms, t o give those c h i l d r e n 
yet t o be born equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h those already a l i v e . Since one can 
be v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n t h a t there w i l l e x i s t i n the f u t u r e a population of 
equal i f not greater siz e than t h a t i n the world today ( c u r r e n t l y 5.3 
b i l l i o n ) the contingency of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s i s i r r e l e v a n t . While i t 
might be r i g h t t o take steps t o reduce the numbers of those l i v i n g i n the 
f u t u r e through population c o n t r o l , t h i s does not mean t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of 
those who w i l l i n e v i t a b l y e x i s t should be abandoned. 
I t may t h e r e f o r e be concluded t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m overwhelmingly suggests 
t h a t the needs of f u t u r e generations be given at l e a s t equal consideration 
t o those of the present generation. However, as Derek P a r f i t p oints out, the 
l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of a population p o l i c y based s t r i c t l y upon u t i l i t a r i a n 
l i n e s are repugnant.^ Kavka argues t h a t e x i s t i n g people have p r i o r i t y over 
f u t u r e people " i n the sense of warranting population l i m i t a t i o n as a means 
of l i m i t i n g the t o t a l needs of f u t u r e generations", but adds that 
" population l i m i t a t i o n c a r r i e d t o the utmost extreme, i . e . the end of 
species by c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n not t o reproduce, would not be morally 
j u s t i f i e d . " - ^ Yet t h i s very decision, or equally objectionable conclusions, 
might w e l l be j u s t i f i a b l e i n u t i l i t a r i a n terms. 
P a r f i t , i n h i s a r t i c l e "Overpopulation and the Qua l i t y of L i f e " , compares 
two r a t e s of population growth. The f i r s t can be described as "The Average 
P r i n c i p l e " which s t a t e s t h a t i t i s b e t t e r i f people's l i v e s are, on 
avearage, b e t t e r or contain more happiness. The second can be described as 
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"The Hedonistic T o t a l P r i n c i p l e " which s t a t e s t h a t i t i s b e t t e r i f there 
e x i s t s a greater g l o b a l sum of t o t a l happiness. I n other words i t i s implied 
t h a t a re d u c t i o n i n the q u a l i t y of l i f e can be compensated f o r by an 
increase i n the q u a n t i t y of l i f e l i v e d . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of e i t h e r p o l i c y 
are shown by P a r f i t t o be morally objectionable, I f one accepts the Total 
P r i n c i p l e i t i m p l i e s t h a t : 
"Compared w i t h the existence of very many people , . , a l l of whom have a very 
high q u a l i t y of l i f e , there must be some much l a r g e r number of people whose 
existence, i f other t h i n g s are equal, would be bet t e r , even though these 
people would have l i v e s t h a t are barely worth l i v i n g . " " ^ 
This P a r f i t names the "Repugnant Conclusion" since the conclusion t h a t i t 
would be b e t t e r f o r many people w i t h l i v e s c ontaining only "muzak and 
potatoes" t o e x i s t than a much smaller number enjoying f a r superior 
l i f e s t y l e s i s hard t o accept. However P a r f i t also devotes considerable space 
i n demonstrating t h a t "The Average P r i n c i p l e " i s equally flawed. The Average 
P r i n c i p l e suggests t h a t a higher q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r a smaller number of 
people i s pr e f e r a b l e t o a lower standard of l i f e f o r a la r g e r number of 
people. However such a view i s very e l i t i s t since i t places much emphasis 
upon the c o n d i t i o n of the b e s t - o f f person i n contrast t o the Rawlsian view 
t h a t i t i s the c o n d i t i o n of worst-off person t h a t i s of importance. Moreover 
the l o g i c a l conclusion of such a view i s t h a t the exceptional standard of 
l i v i n g f o r one person i s pref e r a b l e t o a lower standard of l i v i n g f o r any 
others. U t i l i t a r i a n considerations suggest t h a t one must e i t h e r accept the 
repugnant conclusion or the e l i t i s t average p r i n c i p l e . Neither i s acceptable 
and P a r f i t i s forced t o introduce the f a r from u t i l i t a r i a n consideration of 
"perfectionism", appealing t o "what I s h a l l c a l l the best things i n l i f e . " ^ ^ 
The P r i n c i p l e of U t i l i t y does i m p o r t a n t l y take the welfare of f u t u r e 
generations i n t o account. Unfortunately the best world along such l i n e s 
would e i t h e r be t h a t of an enormous population a l l of whom have l i v e s that 
are not much above the l e v e l where they cease t o be worth l i v i n g , or t h a t of 
a very small population w i t h an optimal standard of l i v i n g . Nevertheless one 
i s i n t u i t i v e l y unable t o disregard the welfare of f u t u r e generations and the 
problems encountered through the employment of the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y do 
not prevent one from attempting t o derive an o b l i g a t i o n t o f u t u r e 
generations by other means. 
Much space has already been devoted t o the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of a Rawlsian 
e t h i c a l approach, but upon f i r s t glance t h i s too appears t o encounter 
problems when f u t u r e generations are taken i n t o account. Golding argues th a t 
i f one accepts t h a t j u s t i c e and r i g h t s are determined by agreements between 
people, i n other words by s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l r e c i p r o c i t y 
must be possible i f f u t u r e generations are t o have any r i g h t s . To be members 
of the same "moral community", he argues, there must be e i t h e r an " e x p l i c i t 
c o n t r a c t between i t s members" or a " s o c i a l arrangement i n which each member 
derives b e n e f i t s from the e f f o r t s of other members, "^^ Since f u t u r e 
generations cannot be p a r t y t o e i t h e r form of agreement, he argues, they 
cannot be s a i d t o have any r i g h t s i n the s o c i a l contract t r a d i t i o n . I f t h i s 
i s accepted then i t would appear t h a t Rawls' Theory of Just i c e , based on the 
concept of a s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , i s unable t o make p r o v i s i o n f o r f u t u r e people. 
On the other hand i t i s argued by others t h a t i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l r e c i p r o c i t y 
i s possible. Walter Wagner, f o r instance, argues t h a t by recognising the 
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r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s i n f u t u r e generations, one manages t o increase one's 
empathy and compassion and hence b e n e f i t oneself. There i s also a long 
t r a d i t i o n i n western e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g maintaining t h a t since our f o r e f a t h e r s 
have b e n e f i t t e d the present gexieration i n many ways, one has o b l i g a t i o n s t o 
one's descendants. Shrader-Frechette quotes an ancient Benedictine 
manuscript t o emphasise the po i n t : 
"...no-one who p l a n t s a f i r t r e e can hope t o f e l l i t i t when i t i s f u l l y 
grown, . . I n s p i t e of t h i s the most sacred o b l i g a t i o n i s t o repl a n t and 
husband these pine f o r e s t s . I f we sweat f o r the b e n e f i t of p o s t e r i t y , we 
should not complain as we reap the r e s u l t s of the e f f o r t s of our 
f o r e f a t h e r s . " ' "• 
However whether or not i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l r e c i p r o c i t y i s - t r u l y possible, and 
i t i s perhaps r a t h e r u n l i k e l y t o be the case, i s not the r e a l issue. Both 
Daniel Callahan and John Rawls argue t h a t e x p l i c i t r e c i p r o c i t y i s not a 
necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r a l l s o c i a l contracts. Callahan c i t e s various 
examples where i t i s accepted t h a t t h i s i s the case. For example, he argues 
t h a t the o b l i g a t i o n of a mother and f a t h e r t o t h e i r c h i l d i s c e r t a i n l y not 
contingent upon any r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n i n the years t o come. Moreover the 
c h i l d i s not asked i f he or she wishes t o be party t o an agreement; the 
con t r a c t e x i s t s because a c h i l d i s i n debt t o h i s or her parents and because 
the parents accept an o b l i g a t i o n towards t h e i r c h i l d . ' " ^ 
Rawls accepts t h a t j u s t i c e between generations "subjects any e t h i c a l theory 
t o severe i f not impossible t e s t s " "=•, but overcomes the problems of 
r e c i p r o c i t y by assuming t h a t the p a r t i e s t o the s o c i a l contract t o be heads 
of f a m i l y or genetic l i n e s " w i t h t i e s of sentiment between successive 
generations."''' He argues t h a t the l e g i s l a t o r s i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , who 
he says are pres e n t l y e x i s t i n g persons, would adopt behind the v e i l of 
ignorance what he c a l l s the " j u s t savings p r i n c i p l e " . The j u s t savings 
p r i n c i p l e i s included i n Rawls' f i n a l d e f i n i t i o n of h i s two p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e reproduced i n the previous chapter (although not then r e f e r r e d t o ) , 
and "can be r e f e r r e d t o as an understanding between generations t o carry 
t h e i r f a i r share of the burden of r e a l i s i n g and preserving a j u s t 
s o c i e t y . " ^ T h i s takes the form of preserving those j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s 
already es t a b l i s h e d and p u t t i n g aside " i n each period of time a s u i t a b l e 
amount of r e a l c a p i t a l accumulation."'-' Cap i t a l includes not only resources 
such as f o s s i l f u e l s and other non-renewable resources, f e r t i l e land, and 
f a c t o r i e s and machinery, but also technology, knowledge, and c u l t u r e . The 
means t o provide an adequate standard of l i v i n g together with the 
pre s e r v a t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n s of l i b e r t y and j u s t i c e are necessary 
t o r e a l i s e and preserve j u s t i c e f o r f u t u r e generations. 
Rawls concedes t h a t r e c i p r a c i t y between generations i s not possible but 
argues t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i s unchangeable and na t u r a l "so the question of 
j u s t i c e does not a r i s e . Rather: 
"What i s Just or unjust i s how i n s t i t u t i o n s deal w i t h the natural 
l i m i t a t i o n s and the way they are set up t o take advantage of h i s t o r i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s , Obviously i f a l l generations are t o gain . . . they must choose 
a j u s t savings p r i n c i p l e ...Censuring]... t h a t each receives from i t s 
predecessors and does i t s f a i r share f o r those which come l a t e r . " ^ ' 
The only generation, and though the l e g i s l a t o r s are a c t u a l l y contemporaries 
Rawls argues t h a t i n e f f e c t representatives from each generation are party 
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t o the agreement since the same p r i n c i p l e s would always be chosen, not t o 
be n e f i t would be the f i r s t and t h i s problem i s supposedly overcame because 
of t h e i r concern f o r t h e i r immediate descendants. However t h i s i s an 
argument not without i t s c r i t i c s . Michael Bayles, f o r instance, argues that 
f a m i l i a l concern i s not l i k e l y t o extend f o r more than about two generations 
i n t o the f u t u r e . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s of some measures 
t o improve the short term p l i g h t of the poor may well store up disastrous 
consequences many years l a t e r , Bayles argues t h a t no p r i n c i p l e designed t o 
avoid the consequences of ec o l o g i c a l d i s a s t e r or population explosion would 
be agreed t o on Rawls' account. ^ '^  Moreover Rawls himself accepts t h a t the 
emphasis on sentiment between successive generations involves a s h i f t i n the 
"mo t i v a t i o n assumption"^"^ made about the p a r t i e s t o the s o c i a l contract, 
p r e v i o u s l y s a i d t o be a c t i n g upon s e l f - i n t e r e s t alone, 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e tempting t o t r y and conceive the p a r t i e s or l e g i s l a t o r s i n 
the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n as representatives of a l l generations, i n other words 
as being a l l a c t u a l persons (past, present and f u t u r e ) i n order t o avoid the 
major charge of short-terraism made against Rawls, However there are many 
problems w i t h such a conception, the most important being i t s coherence. 
Since the existence of possible l e g i s l a t o i ' s depends upon the p r i n c i p l e s 
chosen i t makes no sense t h a t those behind the v e i l of ignorance already 
know t h a t they e x i s t . I n t h i s l i g h t i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see why Rawls 
argues t h a t " i t i s best t o take the present time of entry i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . " ^ " 
I t has already been noted t h a t another reason commonly c i t e d why those 
already a l i v e caniiot be members of the same "moral community" as f u t u r e 
generations i s t h e i r supposed ignorance of a f u t u r e conception of the 'good 
l i f e ' . As already mentioned, Golding argues t h a t f a c t o r s such as the 
r a p i d i t y of te c h n o l o g i c a l change make t h i s impossible. However Joel Feinberg 
attacks, i n the same way as Kavka, the assumption t h a t our i n t e r e s t s w i l l 
be d i f f e r e n t merely because of our ignorance of what they w i l l be i n the 
f u t u r e . As he puts i t , f u t u r e generations " w i l l have i n t e r e s t i n l i v i n g 
space, f e r t i l e s o i l , f r e s h a i r and the l i k e . 
Moreover Rawls argues t h a t persons of any generations w i l l desire an e t h i c a l 
code based upon s o c i a l j u s t i c e and equity, i n c l u d i n g a p r o h i b i t i o n against 
an i n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources derived from h i s two p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e , against using others merely as a means, and against f a i l u r e t o 
p r o t e c t the homeless. This provides enough inf o r m a t i o n t o make i t clear t h a t 
the use of DDT or other chemicals t o prevent disease and protect food 
supplies t o a i d the poor i n the Th i r d World i s not permissable. DDT i s now 
known t o cause cancer and genetic damage and w i l l continue t o do so 
i n d e f i n i t l y making the present generation s u f f e r at the expense of the l i v e s 
saved i n the past. Thus f u t u r e generations were used, a l b e i t u n w i t t i n g l y , as 
a means f o r the ends of the then present generation. Callahan c o r r e c t l y 
p o i n t s out t h a t the most morally secure course t o f o l l o w i s t o assume that 
the s o c i a l i d e a l of f u t u r e generations d i f f e r s l i t t l e from our own. 
A danger, of course, of r e c o g n i t i o n of the ' r i g h t s ' of f u t u r e generations i s 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t those of the present generation are too e a s i l y cast 
aside, as can be the consequence of u t i l i t a r i a n d e l i b e r a t i o n on f u t u r e 
people. However Rawls emphasises t h a t "no generation has stronger claims 
than any other"=='=', thereby acknowledging t h a t the only r a t i o n a l and j u s t way 
t o deal w i t h such a problem of c o n f l i c t s , which i s without a simple answer. 
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i s t o agree t o equal r i g h t s between generations. There i s no reason why t h i s 
should harm the i n t e r e s t s of those presently s u f f e r i n g , but should instead 
act as a c o n s t a l n t on those measures considered t o help them which would 
r e s u l t i n even greater s u f f e r i n g i n the f u t u r e . Rather than provide cause t o 
ignore the p l i g h t of those s t a r v i n g , i n the way of Neo-Malthusians such as 
Garret Hardin, Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e should ensure t h a t the measures 
chosen t o a l l e v i a t e the s i t u a t i o n do not store up f u r t h e r problems f o r the 
f u t u r e , denying the known r i g h t s of f u t u r e generations. 
Furthermore Rawls makes i t c l e a r t h a t the l e a s t advantaged i n society need 
not necessarily make any s a c r i f i c e themselves " t o improve the standard of 
l i f e of l a t e r generations. . .: 
Of course, the saving of the less favoured need not be done by t h e i r t a k i n g 
an a c t i v e p a r t i n the investment process. Rather i t normally consists of 
t h e i r approving of the economic and other arrangements necessary f o r the 
appropriate accumulation."^' 
The j u s t savings p r i n c i p l e also makes p l a i n t h a t the consideration given t o 
f u t u r e generations obviously depends upon the s t a t e of society: a r i c h , 
s o c i e t y c l e a r l y must do more than a poor society. As Rawls notes: 
"When people are poor and saving i s d i f f i c u l t , a lower r a t e of saving should 
be required; wheras i n a w e a l t h i e r s o c i e t y greater savings may be reasonably 
be expected since the r e a l burden i s less. Eventually once j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s 
are f i r m l y established, the net accumulation required f a l l s t o zero. At t h i s 
p o i n t a s o c i e t y meets i t s duty of j u s t i c e by maintaining j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and preserving t h e i r m a t e r i a l base,"^'-' 
Rawls r e a d i l y concedes t h a t a precise estimation as t o what the rate of 
savings ought t o be at any p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n time i s not possible. However 
he coherently argues t h a t general o u t l i n e s can be discerned which are more 
than enough t o p o i n t out the flaws of other suggested doctrines. For example 
Rawls argues t h a t at the very l e a s t h i s theory demonstrates " t h a t the 
c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y leads i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n f o r questions of 
J u s t i c e between generations."^-^ I t ought t o be remembered t h a t economic and 
s o c i a l goods should be a l l o c a t e d according t o p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e rather 
than i n accordance w i t h the maximisation of u t i l i t y , or who can pay the 
highest p r i c e f o r them or who has the most immediate access, whether 
geographically or temporally. P a r a l l e l s might be drawn between the j u s t 
savings p r i n c i p l e and the Lockean proviso t o property r i g h t s t h a t one must 
leave "enough, and as good l e f t i n common f o r others."®'^ I t appears th a t 
the j u s t savings p r i n c i p l e aims t o achieve enough and as good f o r those not 
yet born as w e l l as merely one's contemporaries, and thus might be described 
as Lockean w r i t large. Fundamentally and c r u c i a l l y , Rawls makes i t clear 
t h a t instead of merely concerning oneself w i t h one's o b l i g a t i o n s t o others 
i n the present, man " i s bound by the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t would be chosen i n the 
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t o define j u s t i c e between persons at d i f f e r e n t moments of 
time. "=" 
The second, and somewhat b r i e f e r , s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter concerns the issue 
of h i s t o r i c a l e x p l o i t a t i o n and the reparations, i f any, t h a t those connected 
w i t h such 'crimes' are obliged t o make. Colonial e x p l o i t a t i o n i s commonplace 
i n recent h i s t o r y . Modern or I m p e r i a l c o l o n i a l i s a t l o n was p r a c t i s e d by 
almost a l l European c o u n t r i e s i n the l a s t few hundred years and was 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the subjugation of the c o l o n l a l i s e d country i n l i n e w ith 
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the o v e r r i d i n g m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l and economic aims and o b j e c t i v e s of the 
mother country. The impact was profound, hastening the economic development 
of Europe and r e t a r d i n g progress i n those countries colonised. As John 
Warnock describes: 
"For most people i n what i s now c a l l e d the underdeveloped world, the e f f e c t 
of c o l o n i a l i s a t i o n was Ijnpoverlshment, hunger and even famine, at l e a s t down 
to Vorld War 1. 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , mny T h i r d World countries believe t h a t compensation i s 
owed t o them by t h e i r former aggressors and occupiers. The wealth of the 
West today was b u i l t upon e x p l o i t a t i o n i n the Third World, so the argument 
runs, and t h e r e f o r e p a r t of t h i s wealth must be reinvested or rather 
returned t o the c o u n t r i e s from where i t derived. The c l a s s i c a l u t i l i t a r i a n 
response t o such an argument i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . I t matters l i t t l e , i t would 
appear, from where wealth and power was derived i n the past and what wrongs 
were committed i n the process. The a c t u a l p e r p e t r a t o r s of the crime along 
w i t h the actual v i c t i m s have no doubt been dead f o r many years, and the only 
remaining issue i s what a c t i o n creates the highest net u t i l i t y . I t might 
w e l l , i f Singer i s t o be believed, be f o r the greatest good of the greatest 
number i f c o u n t r i e s i n the West r e t u r n large amounts of t h e i r wealth t o the 
T h i r d World, or i t might not i f Hardin i s c o r r e c t . E i t h e r way, the decision 
i s e n t i r e l y divorced from the h i s t o r i c a l events i n question. 
Rule u t i l i t a r i a n s might argue t h a t i n the long run i t would be b e t t e r t o 
ensure t h a t reparations ai-e paid i n order t o discourage acts of c o l o n i a l i s m 
and i m p e r i a l i s m from o c c u r r i n g i n the f u t u r e . Such an argument does, from 
the p o i n t of view of commonsense, appear t o have some mileage t o i t . I f Iraq 
had managed t o gain from i t s Invasion of Kuwait, f o r instance, i t would 
appear t o encourage other would-be aggressors t o f o l l o w s u i t . However i f 
Bernard Williams' a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , and r u l e - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m cannot avoid 
inexorably c o l l a p s i n g i n t o a c t - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , as has already been shown t o 
be the case, then each i n d i v i d u a l case must be examined on i t s merits. 
Moreover the p e r i o d of time t h a t has elapsed since the golden c o l o n i a l age 
and the vast web of other f a c t o r s t h a t must also be considerd, neans that 
attempts t o c a l c u l a t e what i s owed t o the Third World would be impossible. 
An important p o i n t i n English law i s t h a t a f t e r a c e r t a i n time has elapsed 
many wrongs can no longer be redressed. 
No d i r e c t reference t o such a problem can be found i n Rawls' "A Theory of 
J u s t i c e " . However i t i s more important t o n o t i c e t h a t "although the 
d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e i s not the same as t h a t of redress, i t does achieve 
some of the i n t e n t of the l a t t e r p r i n c i p l e , "'^-^  The a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e on a g l o b a l scale compels one t o regard as wealth and 
other n a t u r a l t a l e n t s as a common asset and t o "share i n the b e n e f i t s of 
t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n whatever i t t u r n s out t o be."®* As a r e s u l t the demands of 
the T h i r d World would be met not by looking back t o crimes c a r r i e d out i n 
the past, but by r e d i s t r i b u t i n g resources according t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e . Hence though the wealth of the West may have been 
created a t the expense of the Third World, i t along Rawlsian l i n e s now has 
an equal r i g h t t o enjoy the b e n e f i t s of i t . 
I t i s more important t o note t h a t despite independence, the consequences of 
c o l o n i a l i s m are s t i l l f e l t today and many T h i r d World countries f i n d 
themselves t i e d t o the damaging "production and export patterns t h a t 
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developed during the p e r i o d of c o l o n i a l i s m " ^ ^ Indeed the consequences of 
neo-colonialism, the c o n t i n u i n g e x p l o i t a t i o n p r a c t i s e d by the West through 
the means of the u n f e t t e r e d g l o b a l mai-ket, are s a i d by many t o be f a r more 
s i g n i f i c a n t . Rawls notes when discussing f u t u r e generations t h a t e a r l i e r 
generations might have saved or they might not have done, but there i s 
nothing one can do t o a f f e c t i t . What i s important, from a point of view of 
j u s t i c e , i s t h a t j u s t p o l i c i e s are employed i n the present and i n the 
f u t u r e , Far more important than seeking redress f o r past wrongs i s t o ensure 
t h a t comparable unj u s t acts do not p e r s i s t . The changes i n the global 
economy t h a t t h i s e n t a i l s , together w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , may w e l l undermine the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the nation s t a t e and 
consequently h i s t o r i c a l i nfluences upon them. Such changes i n one's 
o b l i g a t i o n s t o one's contemporaries pose many challenges t o accepted 
s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic t h i n k i n g . At the same time accepted t h i n k i n g 
concerning o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e t o f u t u r e people needs s i m i l a r r e v i s i o n . 
As Robin Cameron puts i t : 
" I f we take a t a l l s e r i o u s l y the n o t i o n t h a t every person matters and i s due 
respect simply as a person -a n o t i o n enshrined i n our c u l t u r e i n many ways -
then our ways of t h i n k i n g about our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p o s t e r i t y are i n as 
need of a shake-up as fundamental as t h a t brought about by the a n t i - s l a v e r y 
campaigners. 
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CONCLUSIOK' 
"The b e l i e f t h a t a person i n d i r e need has no stronger c l a i m against those 
who can help him or her than a plea f o r benevolence (which i s no r e a l claim 
at a l l ) i s unacceptable. Dire need creates o b l i g a t i o n s and r i g h t s . " ^ 
" I t i s impossible t h a t a l l persons can be equally moralised, therefore the 
laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s must be a l t e r e d so as t o prevent the immoral people 
any longer preying u n w i t t i n g l y on t h i s world. 
"There can be no greater e r r o r than t o export, or c a l c u l a t e upon, r e a l 
favours from n a t i o n t o nation."-^ 
In discussing the e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems raised by the 
s i t u a t i o n of world poverty and famine i t i s very easy t o f o r g e t t h a t one i s 
discussing the f a t e of human beings d i f f e r i n g i n no obvious way from the 
reader and w r i t e r of t h i s t h e s i s . Human beings w i t h the same emotional and 
physical requirements as us are dying throughout the world through lack of 
food, medicine and s h e l t e r . Indeed i n the time i t has taken t o read t h i s 
work (about three hours perhaps) some 11,250 people throughout the world are 
l i k e l y t o have died as a r e s u l t of s t a r v a t i o n and m a l n u t r i t i o n . * This might 
appear t o be extremely evocative language t o employ, r e s o r t i n g t o a form of 
moral blackmail t o make a p o i n t , but the p o i n t i s t h a t these are the p l a i n 
f a c t s , which unless presented i n t h i s manner can be a l l too e a s i l y put t o 
one side and ignored. 
However t h i s i s i n f a c t not the end of the matter. For not only are people 
a c t u a l l y dying through no f a u l t of t h e i r own, unable t o do anything about 
i t , but many more are l i v i n g i n a perpetual s t a t e of poverty. I t was 
concluded i n the f i r s t chapter t h a t , although famine and lack of basic 
n u t r i t i o n a l requirements i s a problem, the basic moral consideration i s that 
of the gross i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t e x i s t both w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l s o c i e t i e s , and 
between the West and the T h i r d World. When the l i v i n g conditions of many, 
though by a l l means not a l l , of those l i v i n g i n the West are compared with 
those of the m a j o r i t y i n countries l i k e B r a z i l , Nigeria and Malaysia i t 
appears t h a t there e x i s t s a strong argument f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth not 
j u s t food. Hone are these c o u n t r i e s are making headlines i n the news i n the 
same way as Somalia, Mozambique and Bosnia but nevertheless the standard of 
l i v i n g i n each f a l l s a long way behind what most i n the West would consider 
acceptable. The simple question why some of us deserve t o l i v e comfortable 
and rewarding l i v e s while others are forced t o undergo d e p r i v a t i o n and 
s u f f e r i n g i s not easy t o answer. However I t evident t h a t such f a c t s remain 
n e a t l y compartmentalised i n t o one pa r t of the mind, i n many people and 
nothing f u r t h e r i s done or thought of i t . I n the words of E.M. Forster's Mr 
Wilcox i n "Howard's End", "The Poor are poor. One i s very sorry f o r them, 
but t h a t i s the way i t i s . " 
One of the reasons f o r t h i s i s t h a t although when looking at the problem 
r a t i o n a l l y i t i s accepted t h a t a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o remedy the s i t u a t i o n 
e x i s t s , many people do not consider moral o b l i g a t i o n s t o be very important. 
Indeed a v a l i d c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s work i s t h a t i t has been assumed from the 
beginning t h a t moral considerations are important t o every i n d i v i d u a l , the 
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question addressed only t h a t of t h e i r nature. Apart from a b r i e f discussion 
about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between e t h i c s and p o l i t i c s , t h i s t h e s i s has been 
conducted w i t h i n the m i l i e u of, ra t h e r than about, e t h i c s . But, as Peter 
Singer puts i t : 
" I f the conclusions of e t h i c s r e q u i r e so much of us, they may ask, should we 
bother about e t h i c s a t a l l . " 
Such a question does demaiad a separate enquiry, though i t i s perhaps 
appropriate t h a t a few words be s a i d on the subject. E t h i c a l discusssion i s 
very much an accepted p a r t of s o c i a l l i f e . Most people w i l l have views about 
the m o r a l i t y of p a r t i c u l a r actions and motives, and w i l l not r e f r a i n from 
condoning or c r i t i c i s i n g people accordingly. There i s however no u n i v e r s a l l y 
agreed c r i t e r i o n t o apply i n each instance. Consequently c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
subjects such as abor t i o n , c a p i t a l punishment or sexual intercourse w i l l 
arouse i n d i f f e r e n t people a mul t i t u d e of e t h i c a l reactions. D i f f e r e n t 
s o c i e t i e s t o have a tendency t o f o s t e r common values but closer examination 
of any s i n g l e issue h i g h l i g h t s the d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t remain. Moreover the 
p o s i t i o n s taken by each i n d i v i d u a l o f t e n appear t o remain t i e d t o 
t h e o r e t i c a l perceptions r a t h e r than what a c t u a l l y occurs i n practice. Apart 
from s p e c i a l considerations made f o r f a m i l y and close f r i e n d s , l i f e , f o r 
most people i s conducted on a somewhat egocentric basis. 
In f a c t there i s a strong t r a d i t i o n i n Western philosophy t o ground the 
o b l i g a t i o n t o concern oneself w i t h e t h i c a l considerations i n s e l f i n t e r e s t . 
A r i s t o t l e , f o r instance, attempted t o prove t h a t happiness depended upon the 
c u l t i v a t i o n of a v i r t u o u s character which by d e f i n i t i o n included respect f o r 
the i n t e r e s t s of other people. In other words, i t i s argued by A r i s t o t l e and 
many others, t h a t the f a c t s of human nature mean t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of 
e t h i c s and s e l f i n t e r e s t coincide, However many believe t h a t such a view 
demonstates a c l a s s i c misunderstandng of the nature of et h i c s . As F.H. 
Bradley argues: 
"What answer can we give when the question why should I be moral?, i n the 
sense of What w i l l i t advantage Me?, i s put t o us? Here we s h a l l do w e l l , I 
t h i n k , t o avoid a l l praises of the pleasantness of v i r t u e . We may believe 
t h a t i t transcends a l l possible d e l i g h t s of vice, but i t would be well t o 
remember t h a t we desert a moral po i n t of view, t h a t we degrade and 
p r o s t i t u t e v i r t u e , when t o those who do not love her f o r h e r s e l f we br i n g 
ourselves t o recomnend her f o r the sake of her pleasures."*^ 
Indeed the c o n t r a s t i n g Kantian notion of duty f o r the sake of duty i s f i r m l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d t o be i n t e g r a l t o any conception of e t h i c s i n the minds of many 
philosophers. Ethics i s defined, i t would appear, by the f a c t t h a t i t guides 
one by p r i n c i p l e s other than t h a t of s e l f i n t e r e s t . A key concept t o most 
e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s i s t h a t of u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y . I f i t i s morally r i g h t t o 
act i n one p a r t i c u l a r way given a c e r t a i n circumstance then i t must be r i g h t 
f o r anybody else t o act i n the same way i n s i m i l a r circumstances. Ethics 
r e q u i r e s t h a t one goes beyond a personal standpoint and takes the view of an 
i m p a r t i a l t h i r d person. This i s achieved by Rawls through the employment of 
the v e i l of ignorance, preventing one from knowing what would be i n one's 
s e l f i n t e r e s t . 
Both Rawls and Kant argue t h a t the reason f o r a c t i n g e t h i c a l l y can be found 
i n reason. Man i s a r a t i o n a l creature, i t i s argued, and as such i s 
compelled t o act e t h i c a l l y . As such, reasons why one should act e t h i c a l l y 
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are d i f f i c u l t t o produce because they would be akin t o arguing why one 
should be r a t i o n a l . Appeals t o r a t i o n a l i t y are commonplace i n the h i s t o r y of 
e t h i c s and i n Chapter Three various versions of the "law of nature" were 
discussed. The major shortcoming w i t h such a p r i o r i laws, employed by those 
such as Aquinas, Locke and Grotlus, i s t h a t i t Involves an appeal t o 
mysterious epistemological and metaphysical r o o t s which can only r e a l l y be 
discovered by i n t u i t i o n or conscience. However Rawls (and also Kant) 
overcome such problems by arguing t h a t the r a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t o r s would agree 
t o abide by the p r i n c i p l e s chosen i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . 
I f the question why one should act e t h i c a l l y i s an e t h i c a l question I t s e l f 
i t i s a c i r c u l a r problem and cannot be answered i n anything but e t h i c a l 
terms. However t o answer the question i n non-ethical terms, appears t o 
undermine the s t a t u s of e t h i c s and reduce i t t o terms of s e l f i n t e r e s t or 
happiness. While i t may be t r u e t h a t the same overwhelming reason t o act 
e t h i c a l l y cannot be provided f o r al l , ' ^ - i t i s i n t u i t i v e t o a l l but the crazed 
psychopath t h a t one i s i n n a t e l y obliged t o act i n an e t h i c a l manner. As 
Rawls argues: 
" A person who lacks a sense of j u s t i c e , and who would never act as j u s t i c e 
r e q u i r e s except as s e l f - i n t e r e s t and expediency prompt ...lacks c e r t a i n 
n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e s and moral f e e l i n g s of a p a r t i c u l a r l y elementary kind. Put 
another way one who lacks a sense of j u s t i c e lacks c e r t a i n fundamental 
a t t i t u d e s and c a p a c i t i e s included under the notion of humanity.'"' 
I f i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o come up w i t h o v e r r i d i n g reasons t o act e t h i c a l l y other 
than t h a t i t i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the nature of man, then t h i s need not be 
regarded as a f l a w i n i t s e l f . V i r t u a l l y a l l w i l l , at some time or other, 
f e e l motivated by e t h i c a l considerations, and i t i s perhaps f a r more 
important t o consider those elements necessary t o make an i d e a l moral 
judgement. Indeed i t i s t h i s question which has preoccupied the ma j o r i t y of 
t h i s t h e s i s . I t was concluded at the end of Chapter Six tha t the 
ph i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s beyond ones grasp. Rawls r e a d i l y admits t h a t a l l 
t h e o r i e s are mistaken i n places, and t h a t one attempt t o reach the best 
approximation o v e r a l l , a s t a t e of a f f a i r s he r e f e r s t o as " r e f l e c t i v e 
e q u i l i b r i u m " i n which one e i t h e r modifies one's e x i s t i n g judgements, or 
i n t u i t i o n s , or one's p r i n c i p l e s u n t i l they coincide. Rawls st a t e s t h a t : 
"From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person's 
sense of j u s t i c e i s not one which f i t s h i s judgements p r i o r t o h i s examining 
any conception of j u s t i c e , but r a t h e r the one which matches h i s judgements 
i n r e f l e c t i v e equilibrium."'^ 
Furthermore he adds t h a t : 
"As I have said, a moral theory characterises a point of view from which 
p o l i c i e s are t o be assessed; and i t may o f t e n be c l e a r t h a t a suggested 
answer i s mistaken even i f an a l t e r n a t i v e d o c t r i n e i s not ready t o hand."'^ 
Tom Regan suggests t h a t a t l e a s t s i x d i f f e r e n t requirements are necessary i f 
one i s t o come close t o an i d e a l moral judgement. The most important of 
these i s t h a t i t must be based on "the c o r r e c t or the most reasonable moral 
p r i n c i p l e Cs).""-' I t i s t h i s requirement above a l l which has, i t i s hoped, 
been co n v i n c i n g l y addressed, by t h i s t h e s i s . During t h i s process i t has been 
passible t o discount a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s which have been seen t o flawed and 
incompatible w i t h basic moral judgements. The remaining requirements 
s p e c i f i e d by Regan are conceptual c l a r i t y , information, r a t i o n a l i t y . 
i m p a r t i a l i t y , and coolness. Each have also, i t i s been hoped, been s a t i s f i e d 
during the course of the t h e s i s . 
The f i r s t chapter attempted t o provide the conceptual c l a r i t y and 
in f o r m a t i o n necessary t o understand the problem of poverty and famine, 
making c l e a r t h a t i t goes f a r beyond the question of food aid. Furthermore, 
i t was c l e a r l y seen t h a t one can not get very f a r i n the debate about world 
poverty and hunger unless one knows whether there are any so l u t i o n s 
a v a i l a b l e , and make i t c l e a r t h a t a i d need not be counterproductive. 
R a t i o n a l i t y involves the observation of the r u l e s of l o g i c , ensuring t h a t 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y conclusions are drawn. For example i f some statements are true 
then those statements which f o l l o w from the f i r s t must also be true whereas 
those which do not need not be t r u e . However while c a r e f u l regard has 
obviously been taken t o ensure t h a t a l l conclusions drawn are compatible, 
care has been c a r e f u l l y taken not t o attempt t o draw too sweeping 
conclusions from simple u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l statements. A common f a i l i n g among 
many moral philosophers i s the tendency t o pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o 
underlying p r i n c i p l e s but instead t o reach intended conclusions through the 
use of c a r e f u l l y s c r i p t e d analogies. While the use of analogy does have i t s 
place, i t must be noted t h a t an attempt t o discover a ne u t r a l construction 
which i s not biased i n one d i r e c t i o n or another i s i n i t s e l f a philosophical 
d i f f i c u l t y . ' ' 
I m p a r t i a l i t y i s described by Regan 'as not " f a v o r i n g someone or something 
above others."'^ As such i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n t h i s t h e s i s 
because, as argued i n Chapter Two, moral concern f o r f e l l o w human beings 
cannot be r e s t r i c t e d merely because they are e i t h e r unknown t o one or l i v e 
i n another country. 
F i n a l l y coolness i s sai d t o be the need t o make e t h i c a l decisions i n an 
emotionally calm s t a t e of mind. While at times i t i s necessary t o make 
emotionally charged statements t o h i g h l i g h t the seriousness of the problem 
the m a j o r i t y of e t h i c a l c o n s ideration has been c a r r i e d out i n a very calm 
and sedate fashion, ensuring t h a t s i g h t has not be l o s t of both i m p a r t i a l i t y 
and r a t i o n a l i t y . 
At the end of the f i r s t chapter i t was concluded t h a t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
wealth might well be a demand of j u s t i c e incumbent upon the r i c h e r countries 
of the world. Indeed the idiom of j u s t i c e has been concentrated upon ever 
since. This should come as no s u r p r i s e t o those who recognise questions of 
j u s t i c e t o l i e at the heart of moral, p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l philosophy. There 
i s of course much debate as t o the nature of j u s t i c e . For instance i t i s 
equated by many w i t h desert and r i g h t and i s therefore seen by some t o be a 
backward-looking conception. However those such as Rawls who are p r i m a r i l y 
concerned w i t h d i s t r i b u t i v e conception of s o c i a l j u s t i c e view i t as a more 
forward-looking conception. As explained i n the previous chapter, Rawls' 
j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s has many of the same consequences of the p r i n c i p l e of 
redress. There i s also much debate as t o whether j u s t i c e i s a s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s or an a t t r i b u t e of an act. A major achievement of Rawls i s t o 
combine d i f f e r e n t concepts of j u s t i c e i n one s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n . 
The Importance of a cogent d e s c r i p t i o n of s o c i a l j u s t i c e i n the debate about 
world poverty and famine i s not d i f f i c u l t t o understand. The d i s t i n c t i o n 
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between o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e and o b l i g a t i o n s of beneficence i s used by 
many philosophers. I f the o b l i g a t i o n t o a i d the poor i s grounded upon 
beneficence alone, then i t i s n e i t h e r claimable or enforceable from the 
p o i n t of view of the v i c t i m . Aid i s then merely a matter of c h a r i t y and 
t h e r e f o r e not a matter f o r p u b l i c a c t i o n . On the other hand i f the 
o b l i g a t i o n t o a i d the poor i s a matter of J u s t i c e then i t i s both claimable 
and enforceable and can be demanded by the v i c t i m . As a r e s u l t i t can be 
considered a matter f o r p u b l i c a c t i o n . O'lTeill describes the d i s t i n c t i o n : 
" J u s t i c e i s seen as c o n s i s t i n g of assignable, claimable, and enforceable 
r i g h t s , which only the claimant can waive. Beneficence i s seen as 
unassignable, unclaimable and unenforceable. This t h e o r e t i c a l wedge i s 
r e f l e c t e d i n many contemporary i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s and ways of 
thought. " ''^  
The magnitude and seriousness of the problem of world poverty and famine 
means t h a t the importance of j u s t i c e cannot be underestimated. I t has been 
s a f e l y concluded t h a t the scale of poverty i n the world means t h a t the 
a c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s cannot expect t o make much impression on the problem. 
The resources of each i n d i v i d u a l are also f i n i t e so i n order t o avoid what 
i s c a l l e d the 'overload of o b l i g a t i o n s ' problem, personal o b l i g a t i o n s of 
beneficence must unavoidably be s e l e c t i v e , r e s u l t i n g i n the f a c t t h a t no 
peasant has the r i g h t t o c l a i m what might r i g h t f u l l y be h i s or hers from 
any p a r t i c u l a r person. Moreover the causes of poverty are so 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d t h a t o n ly the governments of powerful nation-states are 
equipped t o deal w i t h i t . However as George Washington's remark makes clear 
i t i s u n l i k e l y i n normal circumstances f o r a government t o behave 
a l t r u i s t i c a l l y or b e n e f i c e n t l y . For example, one of h i s successors as 
President of the United States, Lyndon Johnson said: 
"There are 200 m i l l i o n of us and 3 b i l l i o n of them and they want what we've 
got, but we're not going t o give i t t o them. "'* 
I f the p r i o r claims of Rawlsian j u s t i c e and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n are recognised, 
s e l e c t i v e beneficence need not be e t h i c a l l y offensive. J u stice must be 
viewed as the most fundamental o b l i g a t i o n because, i n Rawlsian terms, i t 
concerns the basic s t r u c t u r e and p r a c t i c e s of society. As such the basic 
c r i t e r i o n of need can remain c e n t r a l t o e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , and 
need not f a l l by the wayside as i t does when beneficence f a i l s t o address 
the p l i g h t of even the most desperately poor. The need f o r j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and p r a c t i c e s i s important f o r a t l e a s t two good reasons. F i r s t , i t has been 
shown through the course of t h i s t h e s i s t h a t i t i s the basic global 
sti-ucture t h a t r e i n f o r c e s and perpetuates poverty. Consequently those 
supporting c h a r i t i e s and humanitarian p r o j e c t s throughout the world may be 
meeting t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s of beneficence, but are f a i l i n g t o meet t h e i r 
o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e i f they support those i n s t i t u t i o n s which are causing 
much of the problem. I t also means t h a t t h e i r beneficent actions w i l l have 
no long term e f f e c t . Second, i n a world where i t cannot be r e l i e d upon that 
the moral o b l i g a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be acted upon, i t i s Important 
t h a t the basic needs and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e a ctions are c a r r i e d out r o u t i n e l y i n 
the name of the s t a t e and can be claimed by those i n need. As Charles Beitz, 
t e n t a t i v e l y suggested: 
" O b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e , u n l i k e those of humanitarian a i d , might also 
r e q u i r e e f f o r t s at large scale i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. "^^ 
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Therefore the primary o b l i g a t i o n of each i n d i v i d u a l i s t o c o n t r i b u t e towards 
the r e a l i s a t i o n of a j u s t society. I t was concluded i n Chapter Six t h a t such 
a s o c i e t y would recognise Rawls' Difference P r i n c i p l e and as a r e s u l t 
m a t e r i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s would be arranged so as t o o f f e r the greatest benefit 
t o the w o r s t - o f f group. As a r e s u l t , given one's r e l a t i v e l y o p t i m i s t i c 
b e l i e f s about the resources a v a i l a b l e t o man, there i s no need f o r poverty 
and hunger t o e x i s t . The form of government chosen would incorporate 
t r a n s f e r and d i s t r i b u t i o n branches t o ensure adherence t o a " s o c i a l 
minimum" . Rawls argued t h a t the best form of government at any given time i s 
dependant upon circumstance and h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n . The important point, 
from an e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l p o i n t of view, i s t h a t any morally j u s t i f i a b l e 
form of government w i l l guarantee basic standards of l i b e r t y and material 
wealth f o r a l l . This c o n t r a s t s w i t h a s o c i e t y formed on u t i l i t a r i a n 
p r i n c i p l e s , which i t was shown i n Chapter Four, cannot be guaranteed t o 
preclude t r a d e - o f f s i n the basic r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s i n the name of 
u t i l i t y . I t also c o n t r a s t s w i t h a s o c i e t y based on Kantian j u s t i c e . I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o see, both what s o r t of s o c i a l order would e x i s t as a r e s u l t of 
such p r i n c i p l e s and how f a r one's o b l i g a t i o n s t o others would s t r e t c h . I t i s 
p l a u s i b l e t o argue t h a t the Categorical Imperative i s too abstract t o guide 
a c t i o n w i t h s u f f i c i e n t accuracy and d i r e c t i o n , and t h a t a society of 
complying Kantians would have few p o s i t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s towards each other. 
I t i s worth n o t i n g a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t although o b l i g a t i o n s of j u s t i c e are 
paramount i n a Rawlsian s o c i e t y t h i s does not mean t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s of 
beneficence no longer e x i s t . However since they w i l l not have t o address the 
basic needs of a m u l t i t u d e of people i t does not matter t h a t they are 
s e l e c t i v e and f i n i t e . Rawls argues t h a t : 
"We can now define a good act ( i n the sense of a beneficent act) as one 
which we are at l i b e r t y t o do or not t o do, t h a t i s no requirements of 
n a t u r a l duty or o b l i g a t i o n Ci,e, J u s t i c e ] constain us e i t h e r t o do i t or 
not t o do i t , and which advances and i s intended t o advance another's good 
(hi s r a t i o n a l plan),"'"^ 
Rawls defines a good person as one who has i n above average measure those 
q u a l i t i e s which those i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n would l i k e t o see i n one 
another, Qualites such as beneficence obviously rank h i g h l y i n a l i s t of 
p r o p e r t i e s because even i n a j u s t s o c i e t y i t must be assumed t h a t people 
occ a s i o n a l l y f a l l through the s a f e t y net and need support, as well as 
because these are the sentiments t h a t support adherence t o the p r i n c i p l e s of 
j u s t i c e , A j u s t s o c i e t y does not t h e r e f o r e make the realm of m o r a l i t y 
superfluous t o man's needs. As Rawls puts i t : 
"...a person of moral worth, i s someone who has t o a higher degree than the 
average the broadly based features of moral character t h a t i t i s r a t i o n a l 
f o r the persons i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t o want i n one another."''^ 
The o v e r a l l conclusion s t r e s s i n g the importance of j u s t i c e i s shared by 
W i l l i a m Frankena who s t a t e s t h a t : 
" I t does seem t o me t h a t what i s most imperative i s f o r a l l of us t o do what 
we can t o b r i n g i n t o existence a n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l set of 
i n s t i t u t i o n s such t h a t , i f a l l agents act on i t s rules...then everyone's 
basic needs w i l l be supplied i n s o f a r as nature permits.""^ 
The need f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l reform i s also stressed by the 
e g a l i t a r i a n arguments of Richard Watson: 
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"Equal sharing can be accomplished only through t o t a l economic and p o l i t i c a l 
r e v o l u t i o n . Obviously t h i s i s what i s needed."''^ 
However such r a d i c a l a c t i o n i s r e j e c t e d by many self-named r e a l i s t s or 
pragmatists who argue t h a t the s o r t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e c a l l e d f o r i n 
Chapter Six i s not possible i n the r e a l world, Frankena implies t h a t a world 
s t a t e i s necessary t o achieve i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e and Kant himself argued 
t h a t a world government i s the l o g i c a l c o r o l l a r y of a universal moral law. 
The discussion of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Difference P r i n c i p l e also l e d very much 
i n the same d i r e c t i o n . However the ' r e a l i s t s ' argue t h a t "man seems locked 
as f i r m l y as ever i n h i s n a t i o n a l c e l l " ^ ' ^ and t h a t there e x i s t s i n no r e a l 
sense an i n t e i - n a t i o n a l community not t o mention the seeds of an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l government. Consequently i t i s argued t h a t a l l f e a s i b l e moral 
o b l i g a t i o n s must be framed t o f i t w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s . 
For example Garrett Hardin argues t h a t the p o l i t i c a l atomisation of 
contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y i s a f a c t of l i f e . "Spaceship Earth", he 
argues, " c e r t a i n l y has no captain; the [IN i s merely a to o t h l e s s t i g e r , with 
l i t t l e power t o enforce any p o l i c y on i t s b i c k e r i n g members."^' Consequently 
Hardin argues t h a t g l o b a l government i s an irrelevance, dismissing any 
a s p i r a t i o n s of a glob a l s o c i e t y based on sharing and j u s t i c e ; 
"Without a t r u e world government t o c o n t r o l reproduction and the use of 
a v a i l a b l e resources, the sharing e t h i c of the spaceship i s impossible. "^^^^ 
However while g l o b a l government i s not a present r e a l i t y , t h i s does not mean 
t h a t i t i s neces s a r i l y an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Moreover i t does not also mean tha t 
an e t h i c a l theory t h a t d i r e c t s one t o work towards such a r e a l i t y i s 
misguided. Hardin's argument t h a t one i s not obliged t o share the resources 
of the world w i t h others because there i s no i n s t i t u t i o n i n existence t o 
administer the process i s deeply flawed. He presents no argument as t o why 
one i s not obliged t o work towards t h i s goal at a l l . 
The argument f o r gl o b a l government i s not new. As already mentioned Kant 
argued t h a t i t was the l o g i c a l c o r o l l a r y of a univers a l moral law. I t was 
explained i n the Chapter devoted t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between e t h i c s and 
p o l i t i c s t h a t u n i v e r a l moral 'oughts' must apply to one's r e l a t i o n s h i p s with 
a l l other humans and not j u s t one's own countrymen. However since i n d i v i d u a l 
n a t i o n a l governments must almost by d e f i n i t i o n view t h e i r own people 
d i f f e r e n t l y , i t does lend weight t o the argument t h a t the two concepts of 
un i v e r s a l moral laws and the nat i o n s t a t e are incompatible, George Orwell 
c r i t i c i s e s "the h a b i t of i d e n t i f y i n g oneself w i t h a s i n g l e nation or other 
u n i t , p l a c i n g i t beyond good and e v i l an recognizing no other duty than t h a t 
of advancing i t s interests,"^®, which he saw as a d e f i n i n g feature of 
nationalism, i t s e l f p a r t l y a product of the nations t a t e . 
Looking back f u r t h e r , the sixteenth-century C h r i s t i a n Humanist, Erasmus of 
Rotterdam, sought an i d e a l of the u n i t y of C h r i s t i a n peoples. Erasmus 
believed t h a t man was f i r s t and foremost a c h r i s t i a n and only then a member 
of one's nat i o n s t a t e , an Englishman or Burgundian f o r instance. He 
th e r e f o r e shared a v i s i o n w i t h other humanists of a cosmopolitan Europe with 
Ciceronian L a t i n as a common language. National i d e n t i t y f o r Erasmus was of 
su b s i d i a r y importance. I n the contemporary world h i s C h r i s t o c e n t r i c view of 
a world which d i d not extend beyond Europe i s outdated. Nevertheless i t i s 
p l a u s i b l e t o suggest t h a t a view of the world where man i s f i r s t and 
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foremost a human being, and where the importance of the nationstate i s 
diminished, i s very much i n the Brasmian t r a d i t i o n . 
The n a t i o n s t a t e i s however considered by many others t o be of considerable 
importance. The existence of independent nations i s argued t o be a natural 
phenomenon, based on the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and bonds of 
r e l i g i o n , language and c u l t u r e . The break up of the o l d Soviet Empire i s 
sa i d t o p o i n t towards the a r t i f i c i a l i t y of other forms of government, and 
c o n f l i c t s throughout the world, from the Middle-East t o the former Yugoslav 
r e p u b l i c s , are based on a s t r u g g l e f o r the r i g h t of self-governance. 
Although, as Martin Hughes makes c l e a r i n h i s essay on Imperialism^^, s e l f -
determination lacks any explanatory c e n t r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l statement or locus 
c l a s s i c u s , i t i s nevertheless widely respected i n contemporary thought. 
Associated w i t h t h i s i s the s u b j e c t i v i s t view of many academics t h a t the 
most de s i r a b l e way of organising human r e l a t i o n s i n society as well as 
making a l l moral decisions "are l i k e acts of choosing between various brands 
of ice-cream" and best l e f t i n s o f a r as i s p r a c t i c a l t o i n d i v i d u a l s or small 
groups w i t h common i n t e r e s t s . 
The arguments i n favour of the n a t i o n as the most basic and most natu r a l 
p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n are well-rehearsed and need not be i n v e s t i g a t e d any 
f u r t h e r . The l o y a l t i e s engendered through a common h i s t o r y and common 
c u l t u r a l and e t h n i c t i e s are said t o provide s u f f i c i e n t motivation t o 
respect p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and laws, which i s stronger than a mere 
common agreement t o be governed. However a few p e r t i n e n t p o i n t s can be made. 
F i r s t , despite the f a c t t h a t n a t i o n a l l o y a l t i e s are said t o be grounded i n 
human nature, many nations which today e x i s t d i d not evolve n a t u r a l l y and i n 
t h a t sense are a r t i f i c i a l constuctions themselves. Many A f r i c a n States, such 
as Ghana and Nigeria, have no deep h i s t o r i c a l r o o t s and are not composed of 
homogenous groups of people. Indeed any examination of a map of A f r i c a shows 
i t was drawn up by c o l o n i a l European powers on a blackboard. In t h i s sense 
i n many cases nations represent the unnnatural d i v i s i o n of d i f f e r e n t 
peoples. 
Second, f a r from being the most e f f i c i e n t form of association, n a t i o n a l i s t i c 
c onsiderations o f t e n lend i t s e l f t o an I n d i f f e r e n c e t o r e a l i t y and objective 
t r u t h . The member of one n a t i o n desires t o believe t h a t h i s country i s doing 
w e l l and w i l l hide from f a c t s which suggest otherwise and suggest urgent 
changes are necessary. Changes i n i n d u s t r i a l p r a c t i c e s or education 
techniques w i l l be r e s i s t e d t o o t h and n a i l i f believed t o be " f o r e i g n " . 
Furthermore the costs of n a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s together with the costs of 
wars which I n e v i t a b l y breakout leads t o an i n e f f i c i e n t use of resources. 
Reason i t appears o f t e n becomes subservient t o nationalism. 
Third, the most a r t i f i c i a l nations, such as the United States of America 
w i l l o f t e n i n s p i r e the strongest f e e l i n g s of n a t i o n a l i s m and patiotism. 
Though English i s the common language, t o many Americans i t i s not t h e i r 
f i r s t , and i n a l l other respects the people of America are heterogenous. 
Indeed i n many ways America represents people from throughout the whole 
world grouped together i n one country a l l swearing allegiance t o the same 
f l a g , and could be considered a prototype f o r a form of g l o b a l goverment. 
The people of Rhode Is l a n d i t could be argued have no more i n common with 
the people of New Mexico than the people of India w i t h the people of B r a z i l . 
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Indeed what I propose u n i t e s them i s the high l i v i n g standards enjoyed and 
hence a common i n t e r e s t . The reason why s e l f determination i s deemed so 
important i s t h a t the a l t e r n a t i v e , a form of imperialism, i s designed t o 
f o s t e r the ends p r i m a r i l y of those other than those being ruled. However 
globa l governmemt i s nothing other than a n a t i o n a l government w r i t large 
designed i n theory t o promote the i n t e r e s t s of a l l i t s c i t i z e n s . 
I r r e s p e c t i v e of the pros and cons of d i f f e r e n t forms of government there 
appears no a p r i o r i reason why n a t i o n a l i t y should come before the common 
bond of humanity, and i t i s wrong t o believe t h a t i t i s unnatural and 
t h e r e f o r e impossible t o achieve. 
This d i g r e s s i o n i n t o the f e a s i b i l i t y of global government moves one away 
from the major p o i n t . J u s t i c e r e q u i r e s t h a t the wealth of the world i s 
r e d i s t r i b u t e d on a more equ i t a b l e basis and d i c t a t e s t h a t each does what i s 
possible w i t h i n one's powers t o r e a l i s e t h i s goal. The i n e q u a l i t i e s of 
s o c i a l and economic goods must be arranged t o be t o the greatest b e n e f i t of 
the l e a s t advantaged, Perhaps t h i s can be done through a strengthening of 
the powers of the U.N. but the reluctance of s t a t e s t o pay t h e i r present 
dues t o t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n suggest i t i s u n l i k e l y . Although a l l t h a t has been 
argued i s compatible w i t h the existence of the n a t i o n - s t a t e , p r o v i d i n g that 
they l e a r n t o operate on a j u s t basis, i t i s more than l i k e l y t h a t global 
government i s needed. U n t i l the moral o b l i g a t i o n s incumbant upon man are 
transformed i n t o l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s which can be p h y s i c a l l y enforced 
s e l f i s h n e s s , i n d i f f e r e n c e and ignorance w i l l mean t h a t they are not 
f u l f i l l e d . Global government may appear t o be a humanistic pipe-dream but 
j u s t i c e d i c t a t e s t h a t i t i s s t r i v e d f o r . A step towards t h i s goal i s 
convincing others t h a t compliance w i t h the system as i t stands means 
c o n t r i b u t i n g towards the poverty which brings misery and premature death t o 
the m a j o r i t y of our f e l l o w human beings and i s a moral outrage. In the 
meantime as we continue t o be content w i t h t r y i n g t o remedy i n j u s t i c e by 
p l a c i n g small coins i n the c o l l e c t i o n box we merely manage, borrowing the 
words of the f a r from contemporary Thomas More, t o ensure t h a t "...the vast 
m a j o r i t y of the human race,.. w i l l I n e v i t a b l y go on labouring under a burden 
of poverty, hardship and worry. . . I f you t r y t o t r e a t the outbreak i n one 
part of the body p o l i t i c , you merely exacerbate the symtoms elsewhere."^^ 
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